Comments for defenceconsultations.org.uk http://defenceconsultations.org.uk Defence Consultation Papers Fri, 01 Apr 2011 00:55:43 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1 Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by John Robertson http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-434 John Robertson Fri, 01 Apr 2011 00:55:43 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-434 General Question - Overview: Q1. Does our proposed approach, based on the three key principles, strike the right balance between the various factors influencing how we will go about fulfilling our defence and security requirements? (NB: in Parts Two and Three of this document we are asking more focused questions about individual policy areas and issues.) No. The second key principle is explained in para. 16 as “open competition in a free market”, which I find unreal. The reality is that government has used interest and exchange rates as a way of reducing inflation between 1979 and 2009 and perhaps in future. My evidence for this is the monetary policy committee's online diagram “The Transmission Method of Monetary Policy”, bottom set of arrows. Another reality is that the Chinese government has a mirror-image policy that somehow devalues the price of its currency. My evidence is a US site, Faircurrency.org. A third reality is that it is cheaper to make products in countries with fewer human, democratic and welfare rights than in Europe, given slow container delivery. As a result I think that we have lost a common sense understanding of the benefits of buying locally-made goods, or even of labelling them to say where they are made or at what factory. General question - Operational advantage (it wins) Freedom of Action (it's available) Q2. What factors should the UK take into account when assessing the national security implications of acquisition in the defence and security sectors? Manufacture close to the point where troops train and depart for duty (or closeness to duty). Manufacture that pays taxes towards the ministry that hires the troops (or within the EU). Manufacture that employs ex service people such as Remploy or better similar agencies. Democratic rights in the country where the goods are made, measured by Democracy Index. Legal and Welfare rights, for which I do not know of a comparative index, in the country where the goods are made. Specific questions: Q3. Are there particular technological or industrial capabilities, including skills, that you believe are crucial to national security? If so, please give details. Any cluster of capabilities which pays taxes and employs people in the country that pays for the troops, including capabilities like van-making or shoe-making that aren't top of the list for competitive advantage if they're based in the UK, but do have a long term future with a bit of luck if the government stops punishing them with fiddled exchange rates. Industry is particularly important to keep because it isn't fashionable to set-up factories, collect the tools and the skills; office based work is easier to re-start. Q4. Are any of these currently at risk of being lost? If so, please give details. Yes. http://www.ldv.com/ - vans http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/northampton/hi/people_and_places/newsid_9125000/9125422.stm – boots. You are welcome to direct any requests for pilot boots to me. They are a niche market because the better they fit, the tighter the corners a fighter pilot can turn without their feet hurting too much. Q5. Are there any technological or industrial capabilities which the UK has sought to protect where you believe this is unnecessary? If so, please give details Accidental protection of supplies that may not be made in the UK, but need more transparency and more people asking questions to reveal, like this light bulb. http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/cost_of_screws_and_light_bulbs I notice that the MOD has refused to answer questions about the latest £102 cost of buying thigh boots with expensive leathers and seams in about 50 sizes per batch compared to their intended next supplier. My guess is that someone said in a meeting “yes, minister: £102 is a lot for a pair of boots” without having a clue how much it can be reduced with sane spefication that still stops fighter pilot's feet swelling on sharp corners at high G-forces. You can find the latest responses on the same site – http:www.whatdotheyknow.com if you search for “Haynes and Cann” General question - Working with other countries: Q6. How can the UK get the best from working with other nations, whilst avoiding the pitfalls? A general answer to a general question. I think this is a cross-cutting question for the European Union more than for the MOD: I hope you have the patience to read my answer that comes back to the MOD in the end. I think the answer is tariffs against despots, and tariffs against countries without a system of free hospitals, pensions, votes and the rest. Take the example of Haiti. For years the country was able to export cheap T shirts because of cheap labour. I am wearing one now. People in the UK benefit from cheap T shirts but loose the balanced market in which they have a chance to make many T-shirts, so in a way people In rich countries pay in unemployment as well as benefit. from cheap T shirts. Likewise the people of Haiti might be more excited by universal education, pensions, useful courts and votes than a chance to work in hosiery. I think some of them stated that in a recent TV documentary. Then people in wealthy countries have to pay again in ways like charity, state aid or a military force when the system collapses altogether. Arab demonstrators in places like Benghazi have said this to reporters dozens to times: they want rights first, then a chance to think about jobs. You will have seen them saying so on TV. Specific questions: Q7. What are the conditions for successful bilateral/multinational procurement? How can Government best assess these before committing to a project? About my trade of shoes. The current system is that most footwear is ordered from a prime contractor in the EU that meets quality standards. This Spanish firm then may pass-on the business to anyone anywhere in the world so far as I have discovered so far. There is a risk of contractors using their ability to work the system and adhere to all the standards in order to pass business on to someone who meets fewer standards, which would be a bit of a game. I don't know if it happens but Nike M&S and the others do it so it would be odd if the MOD did not, although no better. I think the best strategy is to make sure that local contractors know about an opportunity before tendering further away. The Manufacturing Advisory Service, sponsored by government, advises manufacturers in something they call “lean manufacturing” in which no effort is wasted on anything but getting goods out of the door. In contradiction, government buyers expect suppliers to have time to log-in to a certain web site, meet certain quality standards, and think they are doing well to have been so open. So I think the best thing is for government buyers to research the fullest possible list of UK suppliers and make sure each of them knows that a tender is coming-up. In footwear it would be possible to ask Companies House for all companies involved in the manufacture of footwear, which is one of their categories, and send a letter to each saying “this is probably nothing to do with what you do but we're looking for boots”. Q8. How can the UK engagement with NATO allies and European partners in bilateral procurement arrangements support and benefit interoperability between all member states and other allies and partners? ? Q9. What models are available which allow us to use our defence and security budget more effectively by working together with other countries to develop the capabilities we need? In what circumstances could the models be used most effectively? ? Q10. What more should the Government do to ensure that the process of awarding work under international collaborative programmes is open and fair? Open and fair procurement should be more transparent than MOD staff find they can provide now. I don't know why, but what I see advertised about MOD procurement is different to what I think reasonable or see in detail. Firstly the MOD has a tradition of asking for money to see its tenders. I was quoted I think £250 by BIP solutions quite recently. Secondly the MOD has a tradition of asking for money for explanation of its tenders. Imagine if the MOD advertised for staff on a site that cost a couple of hundred pounds to read, and then offered training days once in a blue moon for another couple of hundred pounds so that job applicants could understand the jargon. That's the equivalent of what they do for tenders. General question - Science and Technology: Q11. What should be the balance of priorities for research investment in science and technology for defence and security purposes? I read that the UK spends very little on R&D outside of the defence industry, but still comes-up with nifty ideas. I guess that in the past there were more situations in which someone like Trevor Bayliss could come up with an idea without special funding and a laboratory; I guess this somehow suits the culture in north Europe. I wish I could suggest a way to help contractors do each bit of science without having to pay for all the others or special facilities, but unfortunately I don't have a way except to concentrate on small and medium sized enterprises which is a different reply. Specific questions: Q12. Given the changing defence and security threats, the breadth of science and technology providers, the pace of innovation and defence ’s ability to influence this, what should be the balance of priorities for the science and technology programme over the next five years and beyond, including support to setting policy, developing force structures, tactics, training and doctrine, and for planning, delivering and generating capability needs, while maintaining value for money? I guess that the cheapest innovation comes from people who are used to tinkering with the bicycle; it only sounds complicated when unfamiliar. It's a problem to encourage an industry that has a multitude of tinkerers in it. One solution is for a contractor to set-up or be encouraged to set-up as a staff owned company. My hunch is that such companies are more likely to let their staff share secrets and branch-out to set-up more companies, so that there is a cluster of providers. Another solution could be something to do with the use of slack time amongst service people. If they were making a universal machine from internet instructions or studying engineering alongside other subjects, there might be more chance of another Barnes Wallace emerging in a generation's time. Q13. How should we develop our strategy for international research collaboration to support interoperability, operations, wider diplomacy and achieve better science and technology outputs? There is one part of the answer in mechanical engineering which is to improve the little CNC software that's been made freely available by the US military. I think it's called something like BRIC and it's very hard to use with no specialist add-ons for making any particular kind of object, but free CNC software boosts the world economy and particularly companies that need to collaborate, because it's easier if everybody can get a copy of the same software. Q14. What should be the balance between research focused on long-term potential threats and conflicts and that supporting current operations and procurement of equipment & services in delivering the SDSR? ? Q15. How can we rigorously and robustly identify those areas of science and technology that need to be sustained in order for us to have a capability a) in Government and b) within the UK? ? Q16. How should we engage with the wider supplier base and exploit innovation to meet our research priorities? As above re Question 12, an industry that's full of home-based manufacturers, staff-owned partnerships and tinkerers is more likely to find solutions than a top-down grant-giving system working with a handful of partners. Q17. How should Government access the widest possible supplier base (industry, universities, and research organisations), ensuring there are no gaps or overlaps, and what mechanisms should be used (existing or new fora, internet, etc.) to ensure both traditional and non-traditional suppliers understand our strategic direction, priorities, and detailed requirements for science and technology, yet maximise pull-through to exploitation? As below for question 37, I think that public buyers should make a list of potential suppliers and send a note to each one. Q18. What are the opportunities for expanding the role of the Centre for Defence Enterprise or using this model more widely across defence, security, and the cyberspace domain? Q19. What mechanisms are needed to facilitate better use of science and technology to improve the export potential of equipment, either within defence or civil spin-offs, and reduce the cost of capability produced in the UK? Civil spin-offs: simply to ask contractors whether they can find any civil market for the product, and sometimes favour those who do. I'm thinking of basic things like a sleeping bag with a tog measurement tested in field trials. Such a trial could possibly help the contractor market the sleeping bag, increase production and make it likely that there would be extra stocks around if the MOD needed them in an emergency. I've made a related point about civil spin-offs under energy efficiency, question 61. Q20. How can we realise the potential benefits from innovation through open systems and modular acquisition, while still achieving value for money? Q21. How do we maintain a capability edge in the innovative use of commercial off-the shelf (COTS) components through the life of a military or security capability? The phrase “off the shelf” make immediate sense but can mean too many things. In wholesale it can mean a pick-and-pack warehouse in the UK that can supply small orders to different branches of a chain store, probably paying for this by buying a very cheap standard product from China. In military boot procurement “off the shelf” seems to mean a design that the MOD has not had to dream-up. It is still made in quantities of a few hundred per batch per style, with the rarer sizes being made in ones or twos, and it is still cheaper if ordered before production, but it is called “off the shelf”. So this is a great expressive phrase but can mean too many things to help suppliers. From experience, Haynes and Cann footwear manufacturers got a letter half way through a recent contract that orders would cease while the air force procurement people made themselves redundant and simplified the specification to an “off the shelf” design. Pilots still want close-fitting boots. I know of no shelf that stores pilot boots in 50 length and width combinations. So I guess that a phrase that sounded good in a meeting when people were asked to make very severe cuts to their own jobs and to others lead to an irrational decision about who will make what specification of pilot boot. A more rational decision would still be to say “why do they cost £102? Can we have them in cheaper materials and maybe use the old ones for longer so we buy less each year?” Q22. How do we generate a technology edge for example, by new systems concepts, which focus more on particular critical areas within the overall system of capability? Q23. In buying capability which contains complex science and technology, how should we ensure our choices are based on intelligent and sound evidence-based decisions? Q24. What are the main elements of being an intelligent customer for capability, equipment and services which depend on science and technology, to enable better value for money and reducing the overall cost of our capability? Q25. How do we maintain a capability edge in the innovative use of commercial off-theshelf (COTS) components through the life of a military or security capability? General questions - Broader Policy: Q26. How can the Government and industry best support responsible defence and security exports by UK-based companies? As below – tariffs against despots. Result: less despots, less calls on the MOD, and more of a local manufacturing industry to pay taxes towards the MOD and supply products to it. Q27. What are the current obstacles to doing so and how could these be overcome? Many of the customers score much worse on the democracy index than the UK. I hope that as in Egypt and Tunisia, a new generation will be able to change this. If so, their governments might not want to buy products from the countries which propped-up the previous governments. There will not be much good will. So I think it makes commercial sense to back the goodies. As in question 6, I believe that there's more money in taxing imports from the baddies than there is in preventing exports to them; either gets goodwill from the next generation. And frankly, there isn't much made in the UK any more that a dictator really needs and can't get on the black market. Possibly Marmite. Specific questions: Q28. How can the Government diversify the destinations for UK defence and security exports and at the same time ensure it has a pan-Government approach to prioritising Government support to export campaigns? As above: tax imports from the baddies. Then they won't ask to buy arms because they will be cross, but we or the EU get the extra tariff money on whatever they do export like human-body-based compost or cheap-labour-based T-shirts or veg grown in a Zimbabwe farm that's just been squatted by a judge or whatever it is. Q29. Is a fresh approach needed for a world where export prospects will increasingly involve industrial partnership and technology transfer? As above: tariffs against despots. Q30. How can Government and industry best deliver international defence training in support of exports? Q31. To what extent can modularity and open systems – needed in future Government requirements to enable greater agility and adaptability – provide a framework for industry to generate export solutions tuned to global markets? I don't know but I am shocked that my local council and central ministries still use paid-for software while services like dementia day-centres are being reduced. I guess that every government department should be using open source before the current licences run-out. Q32. Can the Government streamline its security and export control processes consistent with this objective? I don't know but I think import control is more relevant than export control to a declining but still-rich country. Export control was more important 100 years ago for Gatling Guns. Nowadays there are few products that despots can get from the UK that they cannot get from China. Possibly Marmite. That's all I can think of. And parts for any surviving Morris Marinas that a despot might be riding around in. Q33. Are there any other aspects of Government–to–Government support which will prove particularly decisive in winning future business in a competitive environment? Being on the side of the goodies. Q34. To what extent should the Government provide export credit guarantee finance for defence and security exports? To the extent to which it pays-back, give or take the cost of administration. I don't think we should be paying Mugabe to default on debts (or whoever is currently buying). Q35. How can industry incentivise Government consideration of export potential in its own requirements by providing measurable cost benefits to Government programmes? Q36. Do any international regimes inhibit responsible exports and prevent UK exporting abroad Yes. The European Regional Development Grant system allows people who run the London Development Agency to inflict their own prejudices on the London economy via London Fashion Week. This advertises Chinese-made shoes like Terra Plana at the expense of people who make clothing in the UK. So I would like to see constraints on the European Regional Development Grant system so that it has to be used responsibly – otherwise the MOD won't have many local producers left to make clothes. Getting back to the question, a London Development Agency grant to London Fashion Week and so to Terra Plana who make shoes in China will possibly earn the UK some foreign exchange from invisible exports. This gets jobs for a handful of people. It also raises the value of the pound and makes it harder for all the other people in the UK to earn a living by doing practical things like producing clothing or footwear, so the idea of subsidising earners of invisible exports fails on its own terms I think. General questions – Small and Medium sized Enterprises: Q37. How can the Government ensure that SMEs are better able to fulfil their potential and contribute to the UK’s defence and security requirements? Where there are lots of potential contractors, Government should carry-on trying to make sure that tenders are open and free to view and that pre-qualification questionnaires are sane and appropriate to the job. Where there are a few niche market suppliers of say motorbikes or footwear I suggest better outreach. Large organisations are not used to seeking suppliers. They expect suppliers to come to them and talk endlessly about standards .Large organisations tend not to give rough price guides as I've discovered my making freedom of information requests about boots to the MOD on Whatdotheyknow.com. I'm told it's commercially sensitive. Even to the firm that has been closed by having its contract withdrawn. And the replacement? “We are currently consulting”, which is odd because they are not consulting the firm that's closing as far as I know. So the whole process of past current and future boot prices is fogged in mystery to outsiders. On the other hand, when the manufacturing advisory service advises UK manufacturers, it tells them to learn about lean manufacturing and practive extra-ordinary brevity and concentration on the job in hand. Nothing else. So it seems that one part of government has reached a sensible conclusion about how UK manufacturing can survive and another part amongst procurement offices still thinks it has time to seek-out obscure possible tenders and make-up numbers if the department has already decided but wants some also-rans. No wonder the MOD is only aware of three footwear manufacturers in the UK. So I suggest that public sector procurement staff should attempt to find a list of anyone remotely interested in making say motorbikes (there's a list of several UK firms on Wikipedia) or footwear (a freedom of information request to Companies House for class 1931 Manufacture of Footwear would get a list), and send a letter to each one asking if they want to be kept informed. The next stage is to find out whether any of these companies have something close to the MOD's needs that has been made before. Then I don't know the last stage, but it will involve buying something good and making the design known to other UK contractors. Q38. What are the current obstacles to this happening and how can these be overcome? Suppose I want to make an MOD standard or ex MOD standard boot, which I do. Paragraph 140 states that “Suppliers, especially SMEsm benefit already from the MOD making available free of charge access to over a thousand UK Defence Standards from its website http://www.dstan.mod.uk/ on a 24/7 basis. However, MOD is aware that SMEs are still not contributing as much as they could to the standards-making process. MOD would like to understand how more stakeholders in UK industry could contribute to and (through early awareness) benefit from the development of defence standards. Other stakeholders such as academia and trade associations also have a role to play, but the MOD is not aware of any perceived obstacles to involvement other than costs and time. My own experience is differs. If I log-on to that web site and look for my own speciality, which is boots, I see a section on “clothing”. The only current standard on the site if for a ribbon. If I look for obsolete standards, a few are mentioned but not the one for which I have some tools which is a desert pilot boot. So if I ask on Whatdotheyknow.com for a boot as made by Haynes and Cann – details in .pdf or similar format I am told that details are no longer held. So far I have not seen what a specification for boots looks like, or if they aren't used any more what they used to look like; they remain as mysterious as the rough price paid for the boots or the people who make them for the prime contractors. Another odd thing is the phrasing of refusal to give specifications under the freedom of information act after my requests on Whatdotheyknow.com. The refusal states the public interest in much narrower terms than this consultation, mentioning only the need for good value and nothing about the significant wider impacts mentioned in paragraphs 159-166 of this consultation, such as responsibility to suppliers. Or rather, these are mentioned but in a counter-intuitive way. Really, nothing is clear to me at all – not old standards, not current or forthcoming standards, not rough price or quantity guides: nothing. Q39. How can the Government manage better the risks associated with procurement from SMEs? Specific questions: Q40. Should new requirements be exposed to industry at an earlier stage, potentially to allow SMEs and innovators to propose ‘non-traditional’ solutions? Q41. How can the Government encourage greater SME participation in major projects while still maintaining value for money? Q42. Should MOD’s prime contractors be required to advertise competitive subcontract opportunities in the Defence Contracts Bulletin and on-line portals? Yes. There is a contradiction at the moment that the MOD does not seem to know of any UK footwear manufacturers and farms the business out to companies who have ticked the right boxes further away in Europe. These companies can get the boots made anywhere they like and by anyone they like so far as anybody knows. I don't know if it was always like this but the role of the company that meets the standards and the company that makes the boots seem easily separated now, and the cost of meeting standards is an extra burden for potential smaller suppliers closer to home. Q43. Should prime contractors be required to measure the percentage of work placed with SMEs and to report this to Government? Q44. In the case of competitive tenders, should bidders, at the ‘preferred bidder’ stage, be required to provide a list of expected sub-contractors, including SMEs? Q45. How can the Government encourage greater cooperation between SMEs to form consortia and alliances to increase the competition level? Q46. Are there any significant obstacles that prevent SMEs from contributing to the development of Defence Standards? Q47. How can Government encourage and ‘champion’ greater pull-through of innovative ideas into applications and contracts? Q48. How should the Government balance the effectiveness of consolidating its purchasing power with the importance of supporting SMEs? Q49. What specific measures can the Government take to promote greater export success amongst SMEs? Q50. What barriers are there to SMEs growing to compete as prime contractors for major defence contracts? Q51. With the move to leaner and more efficient Government machinery, how can we ensure that we do not lose our ability to talk to and engage with SMEs? Q52. What framework should be put in place, or assistance provided, that will aid SMEs to more confidently work with primes knowing they have taken the right steps to protect their IPR? Q53. How can prime contractors work with SMEs to facilitate innovation and assist their entry into international markets? Q54. How can Government ensure that its procurement processes take proper account of the quality of a bid and reliability of the bidder, so that SMEs are not disadvantaged? General question – Wider Impacts : working with suppliers for skills & the economy Q55. To what extent should the Government take wider economic considerations into account when taking decisions about fulfilling its defence and security requirements? Ones the basics have been achieved, I think buyers should ask themselves whether they can change the specification to suit UK companies rather than looking for UK companies that have to meet a specification. I'm thinking of things like the size of a batch of clothes or the exact pattern, or the design of something like a motorbike that does the same job as another motorbike. Specific questions: Q56. To what extent does Government spending on defence and security capabilities benefit broader UK manufacturing and services? How could these benefits be increased without prejudicing value-for-money, fair and open competition, or our national security capabilities? A gentle suggestion that staff-owned partnerships are welcome to bid might benefit the economy in providing more opportunities to individual staff to learn the different jobs than in a company organised in a top-down way. Q57. What approach should be taken to assessing value-for-money in fulfilling defence and security requirements and why? Closeness to the point of delivery should be a factor. Contribution in taxes to the government that buys the goods should be a factor. Employment in the same economy – the same part of Europe – as ex soldiers and other taxpayers should be a factor. I'm thinking here about every-day objects rather than the more specialised or high-tec. Q58. What mechanisms could be used to help industry (both defence and civil) better exploit the results of investment in defence research and development? Gentle pressure to get more contractors seeking civilian spin-offs, just as buyers are under pressure to find pre-existing civilian designs that can be used by the military. In both cases there are advantages of more stocks held and more people checking that a price makes sense. Q59. How can the Government encourage industry to do more to develop and exploit defence and security technologies within the UK? It's hard to answer this because the defence procurement system that ministers consult about, which is quite open, and the more secretive system that I hear about are quite different. They might both be good systems but I need to know which is being asked about. Q60. Are there any specific defence and security issues that we need to address for low carbon energy efficient investment and sustainable development research? Q61. To what extent should the Government encourage/insist on the adoption of energy efficient and sustainable development policies when selecting suppliers? There is some work done by DEFRA to try to reduce landfill and promote closed-loop recycling. The current system of disposal can get a low price for perfectly usable equipment – I heard of a set of footwear sole moulds being collected by the MOD from a factory by a scrap yard. By the time I had rung the yard these things that had cost thousands of pounds to make had been melted to aluminium at £1 a kg. Likewise I notice that army surplus trouser aren't as well used as I think they deserve. My idea is that suppliers should be given the opportunity to help dispose of the clothing or whatever item at the end of its in-service life. I know there are needlessly complicated and unfair contracts about this for things like leasing of taxis, but I'm thinking of a more straightforward “we'll offer it to you as well as the usual army surplus bidders” system. This potential to return goods to their manufacturers would make it easier for manufacturers to see how they wear out and whether any parts of them like aluminium chassis or part-worn sets of clothes are good enough to sell-back to the MOD as graded used products or as parts of refurbished products. I hope there would also be a chance of the companies doing more to sell the goods at a good price, given their knowledge of what can be said about the things and their ability to make-up missing sizes to make a range. I've just looked for british camouflage trousers for wholesale second hand. This is the nearest I could find.: Woodland Camouflage Trousers from the Dutch Army – Wholesale Available in Grade 1 – small and medium sizes only Dutch Army DPM Camouflage Combat Trousers (similar to British Cammo pattern) 6 Pockets Sold in bundles of 10 Size Small and Medium Unit Price: Grade 1 £5.95 x 10 + VAT and delivery. The reason this company don't have British combat trousers is that they prefer to sell new ones at £12.95. So I think a UK-based trouser manufacturer with the opportunity to grade used trousers and try to sell them on would be in a good position to create jobs save landfill, provide trousers close to where the army want them delivered and maybe even make money. Q62. How can the Government ensure that the UK creates and retains the skills necessary to support essential national security capabilities? Which skills and capabilities are most vulnerable and what might be done to protect them? Anything to do with making physical objects is vulnerable and useful for the future as the economy is forced Q63. How can we ensure that our policy on industrial participation delivers the best possible value for defence and security? General question: Specifically about Defence: Q64. Is the MOD’s sector-based approach, based around a dual strategy of competition on the global market and intervention where necessary, the best way to meet the UK’s defence capability needs? “competition in the global market”, is a phrase I find unreal. I'm cutting and pasting and answer to question one here. The reality is that government has used interest and exchange rates as a way of reducing inflation between 1979 and 2009 and perhaps in future. My evidence for this is the monetary policy committee's online diagram “The Transmission Method of Monetary Policy”, bottom set of arrows. Another reality is that the Chinese government has a mirror-image policy that somehow devalues the price of its currency. My evidence is a US site, Faircurrency.org. A third reality is that it is cheaper to make products in countries with fewer human, democratic and welfare rights than in Europe, given slow container delivery. As a result I think that we have lost a common sense understanding of the benefits of buying locally-made goods, or even of labelling them to say where they are made or at what factory. At the moment the MOD forbids clothing suppliers from printing the name of the factory on their products, while civilian standards no longer insist on stating the country of origin. Specific questions: Q65. What are the key sectors in delivering defence capability? Is MOD’s current approach to these sectors appropriate in the light of likely future circumstances? Q66. Should a different approach be taken in any specific sector? What about sectors whose nature is changing (for example, fixed-wing combat aircraft)? Q67. Are there any other sectors whose characteristics justify a separate sector approach? Q68. How should MOD balance the benefits of and constraints from making long-term arrangements with a supplier in a particular sector General question: Specifically about Defence Support contractors Q69. Does the MOD involve industry sufficiently in providing support to the Armed Forces? Specific questions: Q70. What support roles should only be delivered by the Armed Forces? Q71. What support roles could legitimately be provided by industry? Q72. How can the MOD remain an intelligent customer if it outsources more activity? Q73. How might MOD enable wider exploitation of simulation and synthetic systems and scenarios? Q74. How could MOD simplify interfaces, relationships, and decision making to improve the provision of support to the Armed Forces? Q75. What legal problems do companies face when providing support to operations? Questions: Specifically about the Security industry. Q76. What methods can the government use to identify systemic capability gaps and communicate them to industry and academia, while maintaining national security? ? Q77. What steps should be taken to make the security market function more efficiently than at present? ? Q78. How can Government achieve more efficient procurement in the public sector security market without disadvantaging SMEs? Q79. How should Government encourage co-ordinated and/or centralised procurement while maintaining competition and innovation? How should Government encourage co-ordinated and/or centralised procurement without disadvantaging SMEs? Educate buyers in the smallness of economic units in industry. One example. Responses to the Spending Challenge website by public sector workers. There were two sensible but contradictory themes amongst people who work for big public organisations: one was that government departments should merge buying of stationary to find economy in scale one was that the employer already had central buying, but that there were identical goods on Amazon or such at lower prices to the office supplies contractor that had won the contract. The contradiction is that plenty of activities like niche market manufacturing or importing from China have more dis-economies of scale than economies on the sort of scale that can bid for public sector tenders: the ones who could be sought-out on the internet are cheaper. I know this stationary example is probably different to fighter planes or tanks but still think that ministers need to help public sector buyers recognise dis economies of scale and to shop local. I had a go on the Whatdotheyknow.com web site by trying to find out why a northern fire brigade had bought german motorcycles for an expensive fire bike project. The answer was pretty typical. They expected buyers to go to them; they had not contacted the several UK bike suppliers listed on WIkipedia in any kind of outreach exercise; such a thing would be un-heard of in a large organisation like a fire brigade. Moreover they had not asked the provider of fire bikes whether the host bike had to be a BMW and not a Triumph or whatever; it had not seemed important even though the purpose of the bikes was to counter fires caused by the anti-social behaviour of unemployed people. Q80. Should the HOSDB standards model be adopted more widely by UK defence and security organisations as a method of encouraging interoperability and efficient procurement while maintaining competition? Q81. What are the priorities for investment in standards? A cost-free priority is to make them available. Where I'm based in London there is no source of British Standards in safety and occupational footwear except the technical college that thinks it's a fashion college and won't let me into their library without a forged ticket. I pay taxes to keep them going but am not allowed to use their library as a small or medium sized enterprise specialising in what they teach. The same kind of problem is even worse for defence standards – I've answered the point under question 38, Q82. What benefit would standards bring to export potential? To what extent can standards promote UK exports? What effects would standards have on industry and in particular on SMEs? Q83. What would be the benefits of a possible UK Security Brand? How could such a brand system be operated and funded? How would a company’s products qualify under such a system? Q84. How should the system balance the competing interests of the widest possible applicability and highest standards? General Question – Specifically about Cyberspace: Q85. Have we adequately identified the key industry-related challenges for cyber security? ? Specific questions: Q86. Is our proposed partnership response the optimum approach, given the nature of the ICT industry and the current fiscal climate? ? Q87. Are our proposed science and technology priorities appropriate to address the challenges we have identified? ? General Question – Overview:
Q1. Does our proposed approach, based on the three key principles, strike the right
balance between the various factors influencing how we will go about fulfilling our
defence and security requirements?
(NB: in Parts Two and Three of this document we are asking more focused questions
about individual policy areas and issues.)

No.

The second key principle is explained in para. 16 as “open competition in a free market”, which I find unreal.

The reality is that government has used interest and exchange rates as a way of reducing inflation between 1979 and 2009 and perhaps in future. My evidence for this is the monetary policy committee’s online diagram “The Transmission Method of Monetary Policy”, bottom set of arrows.
Another reality is that the Chinese government has a mirror-image policy that somehow devalues the price of its currency. My evidence is a US site, Faircurrency.org.
A third reality is that it is cheaper to make products in countries with fewer human, democratic and welfare rights than in Europe, given slow container delivery.

As a result I think that we have lost a common sense understanding of the benefits of buying locally-made goods, or even of labelling them to say where they are made or at what factory.

General question – Operational advantage (it wins) Freedom of Action (it’s available)
Q2. What factors should the UK take into account when assessing the national security
implications of acquisition in the defence and security sectors?

Manufacture close to the point where troops train and depart for duty (or closeness to duty).
Manufacture that pays taxes towards the ministry that hires the troops (or within the EU).
Manufacture that employs ex service people such as Remploy or better similar agencies.
Democratic rights in the country where the goods are made, measured by Democracy Index.
Legal and Welfare rights, for which I do not know of a comparative index, in the country where the goods are made.

Specific questions:
Q3. Are there particular technological or industrial capabilities, including skills, that
you believe are crucial to national security? If so, please give details.

Any cluster of capabilities which pays taxes and employs people in the country that pays for the troops, including capabilities like van-making or shoe-making that aren’t top of the list for competitive advantage if they’re based in the UK, but do have a long term future with a bit of luck if the government stops punishing them with fiddled exchange rates.
Industry is particularly important to keep because it isn’t fashionable to set-up factories, collect the tools and the skills; office based work is easier to re-start.

Q4. Are any of these currently at risk of being lost? If so, please give details.

Yes.
http://www.ldv.com/ – vans
http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/northampton/hi/people_and_places/newsid_9125000/9125422.stm – boots.
You are welcome to direct any requests for pilot boots to me. They are a niche market because the better they fit, the tighter the corners a fighter pilot can turn without their feet hurting too much.

Q5. Are there any technological or industrial capabilities which the UK has sought to
protect where you believe this is unnecessary? If so, please give details

Accidental protection of supplies that may not be made in the UK, but need more transparency and more people asking questions to reveal, like this light bulb.
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/cost_of_screws_and_light_bulbs

I notice that the MOD has refused to answer questions about the latest £102 cost of buying thigh boots with expensive leathers and seams in about 50 sizes per batch compared to their intended next supplier. My guess is that someone said in a meeting “yes, minister: £102 is a lot for a pair of boots” without having a clue how much it can be reduced with sane spefication that still stops fighter pilot’s feet swelling on sharp corners at high G-forces. You can find the latest responses on the same site – http:www.whatdotheyknow.com if you search for “Haynes and Cann”

General question – Working with other countries:
Q6. How can the UK get the best from working with other nations, whilst avoiding the
pitfalls?

A general answer to a general question.

I think this is a cross-cutting question for the European Union more than for the MOD:
I hope you have the patience to read my answer that comes back to the MOD in the end.

I think the answer is tariffs against despots, and tariffs against countries without a system of free hospitals, pensions, votes and the rest.

Take the example of Haiti. For years the country was able to export cheap T shirts because of cheap labour. I am wearing one now. People in the UK benefit from cheap T shirts but loose the balanced market in which they have a chance to make many T-shirts, so in a way people In rich countries pay in unemployment as well as benefit. from cheap T shirts. Likewise the people of Haiti might be more excited by universal education, pensions, useful courts and votes than a chance to work in hosiery. I think some of them stated that in a recent TV documentary.

Then people in wealthy countries have to pay again in ways like charity, state aid or a military force when the system collapses altogether. Arab demonstrators in places like Benghazi have said this to reporters dozens to times: they want rights first, then a chance to think about jobs. You will have seen them saying so on TV.

Specific questions:
Q7. What are the conditions for successful bilateral/multinational procurement?
How can Government best assess these before committing to a project?

About my trade of shoes.
The current system is that most footwear is ordered from a prime contractor in the EU that meets quality standards. This Spanish firm then may pass-on the business to anyone anywhere in the world so far as I have discovered so far. There is a risk of contractors using their ability to work the system and adhere to all the standards in order to pass business on to someone who meets fewer standards, which would be a bit of a game. I don’t know if it happens but Nike M&S and the others do it so it would be odd if the MOD did not, although no better.

I think the best strategy is to make sure that local contractors know about an opportunity before tendering further away. The Manufacturing Advisory Service, sponsored by government, advises manufacturers in something they call “lean manufacturing” in which no effort is wasted on anything but getting goods out of the door. In contradiction, government buyers expect suppliers to have time to log-in to a certain web site, meet certain quality standards, and think they are doing well to have been so open. So I think the best thing is for government buyers to research the fullest possible list of UK suppliers and make sure each of them knows that a tender is coming-up. In footwear it would be possible to ask Companies House for all companies involved in the manufacture of footwear, which is one of their categories, and send a letter to each saying “this is probably nothing to do with what you do but we’re looking for boots”.

Q8. How can the UK engagement with NATO allies and European partners in bilateral
procurement arrangements support and benefit interoperability between all
member states and other allies and partners?

?

Q9. What models are available which allow us to use our defence and security
budget more effectively by working together with other countries to develop
the capabilities we need? In what circumstances could the models be used most
effectively?

?

Q10. What more should the Government do to ensure that the process of awarding work under international collaborative programmes is open and fair?

Open and fair procurement should be more transparent than MOD staff find they can provide now.
I don’t know why, but what I see advertised about MOD procurement is different to what I think reasonable or see in detail.

Firstly the MOD has a tradition of asking for money to see its tenders. I was quoted I think £250 by BIP solutions quite recently.

Secondly the MOD has a tradition of asking for money for explanation of its tenders.

Imagine if the MOD advertised for staff on a site that cost a couple of hundred pounds to read, and then offered training days once in a blue moon for another couple of hundred pounds so that job applicants could understand the jargon. That’s the equivalent of what they do for tenders.

General question – Science and Technology:
Q11. What should be the balance of priorities for research investment in science and
technology for defence and security purposes?

I read that the UK spends very little on R&D outside of the defence industry, but still comes-up with nifty ideas.

I guess that in the past there were more situations in which someone like Trevor Bayliss could come up with an idea without special funding and a laboratory; I guess this somehow suits the culture in north Europe.

I wish I could suggest a way to help contractors do each bit of science without having to pay for all the others or special facilities, but unfortunately I don’t have a way except to concentrate on small and medium sized enterprises which is a different reply.

Specific questions:
Q12. Given the changing defence and security threats, the breadth of science and
technology providers, the pace of innovation and defence ’s ability to influence
this, what should be the balance of priorities for the science and technology
programme over the next five years and beyond, including support to setting
policy, developing force structures, tactics, training and doctrine, and for planning,
delivering and generating capability needs, while maintaining value for money?

I guess that the cheapest innovation comes from people who are used to tinkering with the bicycle; it only sounds complicated when unfamiliar.

It’s a problem to encourage an industry that has a multitude of tinkerers in it.

One solution is for a contractor to set-up or be encouraged to set-up as a staff owned company. My hunch is that such companies are more likely to let their staff share secrets and branch-out to set-up more companies, so that there is a cluster of providers.

Another solution could be something to do with the use of slack time amongst service people. If they were making a universal machine from internet instructions or studying engineering alongside other subjects, there might be more chance of another Barnes Wallace emerging in a generation’s time.

Q13. How should we develop our strategy for international research collaboration to
support interoperability, operations, wider diplomacy and achieve better science
and technology outputs?

There is one part of the answer in mechanical engineering which is to improve the little CNC software that’s been made freely available by the US military. I think it’s called something like BRIC and it’s very hard to use with no specialist add-ons for making any particular kind of object, but free CNC software boosts the world economy and particularly companies that need to collaborate, because it’s easier if everybody can get a copy of the same software.

Q14. What should be the balance between research focused on long-term potential
threats and conflicts and that supporting current operations and procurement of
equipment & services in delivering the SDSR?

?

Q15. How can we rigorously and robustly identify those areas of science and technology
that need to be sustained in order for us to have a capability
a) in Government and
b) within the UK?

?

Q16. How should we engage with the wider supplier base and exploit innovation to
meet our research priorities?

As above re Question 12, an industry that’s full of home-based manufacturers, staff-owned partnerships and tinkerers is more likely to find solutions than a top-down grant-giving system working with a handful of partners.

Q17. How should Government access the widest possible supplier base (industry,
universities, and research organisations), ensuring there are no gaps or overlaps,
and what mechanisms should be used (existing or new fora, internet, etc.) to
ensure both traditional and non-traditional suppliers understand our strategic
direction, priorities, and detailed requirements for science and technology, yet
maximise pull-through to exploitation?

As below for question 37, I think that public buyers should make a list of potential suppliers and send a note to each one.

Q18. What are the opportunities for expanding the role of the Centre for Defence
Enterprise or using this model more widely across defence, security, and the
cyberspace domain?

Q19. What mechanisms are needed to facilitate better use of science and technology to
improve the export potential of equipment, either within defence or civil spin-offs,
and reduce the cost of capability produced in the UK?

Civil spin-offs: simply to ask contractors whether they can find any civil market for the product, and sometimes favour those who do. I’m thinking of basic things like a sleeping bag with a tog measurement tested in field trials. Such a trial could possibly help the contractor market the sleeping bag, increase production and make it likely that there would be extra stocks around if the MOD needed them in an emergency.

I’ve made a related point about civil spin-offs under energy efficiency, question 61.

Q20. How can we realise the potential benefits from innovation through open systems
and modular acquisition, while still achieving value for money?

Q21. How do we maintain a capability edge in the innovative use of commercial off-the shelf
(COTS) components through the life of a military or security capability?

The phrase “off the shelf” make immediate sense but can mean too many things.
In wholesale it can mean a pick-and-pack warehouse in the UK that can supply small orders to different branches of a chain store, probably paying for this by buying a very cheap standard product from China.
In military boot procurement “off the shelf” seems to mean a design that the MOD has not had to dream-up. It is still made in quantities of a few hundred per batch per style, with the rarer sizes being made in ones or twos, and it is still cheaper if ordered before production, but it is called “off the shelf”.

So this is a great expressive phrase but can mean too many things to help suppliers. From experience, Haynes and Cann footwear manufacturers got a letter half way through a recent contract that orders would cease while the air force procurement people made themselves redundant and simplified the specification to an “off the shelf” design. Pilots still want close-fitting boots. I know of no shelf that stores pilot boots in 50 length and width combinations. So I guess that a phrase that sounded good in a meeting when people were asked to make very severe cuts to their own jobs and to others lead to an irrational decision about who will make what specification of pilot boot. A more rational decision would still be to say “why do they cost £102? Can we have them in cheaper materials and maybe use the old ones for longer so we buy less each year?”

Q22. How do we generate a technology edge for example, by new systems concepts,
which focus more on particular critical areas within the overall system of
capability?

Q23. In buying capability which contains complex science and technology, how
should we ensure our choices are based on intelligent and sound evidence-based
decisions?

Q24. What are the main elements of being an intelligent customer for capability,
equipment and services which depend on science and technology, to enable
better value for money and reducing the overall cost of our capability?

Q25. How do we maintain a capability edge in the innovative use of commercial off-theshelf
(COTS) components through the life of a military or security capability?

General questions – Broader Policy:
Q26. How can the Government and industry best support responsible defence and
security exports by UK-based companies?

As below – tariffs against despots. Result: less despots, less calls on the MOD, and more of a local manufacturing industry to pay taxes towards the MOD and supply products to it.

Q27. What are the current obstacles to doing so and how could these be overcome?

Many of the customers score much worse on the democracy index than the UK.
I hope that as in Egypt and Tunisia, a new generation will be able to change this.
If so, their governments might not want to buy products from the countries which propped-up the previous governments. There will not be much good will. So I think it makes commercial sense to back the goodies.

As in question 6, I believe that there’s more money in taxing imports from the baddies than there is in preventing exports to them; either gets goodwill from the next generation. And frankly, there isn’t much made in the UK any more that a dictator really needs and can’t get on the black market. Possibly Marmite.

Specific questions:
Q28. How can the Government diversify the destinations for UK defence and security
exports and at the same time ensure it has a pan-Government approach to
prioritising Government support to export campaigns?

As above: tax imports from the baddies. Then they won’t ask to buy arms because they will be cross, but we or the EU get the extra tariff money on whatever they do export like human-body-based compost or cheap-labour-based T-shirts or veg grown in a Zimbabwe farm that’s just been squatted by a judge or whatever it is.

Q29. Is a fresh approach needed for a world where export prospects will increasingly
involve industrial partnership and technology transfer?

As above: tariffs against despots.

Q30. How can Government and industry best deliver international defence training in
support of exports?

Q31. To what extent can modularity and open systems – needed in future Government
requirements to enable greater agility and adaptability – provide a framework for
industry to generate export solutions tuned to global markets?

I don’t know but I am shocked that my local council and central ministries still use paid-for software while services like dementia day-centres are being reduced. I guess that every government department should be using open source before the current licences run-out.

Q32. Can the Government streamline its security and export control processes
consistent with this objective?

I don’t know but I think import control is more relevant than export control to a declining but still-rich country. Export control was more important 100 years ago for Gatling Guns. Nowadays there are few products that despots can get from the UK that they cannot get from China. Possibly Marmite. That’s all I can think of. And parts for any surviving Morris Marinas that a despot might be riding around in.

Q33. Are there any other aspects of Government–to–Government support which
will prove particularly decisive in winning future business in a competitive
environment?

Being on the side of the goodies.

Q34. To what extent should the Government provide export credit guarantee finance
for defence and security exports?

To the extent to which it pays-back, give or take the cost of administration.
I don’t think we should be paying Mugabe to default on debts (or whoever is currently buying).

Q35. How can industry incentivise Government consideration of export potential in
its own requirements by providing measurable cost benefits to Government
programmes?

Q36. Do any international regimes inhibit responsible exports and prevent UK exporting
abroad

Yes. The European Regional Development Grant system allows people who run the London Development Agency to inflict their own prejudices on the London economy via London Fashion Week. This advertises Chinese-made shoes like Terra Plana at the expense of people who make clothing in the UK. So I would like to see constraints on the European Regional Development Grant system so that it has to be used responsibly – otherwise the MOD won’t have many local producers left to make clothes.

Getting back to the question, a London Development Agency grant to London Fashion Week and so to Terra Plana who make shoes in China will possibly earn the UK some foreign exchange from invisible exports. This gets jobs for a handful of people. It also raises the value of the pound and makes it harder for all the other people in the UK to earn a living by doing practical things like producing clothing or footwear, so the idea of subsidising earners of invisible exports fails on its own terms I think.

General questions – Small and Medium sized Enterprises:
Q37. How can the Government ensure that SMEs are better able to fulfil their potential
and contribute to the UK’s defence and security requirements?

Where there are lots of potential contractors, Government should carry-on trying to make sure that tenders are open and free to view and that pre-qualification questionnaires are sane and appropriate to the job.

Where there are a few niche market suppliers of say motorbikes or footwear I suggest better outreach.
Large organisations are not used to seeking suppliers. They expect suppliers to come to them and talk endlessly about standards .Large organisations tend not to give rough price guides as I’ve discovered my making freedom of information requests about boots to the MOD on Whatdotheyknow.com. I’m told it’s commercially sensitive. Even to the firm that has been closed by having its contract withdrawn. And the replacement? “We are currently consulting”, which is odd because they are not consulting the firm that’s closing as far as I know. So the whole process of past current and future boot prices is fogged in mystery to outsiders.

On the other hand, when the manufacturing advisory service advises UK manufacturers, it tells them to learn about lean manufacturing and practive extra-ordinary brevity and concentration on the job in hand. Nothing else. So it seems that one part of government has reached a sensible conclusion about how UK manufacturing can survive and another part amongst procurement offices still thinks it has time to seek-out obscure possible tenders and make-up numbers if the department has already decided but wants some also-rans. No wonder the MOD is only aware of three footwear manufacturers in the UK.

So I suggest that public sector procurement staff should attempt to find a list of anyone remotely interested in making say motorbikes (there’s a list of several UK firms on Wikipedia) or footwear (a freedom of information request to Companies House for class 1931 Manufacture of Footwear would get a list), and send a letter to each one asking if they want to be kept informed. The next stage is to find out whether any of these companies have something close to the MOD’s needs that has been made before. Then I don’t know the last stage, but it will involve buying something good and making the design known to other UK contractors.

Q38. What are the current obstacles to this happening and how can these be
overcome?
Suppose I want to make an MOD standard or ex MOD standard boot, which I do.
Paragraph 140 states that “Suppliers, especially SMEsm benefit already from the MOD making available free of charge access to over a thousand UK Defence Standards from its website http://www.dstan.mod.uk/ on a 24/7 basis. However, MOD is aware that SMEs are still not contributing as much as they could to the standards-making process. MOD would like to understand how more stakeholders in UK industry could contribute to and (through early awareness) benefit from the development of defence standards. Other stakeholders such as academia and trade associations also have a role to play, but the MOD is not aware of any perceived obstacles to involvement other than costs and time.

My own experience is differs. If I log-on to that web site and look for my own speciality, which is boots, I see a section on “clothing”. The only current standard on the site if for a ribbon. If I look for obsolete standards, a few are mentioned but not the one for which I have some tools which is a desert pilot boot. So if I ask on Whatdotheyknow.com for a boot as made by Haynes and Cann – details in .pdf or similar format I am told that details are no longer held. So far I have not seen what a specification for boots looks like, or if they aren’t used any more what they used to look like; they remain as mysterious as the rough price paid for the boots or the people who make them for the prime contractors.

Another odd thing is the phrasing of refusal to give specifications under the freedom of information act after my requests on Whatdotheyknow.com. The refusal states the public interest in much narrower terms than this consultation, mentioning only the need for good value and nothing about the significant wider impacts mentioned in paragraphs 159-166 of this consultation, such as responsibility to suppliers. Or rather, these are mentioned but in a counter-intuitive way. Really, nothing is clear to me at all – not old standards, not current or forthcoming standards, not rough price or quantity guides: nothing.

Q39. How can the Government manage better the risks associated with procurement
from SMEs?

Specific questions:
Q40. Should new requirements be exposed to industry at an earlier stage, potentially to
allow SMEs and innovators to propose ‘non-traditional’ solutions?

Q41. How can the Government encourage greater SME participation in major projects
while still maintaining value for money?

Q42. Should MOD’s prime contractors be required to advertise competitive subcontract
opportunities in the Defence Contracts Bulletin and on-line portals?

Yes. There is a contradiction at the moment that the MOD does not seem to know of any UK footwear manufacturers and farms the business out to companies who have ticked the right boxes further away in Europe. These companies can get the boots made anywhere they like and by anyone they like so far as anybody knows. I don’t know if it was always like this but the role of the company that meets the standards and the company that makes the boots seem easily separated now, and the cost of meeting standards is an extra burden for potential smaller suppliers closer to home.

Q43. Should prime contractors be required to measure the percentage of work placed
with SMEs and to report this to Government?

Q44. In the case of competitive tenders, should bidders, at the ‘preferred bidder’ stage,
be required to provide a list of expected sub-contractors, including SMEs?

Q45. How can the Government encourage greater cooperation between SMEs to form
consortia and alliances to increase the competition level?
Q46. Are there any significant obstacles that prevent SMEs from contributing to the
development of Defence Standards?

Q47. How can Government encourage and ‘champion’ greater pull-through of
innovative ideas into applications and contracts?

Q48. How should the Government balance the effectiveness of consolidating its
purchasing power with the importance of supporting SMEs?

Q49. What specific measures can the Government take to promote greater export
success amongst SMEs?

Q50. What barriers are there to SMEs growing to compete as prime contractors for
major defence contracts?

Q51. With the move to leaner and more efficient Government machinery, how can we
ensure that we do not lose our ability to talk to and engage with SMEs?

Q52. What framework should be put in place, or assistance provided, that will aid SMEs
to more confidently work with primes knowing they have taken the right steps to
protect their IPR?

Q53. How can prime contractors work with SMEs to facilitate innovation and assist their
entry into international markets?

Q54. How can Government ensure that its procurement processes take proper
account of the quality of a bid and reliability of the bidder, so that SMEs are not
disadvantaged?

General question – Wider Impacts : working with suppliers for skills & the economy
Q55. To what extent should the Government take wider economic considerations
into account when taking decisions about fulfilling its defence and security
requirements?

Ones the basics have been achieved, I think buyers should ask themselves whether they can change the specification to suit UK companies rather than looking for UK companies that have to meet a specification. I’m thinking of things like the size of a batch of clothes or the exact pattern, or the design of something like a motorbike that does the same job as another motorbike.

Specific questions:
Q56. To what extent does Government spending on defence and security capabilities
benefit broader UK manufacturing and services?

How could these benefits be increased without prejudicing value-for-money, fair and open competition, or our
national security capabilities?

A gentle suggestion that staff-owned partnerships are welcome to bid might benefit the economy in providing more opportunities to individual staff to learn the different jobs than in a company organised in a top-down way.

Q57. What approach should be taken to assessing value-for-money in fulfilling defence
and security requirements and why?

Closeness to the point of delivery should be a factor.
Contribution in taxes to the government that buys the goods should be a factor.
Employment in the same economy – the same part of Europe – as ex soldiers and other taxpayers should be a factor.

I’m thinking here about every-day objects rather than the more specialised or high-tec.

Q58. What mechanisms could be used to help industry (both defence and civil) better
exploit the results of investment in defence research and development?

Gentle pressure to get more contractors seeking civilian spin-offs, just as buyers are under pressure to find pre-existing civilian designs that can be used by the military. In both cases there are advantages of more stocks held and more people checking that a price makes sense.

Q59. How can the Government encourage industry to do more to develop and exploit
defence and security technologies within the UK?

It’s hard to answer this because the defence procurement system that ministers consult about, which is quite open, and the more secretive system that I hear about are quite different. They might both be good systems but I need to know which is being asked about.

Q60. Are there any specific defence and security issues that we need to address for low
carbon energy efficient investment and sustainable development research?

Q61. To what extent should the Government encourage/insist on the adoption of
energy efficient and sustainable development policies when selecting suppliers?

There is some work done by DEFRA to try to reduce landfill and promote closed-loop recycling.

The current system of disposal can get a low price for perfectly usable equipment – I heard of a set of footwear sole moulds being collected by the MOD from a factory by a scrap yard. By the time I had rung the yard these things that had cost thousands of pounds to make had been melted to aluminium at £1 a kg. Likewise I notice that army surplus trouser aren’t as well used as I think they deserve.

My idea is that suppliers should be given the opportunity to help dispose of the clothing or whatever item at the end of its in-service life. I know there are needlessly complicated and unfair contracts about this for things like leasing of taxis, but I’m thinking of a more straightforward “we’ll offer it to you as well as the usual army surplus bidders” system. This potential to return goods to their manufacturers would make it easier for manufacturers to see how they wear out and whether any parts of them like aluminium chassis or part-worn sets of clothes are good enough to sell-back to the MOD as graded used products or as parts of refurbished products.

I hope there would also be a chance of the companies doing more to sell the goods at a good price, given their knowledge of what can be said about the things and their ability to make-up missing sizes to make a range.

I’ve just looked for british camouflage trousers for wholesale second hand. This is the nearest I could find.:

Woodland Camouflage Trousers from the Dutch Army – Wholesale
Available in Grade 1 – small and medium sizes only
Dutch Army DPM Camouflage Combat Trousers (similar to British Cammo pattern)
6 Pockets
Sold in bundles of 10
Size Small and Medium
Unit Price: Grade 1 £5.95 x 10 + VAT and delivery.

The reason this company don’t have British combat trousers is that they prefer to sell new ones at £12.95.
So I think a UK-based trouser manufacturer with the opportunity to grade used trousers and try to sell them on would be in a good position to create jobs save landfill, provide trousers close to where the army want them delivered and maybe even make money.

Q62. How can the Government ensure that the UK creates and retains the skills
necessary to support essential national security capabilities? Which skills and
capabilities are most vulnerable and what might be done to protect them?

Anything to do with making physical objects is vulnerable and useful for the future as the economy is forced

Q63. How can we ensure that our policy on industrial participation delivers the best
possible value for defence and security?

General question: Specifically about Defence:
Q64. Is the MOD’s sector-based approach, based around a dual strategy of competition
on the global market and intervention where necessary, the best way to meet the
UK’s defence capability needs?

“competition in the global market”, is a phrase I find unreal. I’m cutting and pasting and answer to question one here.

The reality is that government has used interest and exchange rates as a way of reducing inflation between 1979 and 2009 and perhaps in future. My evidence for this is the monetary policy committee’s online diagram “The Transmission Method of Monetary Policy”, bottom set of arrows.

Another reality is that the Chinese government has a mirror-image policy that somehow devalues the price of its currency. My evidence is a US site, Faircurrency.org.

A third reality is that it is cheaper to make products in countries with fewer human, democratic and welfare rights than in Europe, given slow container delivery.

As a result I think that we have lost a common sense understanding of the benefits of buying locally-made goods, or even of labelling them to say where they are made or at what factory. At the moment the MOD forbids clothing suppliers from printing the name of the factory on their products, while civilian standards no longer insist on stating the country of origin.

Specific questions:
Q65. What are the key sectors in delivering defence capability? Is MOD’s current
approach to these sectors appropriate in the light of likely future circumstances?
Q66. Should a different approach be taken in any specific sector? What about sectors
whose nature is changing (for example, fixed-wing combat aircraft)?
Q67. Are there any other sectors whose characteristics justify a separate sector
approach?

Q68. How should MOD balance the benefits of and constraints from making long-term
arrangements with a supplier in a particular sector

General question: Specifically about Defence Support contractors
Q69. Does the MOD involve industry sufficiently in providing support to the Armed
Forces?
Specific questions:
Q70. What support roles should only be delivered by the Armed Forces?
Q71. What support roles could legitimately be provided by industry?
Q72. How can the MOD remain an intelligent customer if it outsources more activity?
Q73. How might MOD enable wider exploitation of simulation and synthetic systems
and scenarios?
Q74. How could MOD simplify interfaces, relationships, and decision making to improve
the provision of support to the Armed Forces?
Q75. What legal problems do companies face when providing support to operations?

Questions: Specifically about the Security industry.
Q76. What methods can the government use to identify systemic capability gaps and
communicate them to industry and academia, while maintaining national security?

?

Q77. What steps should be taken to make the security market function more efficiently
than at present?

?

Q78. How can Government achieve more efficient procurement in the public sector
security market without disadvantaging SMEs?

Q79. How should Government encourage co-ordinated and/or centralised procurement
while maintaining competition and innovation?

How should Government encourage co-ordinated and/or centralised procurement without disadvantaging
SMEs?

Educate buyers in the smallness of economic units in industry.

One example. Responses to the Spending Challenge website by public sector workers.
There were two sensible but contradictory themes amongst people who work for big public organisations:
one was that government departments should merge buying of stationary to find economy in scale
one was that the employer already had central buying, but that there were identical goods on Amazon or such at lower prices to the office supplies contractor that had won the contract.
The contradiction is that plenty of activities like niche market manufacturing or importing from China have more dis-economies of scale than economies on the sort of scale that can bid for public sector tenders: the ones who could be sought-out on the internet are cheaper. I know this stationary example is probably different to fighter planes or tanks but still think that ministers need to help public sector buyers recognise dis economies of scale and to shop local.

I had a go on the Whatdotheyknow.com web site by trying to find out why a northern fire brigade had bought german motorcycles for an expensive fire bike project. The answer was pretty typical. They expected buyers to go to them; they had not contacted the several UK bike suppliers listed on WIkipedia in any kind of outreach exercise; such a thing would be un-heard of in a large organisation like a fire brigade. Moreover they had not asked the provider of fire bikes whether the host bike had to be a BMW and not a Triumph or whatever; it had not seemed important even though the purpose of the bikes was to counter fires caused by the anti-social behaviour of unemployed people.

Q80. Should the HOSDB standards model be adopted more widely by UK defence and
security organisations as a method of encouraging interoperability and efficient
procurement while maintaining competition?

Q81. What are the priorities for investment in standards?

A cost-free priority is to make them available.

Where I’m based in London there is no source of British Standards in safety and occupational footwear except the technical college that thinks it’s a fashion college and won’t let me into their library without a forged ticket. I pay taxes to keep them going but am not allowed to use their library as a small or medium sized enterprise specialising in what they teach.

The same kind of problem is even worse for defence standards – I’ve answered the point under question 38,

Q82. What benefit would standards bring to export potential?
To what extent can standards promote UK exports?
What effects would standards have on industry and in particular on SMEs?

Q83. What would be the benefits of a possible UK Security Brand? How could such a
brand system be operated and funded? How would a company’s products qualify
under such a system?

Q84. How should the system balance the competing interests of the widest possible
applicability and highest standards?

General Question – Specifically about Cyberspace:
Q85. Have we adequately identified the key industry-related challenges for cyber
security?

?

Specific questions:
Q86. Is our proposed partnership response the optimum approach, given the nature of
the ICT industry and the current fiscal climate?

?

Q87. Are our proposed science and technology priorities appropriate to address the
challenges we have identified?
?

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by Sue Bell http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-433 Sue Bell Thu, 31 Mar 2011 23:59:59 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-433 I have a key observation with several specific examples. Observation is that MOD should focus on solutions to requirements which SATISFICE - that is satisfy the basis requirement and suffice, without any extras, particularly in times of financial constraints. It is too easy for non- scientific/technical customers to be led astray by technical jargon from consultants and scientists. For example, on CBRN, let us look at our vaccine development programme in medical countermeasures area - what have we gained in the last 15 years? Very little by way of product. We have an old-fashioned anthrax vaccine produced by HPA - this works. It will satisfice, given that warfare scenarios have changed and it is unlikely that we will have large numbers of static troops. We were promised by DSTL that by 2002 we would have a licensed plague vaccine - not so. How many of these bio threats should be taken to be grave military threats? Some may be relevant for general medical R&D but not for MOD. How about scrapping the whole vaccines programme and unashamedly hanging on to the coat tails of the Americans over whom we no longer have a lead? IF USA produces a vaccine UK would then buy off the shelf from them with added premium. Second example, our countermeasures to chemical warfare- while the consultation period has been underway a small specialist chemicals firm, Phoenix Chemicals, has gone bust. It produced pralidoxime mesylate, a key ingredient for the L4A1 combopen, and was the only manufacturer. Not easy to find another - and because our requirement is less - this should spell the end of UK combopen. We should buy American version off the shelf from Meridian. Phoenix Chemicals were also to make HI6 for future combopen - well why not scrap that programme, as US off the shelf will do - it will SATISFICE... Again, hang on the coat tails of the US and pay a premium for next generation combopen should it materialise. Future or alternative fuels - UK MOD is far too small to do anything but collaborate or tag on to other military partners - main role to adapt to any alternative fuel which does materialise from industry, but we did not plan ahead with the aircraft carrier(s); we should have had wider vision system to see that during the projected lifetime of carriers conventional fuel may no longer be around. Also MARS was doomed as they had no Business Plan when I visited them several years ago. Rossyth base inadvisable! For refuellers it would be far cheaper and quicker to buy or preferably lease surplus vessels from eg BP and modify them to MOD purpose. Had a contract with around 40 projects mainly technical advice and consultancy with QinetiQ on fuels lubes and gases - this contract has been pared right down with less than 10% cost remaining work won in competition by a rival firm. This was achieved because when you can analyse what the supplier was offering there was little substance to it or added value and it could be discarded with no detriment to customer. Common theme is military customer/MOD is not adequate on scientific/technical side to make the value for money judgements he has done in the past. Dedicated scientists at DSTL have their own vested interests - the tail must not wag the dog. So do suppliers with their consultancy and advice. MOD customer needs rugged independent technical advice - perhaps a small, variable and flexible group - to be in the decision-making process as required. A prototype of this would be the indpendent panel who met as required when we were resurrecting anthrax vaccine manufacture at HPA, independent of the scientists and the supplier, to make sure all were on the right track. I have a key observation with several specific examples. Observation is that MOD should focus on solutions to requirements which SATISFICE – that is satisfy the basis requirement and suffice, without any extras, particularly in times of financial constraints. It is too easy for non- scientific/technical customers to be led astray by technical jargon from consultants and scientists. For example, on CBRN, let us look at our vaccine development programme in medical countermeasures area – what have we gained in the last 15 years? Very little by way of product. We have an old-fashioned anthrax vaccine produced by HPA – this works. It will satisfice, given that warfare scenarios have changed and it is unlikely that we will have large numbers of static troops. We were promised by DSTL that by 2002 we would have a licensed plague vaccine – not so. How many of these bio threats should be taken to be grave military threats? Some may be relevant for general medical R&D but not for MOD. How about scrapping the whole vaccines programme and unashamedly hanging on to the coat tails of the Americans over whom we no longer have a lead? IF USA produces a vaccine UK would then buy off the shelf from them with added premium. Second example, our countermeasures to chemical warfare- while the consultation period has been underway a small specialist chemicals firm, Phoenix Chemicals, has gone bust. It produced pralidoxime mesylate, a key ingredient for the L4A1 combopen, and was the only manufacturer. Not easy to find another – and because our requirement is less – this should spell the end of UK combopen. We should buy American version off the shelf from Meridian. Phoenix Chemicals were also to make HI6 for future combopen – well why not scrap that programme, as US off the shelf will do – it will SATISFICE… Again, hang on the coat tails of the US and pay a premium for next generation combopen should it materialise.
Future or alternative fuels – UK MOD is far too small to do anything but collaborate or tag on to other military partners – main role to adapt to any alternative fuel which does materialise from industry, but we did not plan ahead with the aircraft carrier(s); we should have had wider vision system to see that during the projected lifetime of carriers conventional fuel may no longer be around. Also MARS was doomed as they had no Business Plan when I visited them several years ago. Rossyth base inadvisable! For refuellers it would be far cheaper and quicker to buy or preferably lease surplus vessels from eg BP and modify them to MOD purpose.
Had a contract with around 40 projects mainly technical advice and consultancy with QinetiQ on fuels lubes and gases – this contract has been pared right down with less than 10% cost remaining work won in competition by a rival firm. This was achieved because when you can analyse what the supplier was offering there was little substance to it or added value and it could be discarded with no detriment to customer.
Common theme is military customer/MOD is not adequate on scientific/technical side to make the value for money judgements he has done in the past. Dedicated scientists at DSTL have their own vested interests – the tail must not wag the dog. So do suppliers with their consultancy and advice. MOD customer needs rugged independent technical advice – perhaps a small, variable and flexible group – to be in the decision-making process as required. A prototype of this would be the indpendent panel who met as required when we were resurrecting anthrax vaccine manufacture at HPA, independent of the scientists and the supplier, to make sure all were on the right track.

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Comment on 3.3 Cyberspace – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Middleton http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-3-cyberspace-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-432 Andrew Middleton Thu, 31 Mar 2011 16:28:31 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=230#comment-432 Your focus appears to be on network attack through standard hacker technology - virus, trojans, denial of service by saturation. Once this becomes difficult you will simply face electronic energy attack, through simple 'garden shed' technologies already understood by your (and hostile) military technologists. These are denial of service attacks able to destroy computers and IT equipment via mains power injection and microwave beam. You must prepare for this as well, else you'll be bolting the door while leaving all the windows open. Your focus appears to be on network attack through standard hacker technology – virus, trojans, denial of service by saturation. Once this becomes difficult you will simply face electronic energy attack, through simple ‘garden shed’ technologies already understood by your (and hostile) military technologists. These are denial of service attacks able to destroy computers and IT equipment via mains power injection and microwave beam. You must prepare for this as well, else you’ll be bolting the door while leaving all the windows open.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-431 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 15:46:44 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-431 Q9. (continued) One suggestion is that we consider the impact of the Comprehensive Approach and any role we can play in shining a light on the issues, challenges and possible ways forward. Q9. (continued) One suggestion is that we consider the impact of the Comprehensive Approach and any role we can play in shining a light on the issues, challenges and possible ways forward.

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by shaun hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-430 shaun hipgrave Thu, 31 Mar 2011 14:49:53 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-430 This consultation paper is an opportunity for the Govt to support its growth agenda, concentrating on support for SMEs, UK R + D supprt and simplifying an overcomplicated procurement process will allow natural growth. This consultation is more about removing inhibitors to achieve innovation, growth and enterprise rather than necessarily coming up with the next best way for the Govt to engage with industry. This consultation paper is an opportunity for the Govt to support its growth agenda, concentrating on support for SMEs, UK R + D supprt and simplifying an overcomplicated procurement process will allow natural growth. This consultation is more about removing inhibitors to achieve innovation, growth and enterprise rather than necessarily coming up with the next best way for the Govt to engage with industry.

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Comment on 3.3 Cyberspace – General and Specific Questions by shaun hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-3-cyberspace-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-429 shaun hipgrave Thu, 31 Mar 2011 14:43:55 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=230#comment-429 Q86 Being involved in many of these proposed partnerships my only feedback is that they become less of a rhetoric and create more engagement that actually listes to the partners assembled and delivers something with real outcomes. Cyber is going to be a huge challeng and although the national security demand has critical importance the general cyber security solutions will come from industry or the wider society. A simple test of how well this partnership and shared approach is being taken seriously is, look at the proposed £650 million pounds going to cyber security over the next 4 years and provide a simple table of how much is going back into the HMG/Public Sector organisations and how much is spent in Industry or the wider society Q86 Being involved in many of these proposed partnerships my only feedback is that they become less of a rhetoric and create more engagement that actually listes to the partners assembled and delivers something with real outcomes. Cyber is going to be a huge challeng and although the national security demand has critical importance the general cyber security solutions will come from industry or the wider society. A simple test of how well this partnership and shared approach is being taken seriously is, look at the proposed £650 million pounds going to cyber security over the next 4 years and provide a simple table of how much is going back into the HMG/Public Sector organisations and how much is spent in Industry or the wider society

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Comment on 3.2 Security – Key Questions by shaun hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-2-security-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-428 shaun hipgrave Thu, 31 Mar 2011 14:33:32 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=226#comment-428 q76 As previously stated follow the lines of an open information exchange along the lines of the work being carried out in the Requirments capture project in CPNI and OSCT q76 As previously stated follow the lines of an open information exchange along the lines of the work being carried out in the Requirments capture project in CPNI and OSCT

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Comment on 3.2 Security – Key Questions by shaun hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-2-security-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-427 shaun hipgrave Thu, 31 Mar 2011 14:32:11 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=226#comment-427 q83, there is a UK security brand that was subject of a high level marketing campaign by the security directorate of UKTI, re-inforce that one q83, there is a UK security brand that was subject of a high level marketing campaign by the security directorate of UKTI, re-inforce that one

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Comment on 3.2 Security – Key Questions by shaun hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-2-security-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-426 shaun hipgrave Thu, 31 Mar 2011 14:31:13 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=226#comment-426 q81 Ibelieve that current technical and/or regulatory standards the security industry encounters within some sub-sectors of the national security and resilience (NS&R) sector are not always sufficient in meeting strategic national security objectives. This is particularly noticeable in the category of integrated security systems, some fields of security sub-systems and across the domain of information and cyber security. Security regulation can appear to be reactive and security standards are managed where they exist to fulfil the requirements of individual agencies without consideration of national or cross-departmental requirements. There is a lack of coherence between some technical standards. I would wish to note that some standards exist that are developed with the Government’s national security requirements in mind, or which relate to them, including: - The recently published Defence and Security Procurement Directive (2009/81/EC) covers the use of standards and technical specifications under articles 18 and 19 - The development of the British Standards Institutions’ (BSI) Standard on Business Continuity BS 25999 - ISO and CEN are in the process of developing ‘societal security’ standards which are intended to address government responses to major disasters - BS 31100 Risk Management - BS 25999 - & 2 Business Continuity Management - BS 25777 Information and communications technology continuity management - PAS 55 -1 Asset Management - PAS 55-2 Asset Management application - Draft PAS 200 - Crisis Management - ISO TC223 and CEN TC 391 relating to people-based services such as mass evacuation, exercise and testing and personal protective equipment and privacy. In addition, a huge amount of work is underway on standards and regulation associated with the manpower-related security industry. The Security Alliance chaired by the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) has recently outlined its official position on the future of regulation in this sector. It has also outlined a set of overarching principles that its members collectively agree will need to be central to any new regulatory process. The work being pursued by ISO to produce international NS&R standards is to be welcomed, but the time it may take to produce these international standards is of some concern. It is not always clear how these international standards align with UK standards (e.g. BS25999 and IS0 270001 could be more closely aligned). In terms of protective security standards related to malicious attacks against the critical national infrastructure (CNI), the UK has, to date, largely adopted a “motivate” and “enable” strategy rather than a “regulatory” approach. In the absence of recognised or formal standards (and, where appropriate, regulation), and the reliance on “guidance”, there are no clear standards for organisations within the CNI to aim at. It was noted that there does not currently appear to be a forum for aligning technical standards across civil security and military domains. Policy conclusions:I believe that the Government should target private CNI operators by developing a coherent set of protective security standards relating to industrial solutions in response to specific threats and vulnerabilities. Where possible these should be linked to overseas security standards such as those used in the US for cyber security and energy sector protection, or to wider international standards such as those developed by the EU. Consideration should be given to how the standards 4 could incorporate the information gained from the conduit of information between industry and the UK Intelligence community. q81 Ibelieve that current technical and/or regulatory standards the security industry
encounters within some sub-sectors of the national security and resilience (NS&R)
sector are not always sufficient in meeting strategic national security objectives.
This is particularly noticeable in the category of integrated security systems, some
fields of security sub-systems and across the domain of information and cyber
security.
Security regulation can appear to be reactive and security standards are managed
where they exist to fulfil the requirements of individual agencies without
consideration of national or cross-departmental requirements. There is a lack of
coherence between some technical standards.
I would wish to note that some standards exist that are developed with the
Government’s national security requirements in mind, or which relate to them,
including:
- The recently published Defence and Security Procurement Directive
(2009/81/EC) covers the use of standards and technical specifications under
articles 18 and 19
- The development of the British Standards Institutions’ (BSI) Standard on
Business Continuity BS 25999
- ISO and CEN are in the process of developing ‘societal security’ standards
which are intended to address government responses to major disasters
- BS 31100 Risk Management
- BS 25999 – & 2 Business Continuity Management
- BS 25777 Information and communications technology continuity
management
- PAS 55 -1 Asset Management
- PAS 55-2 Asset Management application
- Draft PAS 200 – Crisis Management
- ISO TC223 and CEN TC 391 relating to people-based services such as mass
evacuation, exercise and testing and personal protective equipment and
privacy.
In addition, a huge amount of work is underway on standards and regulation
associated with the manpower-related security industry. The Security Alliance chaired
by the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) has recently outlined its official
position on the future of regulation in this sector. It has also outlined a set of
overarching principles that its members collectively agree will need to be central to
any new regulatory process.
The work being pursued by ISO to produce international NS&R standards is to be
welcomed, but the time it may take to produce these international standards is of some
concern. It is not always clear how these international standards align with UK
standards (e.g. BS25999 and IS0 270001 could be more closely aligned).
In terms of protective security standards related to malicious attacks against the
critical national infrastructure (CNI), the UK has, to date, largely adopted a
“motivate” and “enable” strategy rather than a “regulatory” approach. In the absence
of recognised or formal standards (and, where appropriate, regulation), and the
reliance on “guidance”, there are no clear standards for organisations within the CNI
to aim at.
It was noted that there does not currently appear to be a forum for aligning technical
standards across civil security and military domains.
Policy conclusions:I believe that the Government should target private CNI
operators by developing a coherent set of protective security standards relating to
industrial solutions in response to specific threats and vulnerabilities. Where possible
these should be linked to overseas security standards such as those used in the US for
cyber security and energy sector protection, or to wider international standards such
as those developed by the EU. Consideration should be given to how the standards
4
could incorporate the information gained from the conduit of information between
industry and the UK Intelligence community.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by shaun hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-425 shaun hipgrave Thu, 31 Mar 2011 14:15:13 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-425 Q56 as previously stated, more co-ordination amongst the Govt Departments who have a security requirment within them to align their security need and in the case of the FCO and DFID try and use UK funding with UK Industry to further achieve our international goals. All the relevant departments are represented at the NSC in one form or another, so an SRO in a role for cross cutting underneath the NSC makes sense Q62, R + D skills are currently the most vulnerable in supporting our national security, with overall reduced R + D funding department by department and the pressure on SMEs to reduce price for current service/products, there has to be give somewhere and R + D take the hit. There is no simple R + D funded projects that require real pull through and products on hte other side, the TSB, CDE, FP 7 and other projects are all made too complex with stringent criteria stifling innovation in the SME who havnt the resource to comply. Q56 as previously stated, more co-ordination amongst the Govt Departments who have a security requirment within them to align their security need and in the case of the FCO and DFID try and use UK funding with UK Industry to further achieve our international goals. All the relevant departments are represented at the NSC in one form or another, so an SRO in a role for cross cutting underneath the NSC makes sense
Q62, R + D skills are currently the most vulnerable in supporting our national security, with overall reduced R + D funding department by department and the pressure on SMEs to reduce price for current service/products, there has to be give somewhere and R + D take the hit. There is no simple R + D funded projects that require real pull through and products on hte other side, the TSB, CDE, FP 7 and other projects are all made too complex with stringent criteria stifling innovation in the SME who havnt the resource to comply.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by shaun hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-2/#comment-424 shaun hipgrave Thu, 31 Mar 2011 14:07:42 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-424 Q40, Yes, an ideal opportunity would be to create a formal information exchange that allows the purchasers to put their requiremnets or possible future requirements into it then allow the suppliers and providers to match up with that requirement. This should not be hosted by HMG dueto the restrictions placed upon them but more suitably hosted by a relevant trade association. There is already some of this work going ahead in a requirements capture project between CPNI and OSCT. q42 yes q43 yes q44 yes Q45 Governement need to understand the 2 very different landscapes between the defence and security sector. The SMEs in the security sector are less used to being part of a supply chain, they more often work directly with the end customer and they are rarelt part of a consortia, this is very different in the defence sector and although defence and security requirements by HMG may have synergies the provision of service/products to those sectors by industry are done in different ways Q40, Yes, an ideal opportunity would be to create a formal information exchange that allows the purchasers to put their requiremnets or possible future requirements into it then allow the suppliers and providers to match up with that requirement. This should not be hosted by HMG dueto the restrictions placed upon them but more suitably hosted by a relevant trade association. There is already some of this work going ahead in a requirements capture project between CPNI and OSCT.
q42 yes
q43 yes
q44 yes
Q45 Governement need to understand the 2 very different landscapes between the defence and security sector. The SMEs in the security sector are less used to being part of a supply chain, they more often work directly with the end customer and they are rarelt part of a consortia, this is very different in the defence sector and although defence and security requirements by HMG may have synergies the provision of service/products to those sectors by industry are done in different ways

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by John Bornholt http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-423 John Bornholt Thu, 31 Mar 2011 14:03:47 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-423 “This Green Paper has an unusually wide scope and poses many questions, both in terms of general policy and specific issues.” A fighter pilot is presented with real-time information on the status of his plane, his munitions, his location, etc., enabling him to make quick decisions to meet the objectives of his mission. His commanders are similarly presented with information on all the planes and pilots currently in action and in reserve, and are able to make decisions and adjustments to meet the overall objectives of the mission, taking into account current performance and associated risks. This is the case with many of the armed forces’ assets. While real-time awareness of the MOD’s performance as a whole against strategic and tactical objectives may not be necessary for many of its functions, timely and regular information is crucial to the management of an organisation in a fast-moving environment. A transformation of the MOD appears to be underway, yet I fear that the tools, the skills and the processes may not be in place to successfully execute its strategies. The convergence of defence and security thinking is logical, as is the approach to closer ties with commercial product designers and manufacturers. The concentration of this consultation on procurement is understandable but somewhat limiting, as the implications are much wider for all concerned. Closer ties with industry and the convergence of defence and security mean that more data than ever has to flow both ways. Within the MOD and security services, it has to be managed and organised into useful information that can be evaluated and used in decision-making. At a higher level, management has to ensure that current and planned projects are aligned with their strategies and are meeting performance expectations, while mitigating any risks to success. Clear lines of responsibility need to be established. Much can be learnt from other industries and disciplines. Many businesses deliver feedback on their performance and risks to decision-makers on a monthly, weekly or daily basis. Both real-time and daily management information are crucial to financial institutions, retailers and utilities, for example. It’s not limited to “front line” activities, but includes supporting infrastructure and processes. In the most successful organisations, it’s embedded in their corporate culture. In defence and security, this should be critical to maximising performance and minimising waste. In the wake of the banking crisis and under pressure from shareholders, governments and regulators, significant changes have occurred in financial services and will continue for some time. This has had a significant impact on management thinking and its approach to governance, performance, risk, sustainability and collaboration. Their strategies, their performance in meeting those strategies, and the possible and actual risks associated with those strategies are identified, measured and reported within a governance framework. New approaches and COTS products have appeared to help organisations meet these requirements. There are many similarities with defence and security needs. I believe that they could be used to great advantage in these areas and deliver substantial savings. It is important that senior civil servants and their ministers have timely and dependable feedback on the success or otherwise of government strategies. It appears that the MOD has lacked an overarching command and control system. We are in a complex and fast-moving world where events can overtake the best plans. No strategy, or its underlying objectives, is perfectly achievable, requiring necessary and timely adjustments along the way. Foreseen and unforeseen risks and events will occur. There needs to be a strategy management framework in place which is resilient, timely, sustainable and able to help deliver the objectives set. “This Green Paper has an unusually wide scope and poses many questions, both in terms of general policy and specific issues.”

A fighter pilot is presented with real-time information on the status of his plane, his munitions, his location, etc., enabling him to make quick decisions to meet the objectives of his mission. His commanders are similarly presented with information on all the planes and pilots currently in action and in reserve, and are able to make decisions and adjustments to meet the overall objectives of the mission, taking into account current performance and associated risks. This is the case with many of the armed forces’ assets.

While real-time awareness of the MOD’s performance as a whole against strategic and tactical objectives may not be necessary for many of its functions, timely and regular information is crucial to the management of an organisation in a fast-moving environment. A transformation of the MOD appears to be underway, yet I fear that the tools, the skills and the processes may not be in place to successfully execute its strategies.

The convergence of defence and security thinking is logical, as is the approach to closer ties with commercial product designers and manufacturers. The concentration of this consultation on procurement is understandable but somewhat limiting, as the implications are much wider for all concerned.

Closer ties with industry and the convergence of defence and security mean that more data than ever has to flow both ways. Within the MOD and security services, it has to be managed and organised into useful information that can be evaluated and used in decision-making. At a higher level, management has to ensure that current and planned projects are aligned with their strategies and are meeting performance expectations, while mitigating any risks to success. Clear lines of responsibility need to be established.

Much can be learnt from other industries and disciplines. Many businesses deliver feedback on their performance and risks to decision-makers on a monthly, weekly or daily basis. Both real-time and daily management information are crucial to financial institutions, retailers and utilities, for example. It’s not limited to “front line” activities, but includes supporting infrastructure and processes. In the most successful organisations, it’s embedded in their corporate culture. In defence and security, this should be critical to maximising performance and minimising waste.

In the wake of the banking crisis and under pressure from shareholders, governments and regulators, significant changes have occurred in financial services and will continue for some time. This has had a significant impact on management thinking and its approach to governance, performance, risk, sustainability and collaboration. Their strategies, their performance in meeting those strategies, and the possible and actual risks associated with those strategies are identified, measured and reported within a governance framework.

New approaches and COTS products have appeared to help organisations meet these requirements. There are many similarities with defence and security needs. I believe that they could be used to great advantage in these areas and deliver substantial savings.

It is important that senior civil servants and their ministers have timely and dependable feedback on the success or otherwise of government strategies. It appears that the MOD has lacked an overarching command and control system. We are in a complex and fast-moving world where events can overtake the best plans. No strategy, or its underlying objectives, is perfectly achievable, requiring necessary and timely adjustments along the way. Foreseen and unforeseen risks and events will occur. There needs to be a strategy management framework in place which is resilient, timely, sustainable and able to help deliver the objectives set.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-422 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 13:18:14 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-422 Q36. The USA's ITAR regime is probably the worst culprit, being viewed as: overly complex; casting a too wider net over what it covers; causing extra work, substantial delays and additional costs; disrupts the effective and efficient functioning of the supply chain; inhibits initiative and the drive for efficiencies; inhibits information sharing; is used as a 1) tool to protect or 2) excuse not to share, US Intellectual Property; puts additional stress on the US-UK relationship, especially when it comes to technology transfer and the source code issue; causes problems for UK companies in the employment of certain foreign nationals, as the demands of ITAR can run contrary to UK legislation; and very importantly, creates strong disincentives to 1) acquire US systems and cooperate with US companies, but also 2) acquire UK systems, especially where those systems use US ITAR-controlled technology, and to cooperate with UK companies . . . leading to a greater and greater incentive to design around the issue and avoid using US technology (and therefore UK systems that incorporate such technology) creating problems in the longer-term for our Defence Industrial Base. The US needs to streamline, re-focus and simplify the entire system and recent moves towards that goal are to be encouraged. Q36. The USA’s ITAR regime is probably the worst culprit, being viewed as:
overly complex;
casting a too wider net over what it covers;
causing extra work, substantial delays and additional costs;
disrupts the effective and efficient functioning of the supply chain;
inhibits initiative and the drive for efficiencies;
inhibits information sharing;
is used as a 1) tool to protect or 2) excuse not to share, US Intellectual Property;
puts additional stress on the US-UK relationship, especially when it comes to technology transfer and the source code issue;
causes problems for UK companies in the employment of certain foreign nationals, as the demands of ITAR can run contrary to UK legislation;
and very importantly, creates strong disincentives to 1) acquire US systems and cooperate with US companies, but also 2) acquire UK systems, especially where those systems use US ITAR-controlled technology, and to cooperate with UK companies . . . leading to a greater and greater incentive to design around the issue and avoid using US technology (and therefore UK systems that incorporate such technology) creating problems in the longer-term for our Defence Industrial Base. The US needs to streamline, re-focus and simplify the entire system and recent moves towards that goal are to be encouraged.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-421 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:25:50 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-421 Q74. From an operational point of view: closer partnership; fundamentally getting industry involved in all planning activity. The command estimate completed before an operation commences, and the regular updates to it, must clearly be led by the MoD but in terms of support provision must include industry personnel from the outset. The concept of the 'Total Support Force', as set out in the DSR, recognizes this need. It is key to understanding industry's capabilities and its robustness to a changing threat, as well as how best to integrate industry support. More broadly, the MoD should examine the US Army's experience of developing a uniformed contracting career 'stream' and whether this has improved the delivery of contracted support and lowered costs and hence whether MoD can learn from it. Q74. From an operational point of view: closer partnership; fundamentally getting industry involved in all planning activity. The command estimate completed before an operation commences, and the regular updates to it, must clearly be led by the MoD but in terms of support provision must include industry personnel from the outset. The concept of the ‘Total Support Force’, as set out in the DSR, recognizes this need. It is key to understanding industry’s capabilities and its robustness to a changing threat, as well as how best to integrate industry support. More broadly, the MoD should examine the US Army’s experience of developing a uniformed contracting career ‘stream’ and whether this has improved the delivery of contracted support and lowered costs and hence whether MoD can learn from it.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-420 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:24:51 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-420 Q72. Education, training and, critically, exchanges between industry and the MoD. Joint working such as that seen between BAE Systems and the MOD at Portsmouth Naval Base not only provides the RN with trained and up to date engineers who can be deployed to the front line, it also helps maintain, in-house, the body of knowledge required to be an Intelligent Customer. Q72. Education, training and, critically, exchanges between industry and the MoD. Joint working such as that seen between BAE Systems and the MOD at Portsmouth Naval Base not only provides the RN with trained and up to date engineers who can be deployed to the front line, it also helps maintain, in-house, the body of knowledge required to be an Intelligent Customer.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-419 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:24:13 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-419 Q71. The comments made against Q70 are equally applicable to this question. Q71. The comments made against Q70 are equally applicable to this question.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-418 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:23:51 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-418 Q70. Some support roles should remain the exclusive domain of the Armed Forces, for example: those executed on-board Royal Navy ships and with early entry amphibious forces; those providing intimate support to Army manoeuvre units and formations; and those associated with air deployed operating bases. Other roles should not be considered as exclusively the domain of the Armed Forces or exclusively of industry but should be considered in the context of threat and operational phase. As an operation takes on the character of a campaign, and as the threat becomes better understood, controlled and contained so, accordingly, can roles be transferred from the Armed Forces to industry. The balance of Armed Forces personnel to industry personnel will change as an operation progresses from 'emergency' to 'campaign'. It should also be recognized that in support functions of a more technical character there will be a critical mass of Armed Forces personnel below which it becomes impossible to sustain a support capability able to respond to future contingencies. Q70. Some support roles should remain the exclusive domain of the Armed Forces, for example: those executed on-board Royal Navy ships and with early entry amphibious forces; those providing intimate support to Army manoeuvre units and formations; and those associated with air deployed operating bases. Other roles should not be considered as exclusively the domain of the Armed Forces or exclusively of industry but should be considered in the context of threat and operational phase. As an operation takes on the character of a campaign, and as the threat becomes better understood, controlled and contained so, accordingly, can roles be transferred from the Armed Forces to industry. The balance of Armed Forces personnel to industry personnel will change as an operation progresses from ‘emergency’ to ‘campaign’. It should also be recognized that in support functions of a more technical character there will be a critical mass of Armed Forces personnel below which it becomes impossible to sustain a support capability able to respond to future contingencies.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-417 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:23:08 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-417 Q69. The nature and extent of the support which industry currently provides to the Armed Forces are the result of a reaction to the resource and political pressures that applied at the time: the fast jet availability-type contracts created to help deliver the DLO's strategic target, and the Defence PFI contracts, are evidence of this. In reality, the MoD will have to make even greater use of industry to deliver support to the Armed Forces in future, a reality which is clearly recognized in the Defence Support Review. What matters is that the scale and scope of this transferral of support functions to industry must result from a clear assessment of what can be transferred and what 'organic' capabilities must be retained and protected. An understanding of support risk, particularly on operations, is critical to this assessment. Q69. The nature and extent of the support which industry currently provides to the Armed Forces are the result of a reaction to the resource and political pressures that applied at the time: the fast jet availability-type contracts created to help deliver the DLO’s strategic target, and the Defence PFI contracts, are evidence of this. In reality, the MoD will have to make even greater use of industry to deliver support to the Armed Forces in future, a reality which is clearly recognized in the Defence Support Review. What matters is that the scale and scope of this transferral of support functions to industry must result from a clear assessment of what can be transferred and what ‘organic’ capabilities must be retained and protected. An understanding of support risk, particularly on operations, is critical to this assessment.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-416 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:21:34 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-416 Q61. To maintain the necessary level of defence and security for the UK, it is essential that the Armed Forces [and Security services] are resilient to the impacts of climate change and natural resource depletion. This implies that they should be inherently sustainable, with as little reliance as possible on scarce resources – for example fossil fuels and rare earths – and with as much adaptive capacity as is affordable. It follows that suppliers on whom the Armed Forces rely for manufacture and through-life support of capabilities should themselves be sustainable and adaptable. They should also apply sustainable principles to the sourcing of materials as part of the Government’s policy drive towards sustainable operations and procurement. This provides an opportunity to lead by example, be transparent and accountable and ultimately improve the sustainability of the supply base. This policy approach led by Government can only help the Armed Forces to build stronger relationships with its suppliers, manage risk and procure in a sustainable manner. It should also be noted that capability requirements, driven by policy, should demand sustainable solutions. It is therefore not only important for the Government to insist on the adoption of sustainable policies when selecting suppliers, but also to provide Capability Sponsors with policy direction that capability requirements should seek sustainable solutions through-life. Q61. To maintain the necessary level of defence and security for the UK, it is essential that the Armed Forces [and Security services] are resilient to the impacts of climate change and natural resource depletion. This implies that they should be inherently sustainable, with as little reliance as possible on scarce resources – for example fossil fuels and rare earths – and with as much adaptive capacity as is affordable. It follows that suppliers on whom the Armed Forces rely for manufacture and through-life support of capabilities should themselves be sustainable and adaptable. They should also apply sustainable principles to the sourcing of materials as part of the Government’s policy drive towards sustainable operations and procurement. This provides an opportunity to lead by example, be transparent and accountable and ultimately improve the sustainability of the supply base. This policy approach led by Government can only help the Armed Forces to build stronger relationships with its suppliers, manage risk and procure in a sustainable manner. It should also be noted that capability requirements, driven by policy, should demand sustainable solutions. It is therefore not only important for the Government to insist on the adoption of sustainable policies when selecting suppliers, but also to provide Capability Sponsors with policy direction that capability requirements should seek sustainable solutions through-life.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-415 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:20:45 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-415 Q60. To maintain the necessary level of defence and security for the UK, it is essential that the Armed Forces [and Security services] are resilient to the impacts of climate change and natural resource depletion. Increased investment in local/distributed sustainable energy generation throughout the Defence infrastructure would reduce reliance on the National Grid, enabling the continuity of training, operations and logistical support etc. in the event of disruption to national energy supplies. Similarly, the use by Defence of low carbon energy sources should drive down costs as fossil fuel supplies diminish and costs increase. This should ensure the continuing affordability and utility of military capabilities. Any rationalisation of the Defence Estate should consider whether locations offer ease of access to ‘renewable’ sources of energy, for example wind, marine (wave and tidal stream) and, solar. If this energy can be captured effectively it can make a significant contribution to long term energy goals relating to climate change and security of supply. Such ‘renewable’ facilities may also reduce the vulnerability of national infrastructure to terrorist action, thus increasing resilience. However, we cannot rely on renewables alone in order to reduce carbon emissions whilst ensuring secure energy supplies. This is because some of the most cost- effective renewable technologies, such as wind, are intermittent and cannot produce electricity on demand. Fossil fuels will be required as part of a diverse energy mix for some time to come, but in order to reduce carbon sources such as coal and gas must become cleaner (decarbonise). It is therefore vital that the technologies necessary to mitigate the emissions from burning fossil fuels are developed and deployed as rapidly as possible. Many other resources used by defence equipment are also being consumed at a rate that threatens the long-term sustainability of military capabilities. For example, some rare earths and precious metals used in electronic equipment may only have 10-15 years supply left. Much increased re-use and recycling, combined with the identification of alternative solutions, will be required if military capabilities are to avoid becoming unsustainable. Suggested Action: Further research is required in all these areas, to understand how the Armed Forces [and Security services] can continue to operate effectively and sustainably in changing climatic conditions and with diminishing natural resources. Q60. To maintain the necessary level of defence and security for the UK, it is essential that the Armed Forces [and Security services] are resilient to the impacts of climate change and natural resource depletion. Increased investment in local/distributed sustainable energy generation throughout the Defence infrastructure would reduce reliance on the National Grid, enabling the continuity of training, operations and logistical support etc. in the event of disruption to national energy supplies. Similarly, the use by Defence of low carbon energy sources should drive down costs as fossil fuel supplies diminish and costs increase. This should ensure the continuing affordability and utility of military capabilities. Any rationalisation of the Defence Estate should consider whether locations offer ease of access to ‘renewable’ sources of energy, for example wind, marine (wave and tidal stream) and, solar. If this energy can be captured effectively it can make a significant contribution to long term energy goals relating to climate change and security of supply. Such ‘renewable’ facilities may also reduce the vulnerability of national infrastructure to terrorist action, thus increasing resilience. However, we cannot rely on renewables alone in order to reduce carbon emissions whilst ensuring secure energy supplies. This is because some of the most cost- effective renewable technologies, such as wind, are intermittent and cannot produce electricity on demand. Fossil fuels will be required as part of a diverse energy mix for some time to come, but in order to reduce carbon sources such as coal and gas must become cleaner (decarbonise). It is therefore vital that the technologies necessary to mitigate the emissions from burning fossil fuels are developed and deployed as rapidly as possible. Many other resources used by defence equipment are also being consumed at a rate that threatens the long-term sustainability of military capabilities. For example, some rare earths and precious metals used in electronic equipment may only have 10-15 years supply left. Much increased re-use and recycling, combined with the identification of alternative solutions, will be required if military capabilities are to avoid becoming unsustainable.
Suggested Action: Further research is required in all these areas, to understand how the Armed Forces [and Security services] can continue to operate effectively and sustainably in changing climatic conditions and with diminishing natural resources.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-414 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:20:17 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-414 Q55. To maintain the necessary level of defence and security for the UK, it is essential that the Armed Forces [and Security services] are resilient to the impacts of climate change and natural resource depletion. Increased investment in local/distributed sustainable energy generation throughout the Defence infrastructure would reduce reliance on the National Grid, enabling the continuity of training, operations and logistical support etc. in the event of disruption to national energy supplies. Similarly, the use by Defence of low carbon energy sources should drive down costs as fossil fuel supplies diminish and costs increase. This should ensure the continuing affordability and utility of military capabilities. Any rationalisation of the Defence Estate should consider whether locations offer ease of access to ‘renewable’ sources of energy, for example wind, marine (wave and tidal stream) and, solar. If this energy can be captured effectively it can make a significant contribution to long term energy goals relating to climate change and security of supply. Such ‘renewable’ facilities may also reduce the vulnerability of national infrastructure to terrorist action, thus increasing resilience. However, we cannot rely on renewables alone in order to reduce carbon emissions whilst ensuring secure energy supplies. This is because some of the most cost- effective renewable technologies, such as wind, are intermittent and cannot produce electricity on demand. Fossil fuels will be required as part of a diverse energy mix for some time to come, but in order to reduce carbon sources such as coal and gas must become cleaner (decarbonise). It is therefore vital that the technologies necessary to mitigate the emissions from burning fossil fuels are developed and deployed as rapidly as possible. Many other resources used by defence equipment are also being consumed at a rate that threatens the long-term sustainability of military capabilities. For example, some rare earths and precious metals used in electronic equipment may only have 10-15 years supply left. Much increased re-use and recycling, combined with the identification of alternative solutions, will be required if military capabilities are to avoid becoming unsustainable. Suggested Action: Conduct further research in all the above areas, to understand how the Armed Forces [and Security services] can continue to operate effectively and sustainably in changing climatic conditions and with diminishing natural resources. Q55. To maintain the necessary level of defence and security for the UK, it is essential that the Armed Forces [and Security services] are resilient to the impacts of climate change and natural resource depletion. Increased investment in local/distributed sustainable energy generation throughout the Defence infrastructure would reduce reliance on the National Grid, enabling the continuity of training, operations and logistical support etc. in the event of disruption to national energy supplies. Similarly, the use by Defence of low carbon energy sources should drive down costs as fossil fuel supplies diminish and costs increase. This should ensure the continuing affordability and utility of military capabilities. Any rationalisation of the Defence Estate should consider whether locations offer ease of access to ‘renewable’ sources of energy, for example wind, marine (wave and tidal stream) and, solar. If this energy can be captured effectively it can make a significant contribution to long term energy goals relating to climate change and security of supply. Such ‘renewable’ facilities may also reduce the vulnerability of national infrastructure to terrorist action, thus increasing resilience. However, we cannot rely on renewables alone in order to reduce carbon emissions whilst ensuring secure energy supplies. This is because some of the most cost- effective renewable technologies, such as wind, are intermittent and cannot produce electricity on demand. Fossil fuels will be required as part of a diverse energy mix for some time to come, but in order to reduce carbon sources such as coal and gas must become cleaner (decarbonise). It is therefore vital that the technologies necessary to mitigate the emissions from burning fossil fuels are developed and deployed as rapidly as possible. Many other resources used by defence equipment are also being consumed at a rate that threatens the long-term sustainability of military capabilities. For example, some rare earths and precious metals used in electronic equipment may only have 10-15 years supply left. Much increased re-use and recycling, combined with the identification of alternative solutions, will be required if military capabilities are to avoid becoming unsustainable.
Suggested Action: Conduct further research in all the above areas, to understand how the Armed Forces [and Security services] can continue to operate effectively and sustainably in changing climatic conditions and with diminishing natural resources.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-413 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:15:56 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-413 Q21. Military capability is generally kept in-service and to a certain spec for between 20 and 30 years. This leads to problems with the MoD and/or supplier base having to maintain either stock holdings or low-level / mothballed production capacity (of components or subsystems for example) for items that should be superceded after a few years. If they cannot do that, then this will lead to problems further into the equipment's life-cycle when disproportionate effort and resources have to be committed to finding appropriate replacements. Those systems that are relatively stable and have relatively long lives would benefit from being more modular, thus allowing new technology that is available on a COTS basis to be inserted on a more regular basis, thus keeping the capability up-to-date. This could also be combined with the much-talked-about concept of bringing a capability into service early (say at 80% of specification). Where a capability is needed to cover a previously unknown need, the UOR process has proven to be of substantial benefit but greater attention needs to be paid to bringing in suitable COTS capability as cheaply as possible but with a stronger focus as to what's going to happen after it's served its purpose. Many of the items so far acquired under the UOR process have been to address theatre-specific capability gaps, so when that particular conflict is over, we need to ask the question - do we REALLY need to retain it within our core military capabilities with all the attendent transportation, maintenance and support costs that this will entail? Or because it was acquired relatively cheaply on a COTS basis, is it easier (and cheaper in the long run) to dispose of it, for example, by handing it over to indigenous forces? A variation on this theme would be for the manufacturers to design and build in designed obsolescence, making the component or system as cheaply as possible, still performing to spec but with a predetermined life-cycle. This would reduce the initial acquisition costs, as well as the through-life cost of the item, the downside being a slight increase in the MoD's overall disposal costs, depending on what level this operated at i.e. component, sub-system or the entire system. However, this could be mitigated by making the item as recyclable as possible. One example of this is the gradual move in certain sections of the car industry to designing products with almost a fixed life-cycle of 100,000 miles where you have to change or replace vert little, lowering the through-life cost of the vehicle. Q21. Military capability is generally kept in-service and to a certain spec for between 20 and 30 years. This leads to problems with the MoD and/or supplier base having to maintain either stock holdings or low-level / mothballed production capacity (of components or subsystems for example) for items that should be superceded after a few years. If they cannot do that, then this will lead to problems further into the equipment’s life-cycle when disproportionate effort and resources have to be committed to finding appropriate replacements.

Those systems that are relatively stable and have relatively long lives would benefit from being more modular, thus allowing new technology that is available on a COTS basis to be inserted on a more regular basis, thus keeping the capability up-to-date. This could also be combined with the much-talked-about concept of bringing a capability into service early (say at 80% of specification).

Where a capability is needed to cover a previously unknown need, the UOR process has proven to be of substantial benefit but greater attention needs to be paid to bringing in suitable COTS capability as cheaply as possible but with a stronger focus as to what’s going to happen after it’s served its purpose. Many of the items so far acquired under the UOR process have been to address theatre-specific capability gaps, so when that particular conflict is over, we need to ask the question – do we REALLY need to retain it within our core military capabilities with all the attendent transportation, maintenance and support costs that this will entail? Or because it was acquired relatively cheaply on a COTS basis, is it easier (and cheaper in the long run) to dispose of it, for example, by handing it over to indigenous forces?

A variation on this theme would be for the manufacturers to design and build in designed obsolescence, making the component or system as cheaply as possible, still performing to spec but with a predetermined life-cycle. This would reduce the initial acquisition costs, as well as the through-life cost of the item, the downside being a slight increase in the MoD’s overall disposal costs, depending on what level this operated at i.e. component, sub-system or the entire system. However, this could be mitigated by making the item as recyclable as possible. One example of this is the gradual move in certain sections of the car industry to designing products with almost a fixed life-cycle of 100,000 miles where you have to change or replace vert little, lowering the through-life cost of the vehicle.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-412 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 09:07:42 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-412 Q17. This topic links into a rapidly developing body of interest to both industry and government know as “open innovation”. While a great deal of research has been done on this topic in respect to consumer industries, very little research has been carried out on this topic in regard to military assets. While the use of UOR contracts are often hailed as examples of how greater use of the widest possible networks can achieve far better results, the limitations of this approach have been given far less attention. The MoD already has a wide range of mechanisms in place to reach out to various institutions (suppliers, academic institutions, and specialist research centres). The MoD has also sought to make greater use of modern ICT equipment in order to extend its reach and interactions with key stakeholders. The challenge therefore is not so much to come up with a radically new approach but to work out if it is possible to extend the reach and effectiveness of existing arrangements. Building off existing capability would seem to be the most cost effective means of going about generating such improvements. What is being asked for in this question really seems to be best defined as a question on how to improve MoD communication with key stakeholders. As there is a law of diminishing returns in trying to reach all stakeholders it may be more productive to work out who are the critical stakeholders and develop well resourced and possibly individually tailored communication strategies for them rather than try to reach all with stakeholders with generic communication strategies. Suggested Action: Conduct a stakeholder analysis to consider the importance of these groups in relation to the MoD capability requirements and then explore if stakeholder requires by way of information and feedback requirements. For example, consider a ‘Knowledge or Information Hub’ approach whereby the Hub is responsible for identifying and implementing the most effective communication methods for each of its spokes. Q17. This topic links into a rapidly developing body of interest to both industry and government know as “open innovation”. While a great deal of research has been done on this topic in respect to consumer industries, very little research has been carried out on this topic in regard to military assets. While the use of UOR contracts are often hailed as examples of how greater use of the widest possible networks can achieve far better results, the limitations of this approach have been given far less attention. The MoD already has a wide range of mechanisms in place to reach out to various institutions (suppliers, academic institutions, and specialist research centres). The MoD has also sought to make greater use of modern ICT equipment in order to extend its reach and interactions with key stakeholders. The challenge therefore is not so much to come up with a radically new approach but to work out if it is possible to extend the reach and effectiveness of existing arrangements. Building off existing capability would seem to be the most cost effective means of going about generating such improvements. What is being asked for in this question really seems to be best defined as a question on how to improve MoD communication with key stakeholders. As there is a law of diminishing returns in trying to reach all stakeholders it may be more productive to work out who are the critical stakeholders and develop well resourced and possibly individually tailored communication strategies for them rather than try to reach all with stakeholders with generic communication strategies.
Suggested Action: Conduct a stakeholder analysis to consider the importance of these groups in relation to the MoD capability requirements and then explore if stakeholder requires by way of information and feedback requirements. For example, consider a ‘Knowledge or Information Hub’ approach whereby the Hub is responsible for identifying and implementing the most effective communication methods for each of its spokes.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-411 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 09:02:41 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-411 Q9. Many of the more sophisticated military assets are few in number, take a long time to develop and have very expensive through life costs. Much of the research to date has focussed on how to get the cost structures right at the beginning of the contract. In other words, despite the best intent the framing up of contracts tends to be efficiency focussed. However the question asked is about “effectiveness” which is usually taken to be a strategic measure associated with outcomes. Without a deeper understanding of how to measure effectiveness it is difficult to answer the question. However as it also mentions budgets it is assumed that cost management for the through life of the asset is a major consideration. As most of the costs are involved in the through life and upgrades of the assets, it would useful to investigate in far more details what has happened with the through life costs of these assets. In particular given the comparative rarity of these large assets there is a need to investigate how to make better use of the maintenance facilities of other countries, if there are any economies of scale to be gained by either concentrating maintenance of specific asset types held across nations or conversely smoothing maintenance activities, and what tradeoffs would be involved in terms of other identified risks such as sovereign capability, national employment, etc. It is most likely that in the end the aggregate decision will come down to what level of risk a nation can live relative to its imperative to reducing overall costs without necessarily loosing the military capability required to meet its strategic ambition. It is probable that either a Transaction Cost Economics or a Resource Based View is the ideal solution and means of deciding who should make what but a combination of politics, bureaucracy and national interest make neither possible. Suggested Action: Review existing decision making models used by European and other allies with emphasis on how they assess risks relative to costs. The strategic aim of the study would be to determine if there is a way to pool risk sharing in order to generate significant savings. Q9. Many of the more sophisticated military assets are few in number, take a long time to develop and have very expensive through life costs. Much of the research to date has focussed on how to get the cost structures right at the beginning of the contract. In other words, despite the best intent the framing up of contracts tends to be efficiency focussed. However the question asked is about “effectiveness” which is usually taken to be a strategic measure associated with outcomes. Without a deeper understanding of how to measure effectiveness it is difficult to answer the question. However as it also mentions budgets it is assumed that cost management for the through life of the asset is a major consideration. As most of the costs are involved in the through life and upgrades of the assets, it would useful to investigate in far more details what has happened with the through life costs of these assets. In particular given the comparative rarity of these large assets there is a need to investigate how to make better use of the maintenance facilities of other countries, if there are any economies of scale to be gained by either concentrating maintenance of specific asset types held across nations or conversely smoothing maintenance activities, and what tradeoffs would be involved in terms of other identified risks such as sovereign capability, national employment, etc. It is most likely that in the end the aggregate decision will come down to what level of risk a nation can live relative to its imperative to reducing overall costs without necessarily loosing the military capability required to meet its strategic ambition. It is probable that either a Transaction Cost Economics or a Resource Based View is the ideal solution and means of deciding who should make what but a combination of politics, bureaucracy and national interest make neither possible.
Suggested Action: Review existing decision making models used by European and other allies with emphasis on how they assess risks relative to costs. The strategic aim of the study would be to determine if there is a way to pool risk sharing in order to generate significant savings.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-410 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 09:01:53 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-410 Q8. (continued) ii) Review decision making processes in respect to large assets and why interoperability and bi-lateral purchases appear to be so difficult to implement across the board. Q8. (continued) ii) Review decision making processes in respect to large assets and why interoperability and bi-lateral purchases appear to be so difficult to implement across the board.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-409 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 09:00:37 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-409 Q8. NATO standards already provide considerable guidance on how to develop equipment in a manner which ensures interoperability. There is therefore a need to explore in more depth why this is not happening in either the scale or volume that should be expected. For instance the rest of Europe tends to use a smooth bore tank gun while the UK persists with a rifled gun. While the case for standardisation is accepted as have several benefits beyond direct interoperability (e.g. being able to distribute store locations for ammunition across nations and thereby increasing flexibility and responsiveness, smoothing production, etc) it does not happen as often as would be expected. Clearly sunk costs in existing assets make it difficult to justify the changing to a common interoperable standard. What therefore seems more relevant to understand is why bodies such as NATO have been as successful to date in generating standardisation. Clearly there are variables (other than cost) involved in this decision making which have a huge impact on decision making and these need to be better understood. Suggested Action: i) Review the long life assets presently used by the UK military with a view to determining their strategic trajectory and what if anything can be done to move them toward greater interoperability with European partners. Q8. NATO standards already provide considerable guidance on how to develop equipment in a manner which ensures interoperability. There is therefore a need to explore in more depth why this is not happening in either the scale or volume that should be expected. For instance the rest of Europe tends to use a smooth bore tank gun while the UK persists with a rifled gun. While the case for standardisation is accepted as have several benefits beyond direct interoperability (e.g. being able to distribute store locations for ammunition across nations and thereby increasing flexibility and responsiveness, smoothing production, etc) it does not happen as often as would be expected. Clearly sunk costs in existing assets make it difficult to justify the changing to a common interoperable standard. What therefore seems more relevant to understand is why bodies such as NATO have been as successful to date in generating standardisation. Clearly there are variables (other than cost) involved in this decision making which have a huge impact on decision making and these need to be better understood.
Suggested Action:
i) Review the long life assets presently used by the UK military with a view to determining their strategic trajectory and what if anything can be done to move them toward greater interoperability with European partners.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-408 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 08:59:52 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-408 Q7. The term “successful procurement” can be measured from several perspectives. Despite its popularity, the term “value for money” is not well defined and does little to reduce the problem associated with multi-measurement issues as this still requires someone to declare what is it is they “value” e.g. sovereign capability, local employment, strategic development of certain industries, etc. Assessing bi-lateral arrangements brings in additional complexities as recent examples with the USA demonstrate. The Joint Strike Fighter and the role of the US Senate in imposing ITAR restrictions mean that in the long term the UK can be held hostage to both the maintainer of the aircraft and changes in US interests, at the possible expense of UK interests. There are no simple solutions to these problems, but in the short term there is a need to clarify how “successful” is measured within a “Capability Management” framework. Once this is done it will be far easier to answer this question with greater consistency. Suggested Actions: Similar to comments already outlined in Question 6, Cranfield, in conjunction with other Universities could undertake a benchmarking exercise to determine which actors are the key features of a successful bi-lateral procurement arrangement and why. The insights gained from this research would then go a long way to answering this question. Q7. The term “successful procurement” can be measured from several perspectives. Despite its popularity, the term “value for money” is not well defined and does little to reduce the problem associated with multi-measurement issues as this still requires someone to declare what is it is they “value” e.g. sovereign capability, local employment, strategic development of certain industries, etc. Assessing bi-lateral arrangements brings in additional complexities as recent examples with the USA demonstrate. The Joint Strike Fighter and the role of the US Senate in imposing ITAR restrictions mean that in the long term the UK can be held hostage to both the maintainer of the aircraft and changes in US interests, at the possible expense of UK interests. There are no simple solutions to these problems, but in the short term there is a need to clarify how “successful” is measured within a “Capability Management” framework. Once this is done it will be far easier to answer this question with greater consistency.
Suggested Actions: Similar to comments already outlined in Question 6, Cranfield, in conjunction with other Universities could undertake a benchmarking exercise to determine which actors are the key features of a successful bi-lateral procurement arrangement and why. The insights gained from this research would then go a long way to answering this question.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Philip Poole http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-407 Philip Poole Thu, 31 Mar 2011 08:58:42 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-407 Q6. In line with the Gray Report the most obvious step is to rapidly increase the “professionalisation” of the acquisition community. Cranfield already works extensively with a number of academic educators of such professionals across the world e.g. USA, Canada, Australasia, Nordic Countries, several European communities and some Asian countries (e.g. Malaysia and Singapore). Professionalisation presently suffers three weaknesses. 1. The development of military acquisition professionals has fallen well behind demand. 2. Acquisition professionals are developed within a nation-centric perspective while working with suppliers who increasingly operate within a business model built around what best serves their commercial interests within international markets. 3. While there is considerable agreement on the need for hard and soft skills to meet the requirements of “professionalism” only the hard skills are well defined yet it is the soft (interpersonal – relational) skills that make a professional a high performer, there is far less agreement and understanding of what these skills should be or how they are best developed. Suggested Action: Cranfield is contracted to use its extensive international contacts with Universities (specialising in military acquisition) throughout the world to generate an international benchmarking exercise to identify what are considered best practice “soft skills” and why (i.e. how they help meet the strategic challenges faced by the military in each country). Also gather information on what are considered the most effective methodologies to develop these skills. Q6. In line with the Gray Report the most obvious step is to rapidly increase the “professionalisation” of the acquisition community. Cranfield already works extensively with a number of academic educators of such professionals across the world e.g. USA, Canada, Australasia, Nordic Countries, several European communities and some Asian countries (e.g. Malaysia and Singapore). Professionalisation presently suffers three weaknesses.
1. The development of military acquisition professionals has fallen well behind demand.
2. Acquisition professionals are developed within a nation-centric perspective while working with suppliers who increasingly operate within a business model built around what best serves their commercial interests within international markets.
3. While there is considerable agreement on the need for hard and soft skills to meet the requirements of “professionalism” only the hard skills are well defined yet it is the soft (interpersonal – relational) skills that make a professional a high performer, there is far less agreement and understanding of what these skills should be or how they are best developed.
Suggested Action: Cranfield is contracted to use its extensive international contacts with Universities (specialising in military acquisition) throughout the world to generate an international benchmarking exercise to identify what are considered best practice “soft skills” and why (i.e. how they help meet the strategic challenges faced by the military in each country). Also gather information on what are considered the most effective methodologies to develop these skills.

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by Zaneta Ulozeviciute http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-406 Zaneta Ulozeviciute Thu, 31 Mar 2011 08:00:38 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-406 MEMORANDUM FROM RESEARCH COUNCILS UK IN RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION PAPER ON EQUIPMENT, SUPPORT AND TECHNOLOGY FOR UK DEFENCE AND SECURITY 1. Research Councils UK (RCUK) is a strategic partnership set up to champion the research supported by the seven UK Research Councils. RCUK was established in 2002 to enable the Councils to work together more effectively to enhance the overall impact and effectiveness of their research, training and innovation activities, contributing to the delivery of the Government’s objectives for science and innovation. Further details are available at www.rcuk.ac.uk. 2. This evidence is submitted by RCUK Global Uncertainties (GU) Programme on behalf of the Research Councils listed below and represents their independent views. This evidence does not include or necessarily reflect the views of the Science and Research Group in the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS). The submission is made on behalf of the following Councils which are members of the Global Uncertainties Programme : Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) Medical Research Council (MRC) Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) Q1 Does our proposed approach, based on the three key principles, strike the right balance between the various factors influencing how we will go about fulfilling our defence and security requirements? 3. Yes, we believe that the proposed approach does strike the right balance. With regard to the second key principle, the RCUK Global Uncertainties Programme can act as a central point for contact with UK academia, and can help to ensure that the UK has the necessary range of expertise to help inform decision making. Q3 Are their particular technological or industrial capabilities, including skills, that you believe are crucial to national security? If so, please give details? 4. We have not identified any specific gaps in provision. If gaps are identified then Research Councils could contribute in a range of ways to helping to address them, from PhD students (eg the £17M Centre for Doctoral Training in Security and Crime Science, SECReT, at UCL) to academic fellowships (eg 14 Global Uncertainties Fellows in Ideas and Beliefs). Q6 How can the UK get the best from working with other nations, whilst avoiding the pitfalls? 5. One way to achieve this is through academic research collaborations at the basic, pre-competitive stage. Research Councils have a range of ways of facilitating international collaborations at this stage. For example the Global Uncertainties Programme has helped to support and run the joint OSCT/DHS workshops referred to in paragraph 69. Research Councils can work flexibly with a range of overseas partners including Government Departments and agencies, research council equivalents and business to fund UK academics in such partnerships. Q11 What should be the balance of priorities for research investment in science and technology for defence and security purposes? 6. This response covers several of the specific questions 12-25 as well. By working in partnership with Research Councils, it is possible for Government Departments to gear their research funds. There are a range of ways of doing this, from collaborating on individual grants to joint funding programmes (eg EPSRC-DSTL £2M Signal Processing call, or the Armour and Protection Science and Technology Centre mentioned in para 98). Research Councils can reach across the UK academic research base, many of whom will not have a tradition of working on defence and security projects. Furthermore the Research Councils’ rigorous peer review process ensures that the highest quality research is supported. In general Research Councils require that research results are placed in the public domain, for example through the academic literature, although Councils also wish to encourage the maximum impact of their research through a range of pathways. 7. Emerging areas of long term potential can be identified through horizon scanning processes. Research Councils use a range of these techniques and often partner with other organisations in this process. Q58 What mechanisms could be used to help industry (both defence and civil) better exploit the results of investment in defence research and development? 8. Research Councils have a range of collaborative mechanisms to help facilitate knowledge exchange. These include industrial co-funding or participation in research projects and CASE (Collaborative Awards in Science and Engineering) PhD studentships. Tripartite partnerships (Research Council – Industry - Government) are also possible. MEMORANDUM FROM RESEARCH COUNCILS UK IN RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION PAPER ON EQUIPMENT, SUPPORT AND TECHNOLOGY FOR UK DEFENCE AND SECURITY

1. Research Councils UK (RCUK) is a strategic partnership set up to champion the research supported by the seven UK Research Councils. RCUK was established in 2002 to enable the Councils to work together more effectively to enhance the overall impact and effectiveness of their research, training and innovation activities, contributing to the delivery of the Government’s objectives for science and innovation. Further details are available at http://www.rcuk.ac.uk.

2. This evidence is submitted by RCUK Global Uncertainties (GU) Programme on behalf of the Research Councils listed below and represents their independent views.

This evidence does not include or necessarily reflect the views of the Science and Research Group in the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS). The submission is made on behalf of the following Councils which are members of the Global Uncertainties Programme :

Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC)
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)
Medical Research Council (MRC)
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)
Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC)

Q1 Does our proposed approach, based on the three key principles, strike the right balance between the various factors influencing how we will go about fulfilling our defence and security requirements?

3. Yes, we believe that the proposed approach does strike the right balance. With regard to the second key principle, the RCUK Global Uncertainties Programme can act as a central point for contact with UK academia, and can help to ensure that the UK has the necessary range of expertise to help inform decision making.

Q3 Are their particular technological or industrial capabilities, including skills, that you believe are crucial to national security? If so, please give details?

4. We have not identified any specific gaps in provision. If gaps are identified then Research Councils could contribute in a range of ways to helping to address them, from PhD students (eg the £17M Centre for Doctoral Training in Security and Crime Science, SECReT, at UCL) to academic fellowships (eg 14 Global Uncertainties Fellows in Ideas and Beliefs).

Q6 How can the UK get the best from working with other nations, whilst avoiding the pitfalls?

5. One way to achieve this is through academic research collaborations at the basic, pre-competitive stage. Research Councils have a range of ways of facilitating international collaborations at this stage. For example the Global Uncertainties Programme has helped to support and run the joint OSCT/DHS workshops referred to in paragraph 69. Research Councils can work flexibly with a range of overseas partners including Government Departments and agencies, research council equivalents and business to fund UK academics in such partnerships.

Q11 What should be the balance of priorities for research investment in science and technology for defence and security purposes?

6. This response covers several of the specific questions 12-25 as well. By working in partnership with Research Councils, it is possible for Government Departments to gear their research funds. There are a range of ways of doing this, from collaborating on individual grants to joint funding programmes (eg EPSRC-DSTL £2M Signal Processing call, or the Armour and Protection Science and Technology Centre mentioned in para 98). Research Councils can reach across the UK academic research base, many of whom will not have a tradition of working on defence and security projects. Furthermore the Research Councils’ rigorous peer review process ensures that the highest quality research is supported. In general Research Councils require that research results are placed in the public domain, for example through the academic literature, although Councils also wish to encourage the maximum impact of their research through a range of pathways.

7. Emerging areas of long term potential can be identified through horizon scanning processes. Research Councils use a range of these techniques and often partner with other organisations in this process.

Q58 What mechanisms could be used to help industry (both defence and civil) better exploit the results of investment in defence research and development?

8. Research Councils have a range of collaborative mechanisms to help facilitate knowledge exchange. These include industrial co-funding or participation in research projects and CASE (Collaborative Awards in Science and Engineering) PhD studentships. Tripartite partnerships (Research Council – Industry – Government) are also possible.

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Comment on 3.3 Cyberspace – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-3-cyberspace-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-405 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 19:39:39 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=230#comment-405 Q85- Yes Q86- Yes, however a worthwhile output of para 220 and 221 would also be a better set of complex network and system security defaults that are mandated to be in force to sell such technologies or software within the UK. Q87- Yes. See also Q86 response. Whilst contentious we should also look to make more robust the in built capabilities of that of the ISPs and Telco’s to have more of a duty of care to prevent such carried traffic that is obvious to spot and should be prevented. Currently all telephone traffic that is a mass phone in is stopped (using network traffic management features) at the extremities of the network to prevent network damage/blocking and also prevent the end switch from failing; it would be prudent for such concerted DoS and similar flood attacks to be also prevented and not carried – the technology exists for this to be readily done now/today. Q85- Yes

Q86- Yes, however a worthwhile output of para 220 and 221 would also be a better set of complex network and system security defaults that are mandated to be in force to sell such technologies or software within the UK.

Q87- Yes. See also Q86 response. Whilst contentious we should also look to make more robust the in built capabilities of that of the ISPs and Telco’s to have more of a duty of care to prevent such carried traffic that is obvious to spot and should be prevented. Currently all telephone traffic that is a mass phone in is stopped (using network traffic management features) at the extremities of the network to prevent network damage/blocking and also prevent the end switch from failing; it would be prudent for such concerted DoS and similar flood attacks to be also prevented and not carried – the technology exists for this to be readily done now/today.

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Comment on 3.2 Security – Key Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-2-security-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-404 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 19:22:24 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=226#comment-404 Q76- Industry has an approach of managing non-disclosure and it is possible to have a staged approach that can do basic antecedence checks early on and culminate with good strong security approvals as is necessary. CDE does a sterling job at briefing industry and this should be actively encouraged and developed for the UK’s version of the DHS. Pre accreditation (c.f. the Blue Book) of suppliers is a strong and an appropriate way forward. Q77- Quality Branding and Pre accreditation. Better cognition of the evidential requirements and judicial tests of systems – (eg camera placements in a CCTV installation) Q78- CDE bidding gateway and more open engagement from HOSDB and Other Government Departments. Q79- Interwork across OGDs, HOSDB and MoD and exchange knowledge of SMEs and Universities to actively encourage the use and reuse of those skills to better drive up value for money and ensure a strong move away from famine and feast – thereby actively underpinning industry and hence government to succeed. Q80- Already suggested such – yes. But ensure considerably more research is done by SMEs and Industry more widely than current. Q81- It should be a lot higher – How many SMEs and Universities are aware of the many existing standards – including data models and special evidential system interfaces? Q82- UK PLC stamp – is a gold standard that many countries have a similar judicial system so some of the features, functionality and interoperability would be highly beneficial. Some not because of the organisational differences and hence peculiarities of interfacing would not help exports, however this is not a barrier to exports per say. Q83- Huge benefit. Could be operated like the Information Assurance programme and products require that additional testing to be done prior to use and as such the product costs proportionally more. Q84- Prudent and commercial astuteness should be strongly followed. Q76- Industry has an approach of managing non-disclosure and it is possible to have a staged approach that can do basic antecedence checks early on and culminate with good strong security approvals as is necessary. CDE does a sterling job at briefing industry and this should be actively encouraged and developed for the UK’s version of the DHS. Pre accreditation (c.f. the Blue Book) of suppliers is a strong and an appropriate way forward.

Q77- Quality Branding and Pre accreditation. Better cognition of the evidential requirements and judicial tests of systems – (eg camera placements in a CCTV installation)

Q78- CDE bidding gateway and more open engagement from HOSDB and Other Government Departments.

Q79- Interwork across OGDs, HOSDB and MoD and exchange knowledge of SMEs and Universities to actively encourage the use and reuse of those skills to better drive up value for money and ensure a strong move away from famine and feast – thereby actively underpinning industry and hence government to succeed.

Q80- Already suggested such – yes. But ensure considerably more research is done by SMEs and Industry more widely than current.

Q81- It should be a lot higher – How many SMEs and Universities are aware of the many existing standards – including data models and special evidential system interfaces?

Q82- UK PLC stamp – is a gold standard that many countries have a similar judicial system so some of the features, functionality and interoperability would be highly beneficial. Some not because of the organisational differences and hence peculiarities of interfacing would not help exports, however this is not a barrier to exports per say.

Q83- Huge benefit. Could be operated like the Information Assurance programme and products require that additional testing to be done prior to use and as such the product costs proportionally more.

Q84- Prudent and commercial astuteness should be strongly followed.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-403 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 18:49:49 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-403 Q69- No; Especially previous UK capability experts and that of the SMEs and Universities… To an extent some of this is being now done via CDE. Q70/71- Nearly all of the support roles could legitimately be transferred from the Armed Forces and done by industry – the key to this is the provision of CONDO terms and the acceptance and provisions of liability and the corporate duty of care under the health and safety at work act amongst others. There are many industrial firms well suited to support and logistical operations. Some roles are best retained in house that are appropriate to do so for operational reasons given the sensitive nature of some operations, support services or logistics – or where it wouldn’t be cost effective to provide for such. Q72- by commercially being astute to review the costs of such and ensuring [1] security is still tightly maintained and [2] the value for money is not at a cost of second rate quality or service that will operationally hamper the Armed Forces. Q73- Deliver its plans for the new training facilities in South Wales and grow its use and programmes in Augmented Reality. Q74- no comment Q75- Many. We are the only company in the UK to our knowledge that everyone in the company has in its contract of employment mandatory CONDO terms. That said it is highly complex with current theatres to effectively define appropriate MoU’s and limits of liability when the defacto position of CONDO contract terms could have the potential to leave open the claim for corporate manslaughter. The insurance provisions and employee family support leave open complex legal issues for liability if at work this death/serious injury occurs in a war zone. The data protection and other security implications need careful management by the supplier especially if the support arrangements are for repair activities of active/live systems with sensitive data. Addressing the pastoral care requirements (not adequately covered by CONDO contractual terms) – falls to the supplier for the repatriation of the employee and any long term needs. Q69- No; Especially previous UK capability experts and that of the SMEs and Universities… To an extent some of this is being now done via CDE.

Q70/71- Nearly all of the support roles could legitimately be transferred from the Armed Forces and done by industry – the key to this is the provision of CONDO terms and the acceptance and provisions of liability and the corporate duty of care under the health and safety at work act amongst others. There are many industrial firms well suited to support and logistical operations. Some roles are best retained in house that are appropriate to do so for operational reasons given the sensitive nature of some operations, support services or logistics – or where it wouldn’t be cost effective to provide for such.

Q72- by commercially being astute to review the costs of such and ensuring [1] security is still tightly maintained and [2] the value for money is not at a cost of second rate quality or service that will operationally hamper the Armed Forces.

Q73- Deliver its plans for the new training facilities in South Wales and grow its use and programmes in Augmented Reality.

Q74- no comment

Q75- Many. We are the only company in the UK to our knowledge that everyone in the company has in its contract of employment mandatory CONDO terms. That said it is highly complex with current theatres to effectively define appropriate MoU’s and limits of liability when the defacto position of CONDO contract terms could have the potential to leave open the claim for corporate manslaughter. The insurance provisions and employee family support leave open complex legal issues for liability if at work this death/serious injury occurs in a war zone. The data protection and other security implications need careful management by the supplier especially if the support arrangements are for repair activities of active/live systems with sensitive data. Addressing the pastoral care requirements (not adequately covered by CONDO contractual terms) – falls to the supplier for the repatriation of the employee and any long term needs.

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Comment on 3.1.2 Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-urgent-operational-requirements-uors-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-402 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 18:23:05 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=345#comment-402 Q64/65/66/67- Yes – although C4ISTAR is huge and whilst synthesis, data fusion and tasking are key.. special focus on EW distinct EO and ESM/ECM would benefit – especial as the overlaps and synergy with the spectrum comes to the fore with Cyber. Q68- Like successful industry does - it always does succession planning and has sensible review milestones at pertinent points in a long term programme. Q64/65/66/67- Yes – although C4ISTAR is huge and whilst synthesis, data fusion and tasking are key.. special focus on EW distinct EO and ESM/ECM would benefit – especial as the overlaps and synergy with the spectrum comes to the fore with Cyber.

Q68- Like successful industry does – it always does succession planning and has sensible review milestones at pertinent points in a long term programme.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-401 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 18:21:47 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-401 Q55- As we answered Q14; Empirically a 30% short, 50% medium and 20% long term approach would be better to the Research Programme Expenditure/Focus.. Taking Short to mean 0-2years, Medium 2-10 years and long the10 to 20 years timeframe. Like Industry the approach to long term economic considerations would clearly stretch and alter milestones (hence expenditure) on the long term – or perhaps medium term if absolutely necessary. Short term reprioritisation should only be done based on threats and urgent needs. Q56- Considerable down streaming of technology has been done in the past in medicine, EO, displays, materials, energy, acoustics, signal processing etc etc.. The DEFCON705 terms actively encourage the IPR to remain with the supplier and to be exploited. The tight contracting regime though needs to engage discussions of potential spin out – as it often actively precludes advertising and such promotion – thereby SMEs are likely to be discouraged for finding potential products or parts thereof… Q57- Due regard for the potential to exploitation, innovation potential costs to exploit, ROI, potential for government to government transfer/sale of capability (Leverage for the UK), and the likelihood of the supplier to be a prolific innovator or an expert in a field that is considered highly key to the country. Better end user input (including End User input in CDE) in the final say on projects. Q58/59- more open access to Athena and other repositories and due note most of the SMEs and Universities are not on the secure network of government thereby precluding their access – some of the primes are; so this playing field needs addressing with due regard to security. Q59- [1] more open less risk adverse contracting terms, [2] partnering/fostering the special skills many of the SMEs and Universities hold, [3] more longer terms (i.e. short and medium term projects) contracting will allow for businesses to see it is worth the nugatory effort and abortive bid work in engagement to better underpin and support the UK. Q60- no comment Q61- as with many other key requirements – energy efficiency should be on the table. Any soldier will tell you carrying heavy lorry batteries isn’t ideal. So if it is applicable energy efficiency should be the most important, in others it isn’t. Q62- Electronic Surveillance, Electronic Warfare {ESM, ECM, and ELINT}, Augmented Reality, Information Assurance, Cryptography, Advanced Signal Processing, Cyber Warfare {incl Infosec), Telecommunications, Human Behavioural Analysis – not exhaustive but are the key elements technologically, industrially and the key skills the UK should ensure are nurtured. The approach to keeping these we have already stated across all of the above questions – it is crucial to partner and identify those key skills and gaps that exist… this should not just become a resource need for say DSTL, the country should look at the skills and support SMEs and Universities to fill these gaps short, medium and long term. Q63- contract with them to win! Q55- As we answered Q14; Empirically a 30% short, 50% medium and 20% long term approach would be better to the Research Programme Expenditure/Focus.. Taking Short to mean 0-2years, Medium 2-10 years and long the10 to 20 years timeframe. Like Industry the approach to long term economic considerations would clearly stretch and alter milestones (hence expenditure) on the long term – or perhaps medium term if absolutely necessary. Short term reprioritisation should only be done based on threats and urgent needs.

Q56- Considerable down streaming of technology has been done in the past in medicine, EO, displays, materials, energy, acoustics, signal processing etc etc.. The DEFCON705 terms actively encourage the IPR to remain with the supplier and to be exploited. The tight contracting regime though needs to engage discussions of potential spin out – as it often actively precludes advertising and such promotion – thereby SMEs are likely to be discouraged for finding potential products or parts thereof…

Q57- Due regard for the potential to exploitation, innovation potential costs to exploit, ROI, potential for government to government transfer/sale of capability (Leverage for the UK), and the likelihood of the supplier to be a prolific innovator or an expert in a field that is considered highly key to the country. Better end user input (including End User input in CDE) in the final say on projects.

Q58/59- more open access to Athena and other repositories and due note most of the SMEs and Universities are not on the secure network of government thereby precluding their access – some of the primes are; so this playing field needs addressing with due regard to security.

Q59- [1] more open less risk adverse contracting terms, [2] partnering/fostering the special skills many of the SMEs and Universities hold, [3] more longer terms (i.e. short and medium term projects) contracting will allow for businesses to see it is worth the nugatory effort and abortive bid work in engagement to better underpin and support the UK.

Q60- no comment

Q61- as with many other key requirements – energy efficiency should be on the table. Any soldier will tell you carrying heavy lorry batteries isn’t ideal. So if it is applicable energy efficiency should be the most important, in others it isn’t.

Q62- Electronic Surveillance, Electronic Warfare {ESM, ECM, and ELINT}, Augmented Reality, Information Assurance, Cryptography, Advanced Signal Processing, Cyber Warfare {incl Infosec), Telecommunications, Human Behavioural Analysis – not exhaustive but are the key elements technologically, industrially and the key skills the UK should ensure are nurtured. The approach to keeping these we have already stated across all of the above questions – it is crucial to partner and identify those key skills and gaps that exist… this should not just become a resource need for say DSTL, the country should look at the skills and support SMEs and Universities to fill these gaps short, medium and long term.

Q63- contract with them to win!

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-2/#comment-400 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 17:34:22 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-400 Q37/Q38- SMEs are by their very nature often very agile businesses that may be highly sensitive to cash flow impacts and delays/nugatory effort that is needed to resolve contracting agreements is of concern and note. SMEs do need to watch longer term commitments and famine and feast hurt the resourcing and business development. They are though highly innovative and are the major source of Intellectual Property (development and exploitation) which will yield high value in the UK. Government zero (financial) risk contracting is not conducive with nurturing a strong collaborative partnership that yields high value innovation and contributions. It unfortunately drives behaviours which potentially will develop this IP and capability ‘in-house’ first and then potentially offer it to MoD with limited risk of impact due to the zero risk contracting…. Q39-Partnering better and government involvement on SME sites – will foster better relationships and hence produce more effective trusting arrangements that will in turn yield strong value for money. After all the SMEs offer a strong route to the short term needs given the flexibility and high levels of innovation they possess. Security risks are currently well managed and the DVA procedures are well established and effective. The Financial risks are two fold, if the contracting approach is too tight you actually create the potential for the risk to mature as you potentially kill the companies cash flow. Secondly such stricture to process in high innovation research can drive contracting to know all aspects and the fully articulated answer (eg the cure for this virus is xyz before the research is done!). Take care for risk management to therefore become highly stage based tiny step/incremental research which yields potential to produce very long drawn out timescales for research fruition. Take note the real innovation sits in this space that is currently being over risk managed… Q40- Yes and where appropriate with controls (e.g. the current security approval process of individuals and/or companies where appropriate). Q41- Make sure the collaboration between Primes, SMEs and indeed Universities protects all parties IP and financial rewards, to ensure a united and effective long term result for the capability and skill sets. Q42- Yes and auditable that it is open/fair. Q43- No. Q44- Yes. Q45- Contracts that end 31st March (hence short term) actively discourages longer term relationships – also it does little to engage wider SME consortia commitments. Remember cash flow and the costs of bidding/contracting can be very high and nugatory. Q46- Yes money and also commercial interests often are such that preclude little SMEs from effectively producing and contributing to Defence Standards… c.f. Mobile phone chargers and PC interfacing… Q47- as DARPA have a small, strong, effective, and empowered team that is not restricted by short team cut-off dates (eg 31st March). Industry regularly manages to do its business plans beyond year end dates without undue restrictions on its suppliers – this surely can be done by government to do an effective light touch and rapid assessment at the year end that does not stop all work until completed. Q48- effective partnerships as stated in answer to Q39, will balance the needs of consolidating purchasing power – so too will the propensity towards enumerate small contracts. You can still support SME procurements with a minimum contract philosophy of say £75,000 or £100,000 – thereby ensuring more value for money and less contract negotiation. Q49- no comment Q50/51- Constant Feast and Famine and strong partnering relationship are the major barriers for government engagement with SMEs. Q52- License the IP from the SME to Government and not the Prime. The prime gets the IP only through the GFE process – hence strongly protecting the IPR of the SME. Q53- no comment Q54- CDE already does a stunning job in this area. MoD should ensure it understands what leading expertise exists out with the SME base and perhaps like HOSDB produce and manage an equivalent to the BLUE BOOK – say a GREEN BOOK. Q37/Q38- SMEs are by their very nature often very agile businesses that may be highly sensitive to cash flow impacts and delays/nugatory effort that is needed to resolve contracting agreements is of concern and note. SMEs do need to watch longer term commitments and famine and feast hurt the resourcing and business development. They are though highly innovative and are the major source of Intellectual Property (development and exploitation) which will yield high value in the UK. Government zero (financial) risk contracting is not conducive with nurturing a strong collaborative partnership that yields high value innovation and contributions. It unfortunately drives behaviours which potentially will develop this IP and capability ‘in-house’ first and then potentially offer it to MoD with limited risk of impact due to the zero risk contracting….

Q39-Partnering better and government involvement on SME sites – will foster better relationships and hence produce more effective trusting arrangements that will in turn yield strong value for money. After all the SMEs offer a strong route to the short term needs given the flexibility and high levels of innovation they possess. Security risks are currently well managed and the DVA procedures are well established and effective. The Financial risks are two fold, if the contracting approach is too tight you actually create the potential for the risk to mature as you potentially kill the companies cash flow. Secondly such stricture to process in high innovation research can drive contracting to know all aspects and the fully articulated answer (eg the cure for this virus is xyz before the research is done!). Take care for risk management to therefore become highly stage based tiny step/incremental research which yields potential to produce very long drawn out timescales for research fruition. Take note the real innovation sits in this space that is currently being over risk managed…

Q40- Yes and where appropriate with controls (e.g. the current security approval process of individuals and/or companies where appropriate).

Q41- Make sure the collaboration between Primes, SMEs and indeed Universities protects all parties IP and financial rewards, to ensure a united and effective long term result for the capability and skill sets.

Q42- Yes and auditable that it is open/fair.

Q43- No.

Q44- Yes.

Q45- Contracts that end 31st March (hence short term) actively discourages longer term relationships – also it does little to engage wider SME consortia commitments. Remember cash flow and the costs of bidding/contracting can be very high and nugatory.

Q46- Yes money and also commercial interests often are such that preclude little SMEs from effectively producing and contributing to Defence Standards… c.f. Mobile phone chargers and PC interfacing…

Q47- as DARPA have a small, strong, effective, and empowered team that is not restricted by short team cut-off dates (eg 31st March). Industry regularly manages to do its business plans beyond year end dates without undue restrictions on its suppliers – this surely can be done by government to do an effective light touch and rapid assessment at the year end that does not stop all work until completed.

Q48- effective partnerships as stated in answer to Q39, will balance the needs of consolidating purchasing power – so too will the propensity towards enumerate small contracts. You can still support SME procurements with a minimum contract philosophy of say £75,000 or £100,000 – thereby ensuring more value for money and less contract negotiation.

Q49- no comment

Q50/51- Constant Feast and Famine and strong partnering relationship are the major barriers for government engagement with SMEs.

Q52- License the IP from the SME to Government and not the Prime. The prime gets the IP only through the GFE process – hence strongly protecting the IPR of the SME.

Q53- no comment

Q54- CDE already does a stunning job in this area. MoD should ensure it understands what leading expertise exists out with the SME base and perhaps like HOSDB produce and manage an equivalent to the BLUE BOOK – say a GREEN BOOK.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-399 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 16:38:45 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-399 Q11- A cogent and coherent funded short, medium and long term plan is needed that develops key capabilities (Question 2 set), core platforms and other capabilities – against a backdrop of understanding COTS doesn’t always allow for interoperability (taking COTS in its broadest meaning of MOTS) and often has capability gaps – some the UK can live with. The balance of priorities needs to ensure skills are developed within the relevant communities in government and in industry to ensure sustainment, value for money and effective deliverance of capabilities both now and in the future. SMEs and Universities have the most crucial part to play here in support of these plans. Q12- Our answer to Q11 yields in part the answer. A cogent and coherent funded short, medium and long term plan. The flexibility comes in the short term – some R&D will be abortive and high innovation/high risk (with high value for money on those that are a success). Some will as the needs change also gain step changes and direction changes that are indeed sensible. Until procurement methods change (and contracting lead times considerably reduce and reliance on all contracts ending the 31st March yielding odd research programme project behaviours which are often disproportionately costly to both the supplier and government), the rate and pace of change will have a value for money element where the abortive research element currently has more risk than is needed. Programmes and Projects to remain both innovative and leading edge should not be discounted simply because of risk or current active programmes. Q13- Core National Security programmes should have long term high level collaborative programmes, short and medium should remain largely in country unless those skills are {genuinely} lacking. The collaborative programme should like KTPs ensure strong skills transfer and inward development, and export skills that can seriously help others. CERN is on many levels an exemplar international programme of science sharing, development and serious knowledge development on an international footing – such programmes if the vested interests are carefully assessed can similarly be done in the defence sector – take note though of the issues we state in our answer to Question 7. Q14- Empirically a 30% short, 50% medium and 20% long term approach would be better. Taking Short to mean 0-2years, Medium 2-10 years and long the10 to 20 years timeframe. Q15- The DARPA model has some serious value for money elements and indeed strongly supports industry and skills continuance. Very little is left to government only, to ensure strong innovation and carefully controlled exploitation. Q16- Current research programmes needs much more industrial {esp SMEs} and Universities involvement. The current engagement model needs to go back in part to the DERA model which had a small programme office that controlled and co-ordinated all research threads across government and industry – not subcontracting some management and steerage elements of this. By intelligently co-ordinating this in house, by selective and effective briefings (such as the CDE briefings which are inexpensive to attend), much stronger innovation and engagement would be possible with stronger coherence, more effective communication and better value for money. Be aware nugatory effort of bidding is highly costly to small firms and universities and as such (and perhaps like DARPA) sensible lower limits on contract sizes should perhaps be set. Q17- CDE model is excellent and long overdue. The briefings are first class, the portal idea is really good and effective to use, however some procedural refinement would be wise on the peer review of bids when all but one thinks the idea is absolutely key to proceed and one doesn’t – current approach rejects this which has the potential to miss good innovation and improvement for the country. It is appears that the CDE model is largely focussing on proof of concept (TRL3) and hence small contract sizes; it would be wise to engage more of the wider research programmes in a similar manner (and allowing classified submissions were appropriate). The CDE approach for MoD to road show throughout the UK is prudent to deliver the core element of this question as the wider new supply base is growing rightly. Existing MoD suppliers that have security approvals should be encouraged to engage with their supply chain to introduce appropriate companies to CDE and also where security provisions allow interwork with each other to a stronger and better effect for MoD. Q18- great and welcomed! Cyber would be wise, so would items for the OGDs. It would be prudent for the role expansion to also look at the Technical Demonstrator Programmes too…. A few procedural changes would result in much better results. Contracting delays and timescales with a hard 31st March end date sometimes exceed the duration and length of the timescales to deliver the project itself or compress such and drive odd commercial behaviour to reduce the work to be done! For SMEs this is highly painful and results in excess costs that on fixed price work are not accounted for originally – leading to supplier relations issues and better networking between suppliers and also suppliers to MoD. Q19- return in part to the partnering approach to delivering projects that existed in the DERA days – sometimes with collocated (short term) some key resource sharing to ensure success in projects and better value for money in more effective and timely results. Arms length project management in our experience rarely delivers strong cost effective results. Q20- see our Q8 answer – in a former role I lead the delivery of one of Europe’s largest Real Time Systems development systems engineering programme – this had some of the most complex system interoperability and mission critical interfacing. The key answer to the needs of Q20 is largely covered by Q8. Q21- Procure it as is – warts and all… And use it as is. Don’t procure it and then try modifying it and transforming the procurement into essentially a major re-development. Pick wisely what you procure as COTS and ensure life of capability is commensurate with the suppliers’ view of such life… Otherwise the whole life costs can be seriously misgiving and this process is both de-motivating for both the supplier and end user. Q22- This is often done within the DEFCON703 development arena… smart procurement can be achieved by considering given architectures, technologies and sub-systems/assemblies. If these are given and GFE’d industry can readily engage and ensure its work isn’t nugatory. There is nothing worse at the leading edge for a small set of companies to all bid for a complex capability (famine and feast again) and the loosing team either exports or has wasted precious money, skills and capabilities that may indeed be lost for good for the country. Q23/24- Develop a partnering model that engages with SMEs and Primes to develop capabilities based intelligently on key skills and capabilities – not the financial strength nor leverage of the company. If you want true value for money, flexibility and want a strong defence R&D capability in the UK (and with those that engage with the UK), then it is critical to value contribution and skills and the impact of engagement (eg costs and implications of nugatory effort). Q25- COTS is often seen as short term and MOTS long term. Both preconceptions are wrong. You can have short term MOTS and similarly long term COTS. The issue is the procedural approach to longevity and the supply chain succession management. It is crucial to understand the life of the procurement and a realistic service life. The service succession approach in the supply chain (spares, repairs, data evolution, etc) is a key element to success. Q11- A cogent and coherent funded short, medium and long term plan is needed that develops key capabilities (Question 2 set), core platforms and other capabilities – against a backdrop of understanding COTS doesn’t always allow for interoperability (taking COTS in its broadest meaning of MOTS) and often has capability gaps – some the UK can live with. The balance of priorities needs to ensure skills are developed within the relevant communities in government and in industry to ensure sustainment, value for money and effective deliverance of capabilities both now and in the future. SMEs and Universities have the most crucial part to play here in support of these plans.

Q12- Our answer to Q11 yields in part the answer. A cogent and coherent funded short, medium and long term plan. The flexibility comes in the short term – some R&D will be abortive and high innovation/high risk (with high value for money on those that are a success). Some will as the needs change also gain step changes and direction changes that are indeed sensible. Until procurement methods change (and contracting lead times considerably reduce and reliance on all contracts ending the 31st March yielding odd research programme project behaviours which are often disproportionately costly to both the supplier and government), the rate and pace of change will have a value for money element where the abortive research element currently has more risk than is needed. Programmes and Projects to remain both innovative and leading edge should not be discounted simply because of risk or current active programmes.

Q13- Core National Security programmes should have long term high level collaborative programmes, short and medium should remain largely in country unless those skills are {genuinely} lacking. The collaborative programme should like KTPs ensure strong skills transfer and inward development, and export skills that can seriously help others. CERN is on many levels an exemplar international programme of science sharing, development and serious knowledge development on an international footing – such programmes if the vested interests are carefully assessed can similarly be done in the defence sector – take note though of the issues we state in our answer to Question 7.

Q14- Empirically a 30% short, 50% medium and 20% long term approach would be better. Taking Short to mean 0-2years, Medium 2-10 years and long the10 to 20 years timeframe.

Q15- The DARPA model has some serious value for money elements and indeed strongly supports industry and skills continuance. Very little is left to government only, to ensure strong innovation and carefully controlled exploitation.

Q16- Current research programmes needs much more industrial {esp SMEs} and Universities involvement. The current engagement model needs to go back in part to the DERA model which had a small programme office that controlled and co-ordinated all research threads across government and industry – not subcontracting some management and steerage elements of this. By intelligently co-ordinating this in house, by selective and effective briefings (such as the CDE briefings which are inexpensive to attend), much stronger innovation and engagement would be possible with stronger coherence, more effective communication and better value for money. Be aware nugatory effort of bidding is highly costly to small firms and universities and as such (and perhaps like DARPA) sensible lower limits on contract sizes should perhaps be set.

Q17- CDE model is excellent and long overdue. The briefings are first class, the portal idea is really good and effective to use, however some procedural refinement would be wise on the peer review of bids when all but one thinks the idea is absolutely key to proceed and one doesn’t – current approach rejects this which has the potential to miss good innovation and improvement for the country. It is appears that the CDE model is largely focussing on proof of concept (TRL3) and hence small contract sizes; it would be wise to engage more of the wider research programmes in a similar manner (and allowing classified submissions were appropriate). The CDE approach for MoD to road show throughout the UK is prudent to deliver the core element of this question as the wider new supply base is growing rightly. Existing MoD suppliers that have security approvals should be encouraged to engage with their supply chain to introduce appropriate companies to CDE and also where security provisions allow interwork with each other to a stronger and better effect for MoD.

Q18- great and welcomed! Cyber would be wise, so would items for the OGDs. It would be prudent for the role expansion to also look at the Technical Demonstrator Programmes too…. A few procedural changes would result in much better results. Contracting delays and timescales with a hard 31st March end date sometimes exceed the duration and length of the timescales to deliver the project itself or compress such and drive odd commercial behaviour to reduce the work to be done! For SMEs this is highly painful and results in excess costs that on fixed price work are not accounted for originally – leading to supplier relations issues and better networking between suppliers and also suppliers to MoD.

Q19- return in part to the partnering approach to delivering projects that existed in the DERA days – sometimes with collocated (short term) some key resource sharing to ensure success in projects and better value for money in more effective and timely results. Arms length project management in our experience rarely delivers strong cost effective results.

Q20- see our Q8 answer – in a former role I lead the delivery of one of Europe’s largest Real Time Systems development systems engineering programme – this had some of the most complex system interoperability and mission critical interfacing. The key answer to the needs of Q20 is largely covered by Q8.

Q21- Procure it as is – warts and all… And use it as is. Don’t procure it and then try modifying it and transforming the procurement into essentially a major re-development. Pick wisely what you procure as COTS and ensure life of capability is commensurate with the suppliers’ view of such life… Otherwise the whole life costs can be seriously misgiving and this process is both de-motivating for both the supplier and end user.

Q22- This is often done within the DEFCON703 development arena… smart procurement can be achieved by considering given architectures, technologies and sub-systems/assemblies. If these are given and GFE’d industry can readily engage and ensure its work isn’t nugatory. There is nothing worse at the leading edge for a small set of companies to all bid for a complex capability (famine and feast again) and the loosing team either exports or has wasted precious money, skills and capabilities that may indeed be lost for good for the country.

Q23/24- Develop a partnering model that engages with SMEs and Primes to develop capabilities based intelligently on key skills and capabilities – not the financial strength nor leverage of the company. If you want true value for money, flexibility and want a strong defence R&D capability in the UK (and with those that engage with the UK), then it is critical to value contribution and skills and the impact of engagement (eg costs and implications of nugatory effort).

Q25- COTS is often seen as short term and MOTS long term. Both preconceptions are wrong. You can have short term MOTS and similarly long term COTS. The issue is the procedural approach to longevity and the supply chain succession management. It is crucial to understand the life of the procurement and a realistic service life. The service succession approach in the supply chain (spares, repairs, data evolution, etc) is a key element to success.

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Comment on 3.3 Cyberspace – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-3-cyberspace-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-398 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 16:08:17 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=230#comment-398 Q87 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS We agree that the focus on information assurance is entirely correct as a crucial enabler for effective cyber security. We recommend that Government does not consider technological defences as an area of information assurance separated from broader human behaviour. Rather the two aspects of behavioural and technological defences should be considered together, much as defence now considers its capabilities across all "lines of development". We believe that limited success will be achieved if only technological aspects are addressed and that a systems engineering approach is required to deliver security by design and to ensure “baked in” resilience. For example we note that the 2010 Infosecurity Information Security Breach Survey indicated that, of the worst breaches encountered, very few were due to technology failings alone. Therefore we believe a holistic approach that prioritises technology and human behaviour together (including aspects such as governance and process) will deliver a more comprehensive response to the challenges identified. Q87 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

We agree that the focus on information assurance is entirely correct as a crucial enabler for effective cyber security.

We recommend that Government does not consider technological defences as an area of information assurance separated from broader human behaviour.

Rather the two aspects of behavioural and technological defences should be considered together, much as defence now considers its capabilities across all “lines of development”.

We believe that limited success will be achieved if only technological aspects are addressed and that a systems engineering approach is required to deliver security by design and to ensure “baked in” resilience.

For example we note that the 2010 Infosecurity Information Security Breach Survey indicated that, of the worst breaches encountered, very few were due to technology failings alone.

Therefore we believe a holistic approach that prioritises technology and human behaviour together (including aspects such as governance and process) will deliver a more comprehensive response to the challenges identified.

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Comment on 3.3 Cyberspace – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-3-cyberspace-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-397 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 16:07:01 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=230#comment-397 Q86 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS We note that UK cyber security is developing and that the questions and priorities are still being formulated. The partnership model should form a sound base for Government’s engagement with industry, but this will take some time to mature and become effective. Cyber security will meantime require agility from both industry and government, and the need to operate with the technical and commercial fluidity required will be a challenge. A truly effective partnership requires trust and real commitment to each party’s objectives. In our opinion the term is used widely but “partnerships” struggle to achieve success due to a lack of commitment and effort. Based on our experience the speed with which an effective partnership can be implemented will depend significantly on the level of effort invested. We recommend that Government considers carefully the quantity and quality of skills required to develop and sustain an effective partnership with industry and invests in these skills accordingly. Q86 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

We note that UK cyber security is developing and that the questions and priorities are still being formulated.

The partnership model should form a sound base for Government’s engagement with industry, but this will take some time to mature and become effective.

Cyber security will meantime require agility from both industry and government, and the need to operate with the technical and commercial fluidity required will be a challenge.

A truly effective partnership requires trust and real commitment to each party’s objectives.

In our opinion the term is used widely but “partnerships” struggle to achieve success due to a lack of commitment and effort. Based on our experience the speed with which an effective partnership can be implemented will depend significantly on the level of effort invested.

We recommend that Government considers carefully the quantity and quality of skills required to develop and sustain an effective partnership with industry and invests in these skills accordingly.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-396 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 16:04:52 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-396 Q72 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS As identified in our response to Q24, key to MOD remaining an intelligent customer is its identification of core activities and organising itself to build world class expertise and capability in these areas. These core areas include commercial management, supply chain management, procurement, systems integration and systems engineering. This will then enable MOD to outsource appropriately and importantly to establish long term relationships with suppliers who have aligned expectations of future needs and who can work with the MOD to ensure continuity of supply and value for money. Such relationships should be established to ensure rapid support not only to the UK Armed Forces, but also to the procurement organisation. Q72 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

As identified in our response to Q24, key to MOD remaining an intelligent customer is its identification of core activities and organising itself to build world class expertise and capability in these areas.

These core areas include commercial management, supply chain management, procurement, systems integration and systems engineering.

This will then enable MOD to outsource appropriately and importantly to establish long term relationships with suppliers who have aligned expectations of future needs and who can work with the MOD to ensure continuity of supply and value for money.

Such relationships should be established to ensure rapid support not only to the UK Armed Forces, but also to the procurement organisation.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-395 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 16:02:52 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-395 Q62 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS Ensuring that Government creates and retains the skills it requires will demand clarity concerning the activities it needs to retain in order to be an intelligent customer. This will differ from sector to sector. For example in sovereign capability areas where there is a need to sustain expertise and capability over an extended timeframe there is a corresponding need for deep domain expertise to be established and retained. Examples of these include nuclear propulsion, nuclear warheads and cryptography. In other areas, where there is a competitive supply chain, the expertise is more orientated to commercial and procurement skills rather than technical skills, which can typically be brought into programmes on a case by case basis though the supply chain of independent engineering support contractors. In this respect there are already areas of vulnerability that are arising due to a number of different factors: • Market forces, for example in the nuclear sector. • Ageing workforces, for example in engineering in the public sector. • Public perception of career and remuneration opportunities in procurement. • Lack of appreciation of future skills needs, for example systems engineering. The above drivers equally apply in the private sector and examples of measures that are typically applied to counteract these drivers include: • The creation of specific training courses to enable staff with appropriate skills to become conversant and effective in another sector. For example in Atkins we operate a Nuclear Academy which enables staff from other sectors to gain the knowledge and background of the nuclear industry and become operationally effective in a short period of time. • Aggressive graduate attraction programmes and structured (fast track) career progression. • Driving for professional qualifications and the provision of appropriate remuneration for excellent performance against well articulated goals and objectives. • Formal training in disciplines such as systems engineering. To this end Atkins has appointed Network Chairs whose role is to promote excellence in engineering disciplines across the company and specifically has had in place a Systems Engineering Network Chair since 2009. Q62 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

Ensuring that Government creates and retains the skills it requires will demand clarity concerning the activities it needs to retain in order to be an intelligent customer.

This will differ from sector to sector. For example in sovereign capability areas where there is a need to sustain expertise and capability over an extended timeframe there is a corresponding need for deep domain expertise to be established and retained.

Examples of these include nuclear propulsion, nuclear warheads and cryptography. In other areas, where there is a competitive supply chain, the expertise is more orientated to commercial and procurement skills rather than technical skills, which can typically be brought into programmes on a case by case basis though the supply chain of independent engineering support contractors.

In this respect there are already areas of vulnerability that are arising due to a number of different factors:

• Market forces, for example in the nuclear sector.

• Ageing workforces, for example in engineering in the public sector.

• Public perception of career and remuneration opportunities in procurement.

• Lack of appreciation of future skills needs, for example systems engineering.

The above drivers equally apply in the private sector and examples of measures that are typically applied to counteract these drivers include:

• The creation of specific training courses to enable staff with appropriate skills to become conversant and effective in another sector. For example in Atkins we operate a Nuclear Academy which enables staff from other sectors to gain the knowledge and background of the nuclear industry and become operationally effective in a short period of time.

• Aggressive graduate attraction programmes and structured (fast track) career progression.

• Driving for professional qualifications and the provision of appropriate remuneration for excellent performance against well articulated goals and objectives.

• Formal training in disciplines such as systems engineering. To this end Atkins has appointed Network Chairs whose role is to promote excellence in engineering disciplines across the company and specifically has had in place a Systems Engineering Network Chair since 2009.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-394 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 15:58:43 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-394 Q24 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS We believe that the main elements of being an intelligent customer are: 1. A strong knowledge of the science and technology underlying the capability, equipment and services being purchased. This will demand not only a theoretical understanding of the science and technology but also a practical appreciation of its use and implementation. 2. Expertise and experience across a broad range of engineering disciplines, and in particular: a. Systems engineering – used in complex systems integration in an open systems environment. b. Multi-disciplinary design engineering – used in designing and developing the complex infrastructure associated with these systems. 3. Strong competence in procurement, encompassing financial management, commercial management, legislative compliance and portfolio, programme and project management. In identifying the above it should be recognised that Government does not have to “carry” all of these skills and capabilities all of the time. The key to this is for Government to identify its core functions, such as maintaining long term relationships with providers of sovereign capabilities and defining procurement strategies and policy for COTS/MOTS procurements. Over and above this it should then identify where it can access skills and capabilities that it may require but does not need to sustain over the long term. These skills and capabilities can be provided as external industry and/or academic support where such support is demonstrably independent of the parties bidding to provide the capabilities, equipment and services. Furthermore such external sources of support offer access to greater innovation through the broader network of markets, understanding of industry suppliers and emerging academic research. As an example of this "core/non-core" review Atkins examined the activities of a generic project team within MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support organisation together with senior management within DE&S. This determined that many of the activities undertaken today could be undertaken externally without denuding the project of its intelligent procurer role. Related work also identified that, in order to realise greater efficiencies, more significant groupings of projects or programmes should be sourced externally. Our examination of more general engineering and technical services has also concluded that approximately 80% of these activities are potentially non-core and could be sourced externally, a finding that we presented in our "Dragons' Den" proposal to MOD in late 2010. Q24 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

We believe that the main elements of being an intelligent customer are:

1. A strong knowledge of the science and technology underlying the capability, equipment and services being purchased. This will demand not only a theoretical understanding of the science and technology but also a practical appreciation of its use and implementation.

2. Expertise and experience across a broad range of engineering disciplines, and in particular:
a. Systems engineering – used in complex systems integration in an open systems environment.
b. Multi-disciplinary design engineering – used in designing and developing the complex infrastructure associated with these systems.

3. Strong competence in procurement, encompassing financial management, commercial management, legislative compliance and portfolio, programme and project management.

In identifying the above it should be recognised that Government does not have to “carry” all of these skills and capabilities all of the time. The key to this is for Government to identify its core functions, such as maintaining long term relationships with providers of sovereign capabilities and defining procurement strategies and policy for COTS/MOTS procurements.

Over and above this it should then identify where it can access skills and capabilities that it may require but does not need to sustain over the long term. These skills and capabilities can be provided as external industry and/or academic support where such support is demonstrably independent of the parties bidding to provide the capabilities, equipment and services.

Furthermore such external sources of support offer access to greater innovation through the broader network of markets, understanding of industry suppliers and emerging academic research.

As an example of this “core/non-core” review Atkins examined the activities of a generic project team within MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support organisation together with senior management within DE&S. This determined that many of the activities undertaken today could be undertaken externally without denuding the project of its intelligent procurer role.

Related work also identified that, in order to realise greater efficiencies, more significant groupings of projects or programmes should be sourced externally.

Our examination of more general engineering and technical services has also concluded that approximately 80% of these activities are potentially non-core and could be sourced externally, a finding that we presented in our “Dragons’ Den” proposal to MOD in late 2010.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-393 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 15:55:54 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-393 Q20 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS In seeking innovation, Government is rightly looking to use open systems and modular acquisition. To realise the benefits of this we believe that there is a need to invest further in systems engineering skills to ensure that the complex and technologically advanced systems developed are interoperable. This area was highlighted in the last Defence Industry Strategy and a recent survey undertaken by Intellect has shown systems engineering skills to be below the levels needed in both Government and industry. There is strong evidence that investment in systems engineering skills improves value for money at two levels. First, systems engineering techniques facilitate the effective integration and interoperation of the complex systems within defence and security, ensuring that their individual capability is more fully realised within the broader “system of systems” that comprises the UK’s defence and security capability, and that these capabilities are not inefficiently “stovepiped”. Second, the use of systems engineering within development programmes has been demonstrated to drive both significantly higher performance and lower outturn costs. The body of evidence demonstrating the return on investment in systems engineering has been generated by INCOSE (the International Council on Systems Engineering) over several years and includes, for example, the proceedings of the January 2008 INCOSE conference and of the INCOSE International Symposium, Chicago 2010, including a body of work undertaken by Eric Honour (University of South Australia) and the US National Defense Industries Association. It is also noteworthy that the US has created a key new position of Director, Systems Engineering within its defence acquisition organisation under the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act. Q20 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

In seeking innovation, Government is rightly looking to use open systems and modular acquisition.

To realise the benefits of this we believe that there is a need to invest further in systems engineering skills to ensure that the complex and technologically advanced systems developed are interoperable.

This area was highlighted in the last Defence Industry Strategy and a recent survey undertaken by Intellect has shown systems engineering skills to be below the levels needed in both Government and industry.

There is strong evidence that investment in systems engineering skills improves value for money at two levels. First, systems engineering techniques facilitate the effective integration and interoperation of the complex systems within defence and security, ensuring that their individual capability is more fully realised within the broader “system of systems” that comprises the UK’s defence and security capability, and that these capabilities are not inefficiently “stovepiped”.

Second, the use of systems engineering within development programmes has been demonstrated to drive both significantly higher performance and lower outturn costs.

The body of evidence demonstrating the return on investment in systems engineering has been generated by INCOSE (the International Council on Systems Engineering) over several years and includes, for example, the proceedings of the January 2008 INCOSE conference and of the INCOSE International Symposium, Chicago 2010, including a body of work undertaken by Eric Honour (University of South Australia) and the US National Defense Industries Association.

It is also noteworthy that the US has created a key new position of Director, Systems Engineering within its defence acquisition organisation under the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-392 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 15:51:32 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-392 Q4 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS In many cases the skills and capabilities relevant to the defence and security industries are transferrable and relevant to a number of other market segments. The ability of defence suppliers to attract and retain key staff will be driven by the ability to offer competitive remuneration packages coupled with long term stability. There is already evidence that the new nuclear build market and the ever expanding electronic communications market are potentially denuding capacity in sovereign capability areas such as the nuclear deterrent and cryptography. Other areas of concern include: • An ageing workforce in baseline engineering capabilities. For example the DE&S engineering strategy quotes "a mass outflow of knowledge and experience over the next 5 - 15 years due to an ageing workforce". • Insufficient capacity. Whilst better placed than government, the private sector is also struggling to achieve the levels of engineering skills needed in key areas such as systems engineering. This has been indicated in a recent Intellect survey of Government and industry systems engineering capabilities. Government needs to review this position with particular emphasis on its role as the overall integrator of national defence and security capability. This will have significant implications for its role as an intelligent customer in terms both of its in-house engineering capability and the external engineering support that it can draw on. Q4 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

In many cases the skills and capabilities relevant to the defence and security industries are transferrable and relevant to a number of other market segments.

The ability of defence suppliers to attract and retain key staff will be driven by the ability to offer competitive remuneration packages coupled with long term stability.

There is already evidence that the new nuclear build market and the ever expanding electronic communications market are potentially denuding capacity in sovereign capability areas such as the nuclear deterrent and cryptography.

Other areas of concern include:
• An ageing workforce in baseline engineering capabilities. For example the DE&S engineering strategy quotes “a mass outflow of knowledge and experience over the next 5 – 15 years due to an ageing workforce”.

• Insufficient capacity. Whilst better placed than government, the private sector is also struggling to achieve the levels of engineering skills needed in key areas such as systems engineering. This has been indicated in a recent Intellect survey of Government and industry systems engineering capabilities.

Government needs to review this position with particular emphasis on its role as the overall integrator of national defence and security capability. This will have significant implications for its role as an intelligent customer in terms both of its in-house engineering capability and the external engineering support that it can draw on.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-391 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 15:49:44 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-391 Q3 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS We believe that, given the increasing complexity and interoperability of defence and security systems, there is a broad range of engineering skills crucial to national security. In particular there is an increasing need for systems integration and systems engineering skills which are essential to the efficient delivery and integration of complex defence and security systems. This is particularly true in the scenario that future equipment is based around off-the-shelf procurements. Q3 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

We believe that, given the increasing complexity and interoperability of defence and security systems, there is a broad range of engineering skills crucial to national security.

In particular there is an increasing need for systems integration and systems engineering skills which are essential to the efficient delivery and integration of complex defence and security systems.

This is particularly true in the scenario that future equipment is based around off-the-shelf procurements.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-390 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 15:47:55 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-390 Q2 - Comments made on behalf of ATKINS The UK is rightly looking at operational advantage and freedom of action as central aspects of its sovereignty. Achieving balance between these potentially conflicting issues demands that Government must ensure that it can sustain in the long term its ability to act as an intelligent customer. The skills required to be an intelligent customer will depend upon the procurements being undertaken. The skills and capability needed to procure sovereign capabilities will differ markedly from those needed for the procurement of commercial and modified off-the-shelf systems (COTS/MOTS) and commodities. This need to act as an intelligent customer may require investment in skills and capability, for example to avoid becoming systemically vulnerable to an ageing demographic, as has occurred in the nuclear industry or is occurring within the MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support organisation which quotes "a mass outflow of knowledge and experience over the next 5 - 15 years due to an ageing workforce". Q2 – Comments made on behalf of ATKINS

The UK is rightly looking at operational advantage and freedom of action as central aspects of its sovereignty. Achieving balance between these potentially conflicting issues demands that Government must ensure that it can sustain in the long term its ability to act as an intelligent customer.

The skills required to be an intelligent customer will depend upon the procurements being undertaken. The skills and capability needed to procure sovereign capabilities will differ markedly from those needed for the procurement of commercial and modified off-the-shelf systems (COTS/MOTS) and commodities.

This need to act as an intelligent customer may require investment in skills and capability, for example to avoid becoming systemically vulnerable to an ageing demographic, as has occurred in the nuclear industry or is occurring within the MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support organisation which quotes “a mass outflow of knowledge and experience over the next 5 – 15 years due to an ageing workforce”.

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Comment on Part One – General Question by Geoff Robins http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/part-one-general-question/comment-page-1/#comment-389 Geoff Robins Wed, 30 Mar 2011 15:40:08 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=171#comment-389 Atkins is in agreement with the three key principles but would like to make the following comments: In an environment of increasingly complex and integrated systems, we believe that strong engineering skills are also vital to providing the capability edge identified in principle 2. The importance of engineering was clearly recognised in the 2010 report by Sir James Dyson: "Ingenious Britain – Making the UK the leading high tech exporter in Europe". The move to off-the-shelf procurements coupled with the adoption of the EU Directive 2009/81/EC will result in a need for significant changes in the procurement practices used by Government. In order to make intelligent decisions and demonstrate value for money, Government will not simply require sound scientific evidence, but will also need to draw upon professional procurement practices underpinned by a range of expertise encompassing project management, engineering, cost estimation, commercial and legal skillsets. Atkins is in agreement with the three key principles but would like to make the following comments:

In an environment of increasingly complex and integrated systems, we believe that strong engineering skills are also vital to providing the capability edge identified in principle 2. The importance of engineering was clearly recognised in the 2010 report by Sir James Dyson: “Ingenious Britain – Making the UK the leading high tech exporter in Europe”.

The move to off-the-shelf procurements coupled with the adoption of the EU Directive 2009/81/EC will result in a need for significant changes in the procurement practices used by Government.

In order to make intelligent decisions and demonstrate value for money, Government will not simply require sound scientific evidence, but will also need to draw upon professional procurement practices underpinned by a range of expertise encompassing project management, engineering, cost estimation, commercial and legal skillsets.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-388 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 14:27:16 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-388 Q6- Select the right programmes that are not in the Question 2 category that can be embraced more openly by all vested interests and healthy industrial behaviours will be fostered allowing all countries to benefit from such procurement developments… a tough challenge though. Q7- Like any Company Merger and Acquisition – it is critical to understand what each party wants from the relationship and what each will get. Understand the downside and exit strategies; this is more than risk assessment – it ensures that the bilateral procurement is started on the basis that all parties are set to heavily gain and hence crucially support the development and its success. It is prudent to ensure that an element of skills transfer comes in country as well as into the bilateral development to de-risk the venture. Q8- The telecommunications industry has gone a long way in solving interoperability and indeed supplier reliance. Much of this is done with ETSI and ISO standardisation of interfaces and data models. Strong Engineering and Software R&D approaches ensure forward and backward compatibility of system interfaces to ensure a range of differing revision levels and new equipments can be interoperated and deployed – whilst maintaining high integrity and security. Q10- Ensure skills and Intellectual Property are not lost from this country! Q6- Select the right programmes that are not in the Question 2 category that can be embraced more openly by all vested interests and healthy industrial behaviours will be fostered allowing all countries to benefit from such procurement developments… a tough challenge though.

Q7- Like any Company Merger and Acquisition – it is critical to understand what each party wants from the relationship and what each will get. Understand the downside and exit strategies; this is more than risk assessment – it ensures that the bilateral procurement is started on the basis that all parties are set to heavily gain and hence crucially support the development and its success. It is prudent to ensure that an element of skills transfer comes in country as well as into the bilateral development to de-risk the venture.

Q8- The telecommunications industry has gone a long way in solving interoperability and indeed supplier reliance. Much of this is done with ETSI and ISO standardisation of interfaces and data models. Strong Engineering and Software R&D approaches ensure forward and backward compatibility of system interfaces to ensure a range of differing revision levels and new equipments can be interoperated and deployed – whilst maintaining high integrity and security.

Q10- Ensure skills and Intellectual Property are not lost from this country!

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Andrew Dawson-Maddocks http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-387 Andrew Dawson-Maddocks Wed, 30 Mar 2011 13:52:35 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-387 Q2- The long term viability of skill sets that are needed in industry to maintain UK capabilities and key interests is a crucial factor – currently at risk. Cyber threats are ever increasing globally as well as country level orchestrated intel ops against the UK and its Industrial interests. Electronic Warfare, CBRNE and Cyber are crucial elements amongst a short list should have a developmental approach both within Other Government Departments, DSTL and out with in industry {SMEs and Primes}. Even with strong Information Assurance Programmes reliance globally on procurement in these areas will have implications both in terms of how benign the capability is, and in terms of understanding future vulnerabilities and risk mitigation. Q3- Electronic Surveillance, Electronic Warfare {ESM, ECM, and ELINT}, Augmented Reality, Information Assurance, Cryptography, Advanced Signal Processing, Cyber Warfare {incl Infosec), Telecommunications, Human Behavioural Analysis – not exhaustive but are the key elements technologically, industrially and the key skills the UK should ensure are nurtured. Q4-All of them - especially in industry due to the famine/feast way procurements are managed and limited tie in with Research programmes. Q2- The long term viability of skill sets that are needed in industry to maintain UK capabilities and key interests is a crucial factor – currently at risk. Cyber threats are ever increasing globally as well as country level orchestrated intel ops against the UK and its Industrial interests. Electronic Warfare, CBRNE and Cyber are crucial elements amongst a short list should have a developmental approach both within Other Government Departments, DSTL and out with in industry {SMEs and Primes}. Even with strong Information Assurance Programmes reliance globally on procurement in these areas will have implications both in terms of how benign the capability is, and in terms of understanding future vulnerabilities and risk mitigation.

Q3- Electronic Surveillance, Electronic Warfare {ESM, ECM, and ELINT}, Augmented Reality, Information Assurance, Cryptography, Advanced Signal Processing, Cyber Warfare {incl Infosec), Telecommunications, Human Behavioural Analysis – not exhaustive but are the key elements technologically, industrially and the key skills the UK should ensure are nurtured.

Q4-All of them – especially in industry due to the famine/feast way procurements are managed and limited tie in with Research programmes.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-386 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 05:03:23 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-386 Q69 - To answer this Mod must first decide what it wants/needs to be? It could be a very smart executive deciding what it wants and where to get it. Does it need to be a delivery organisation? It is confused at the moment doing some delivery functions and not others. In general industry does the delivery functions more efficiently but may not have a sufficiently broad perspective to do them sustainably well. MoD could ask industry to do more but should determine what it will do less of to complement that change. Q69 – To answer this Mod must first decide what it wants/needs to be? It could be a very smart executive deciding what it wants and where to get it. Does it need to be a delivery organisation? It is confused at the moment doing some delivery functions and not others. In general industry does the delivery functions more efficiently but may not have a sufficiently broad perspective to do them sustainably well. MoD could ask industry to do more but should determine what it will do less of to complement that change.

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Comment on 3.1.2 Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-urgent-operational-requirements-uors-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-385 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:57:32 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=345#comment-385 Q64 - If a dual approach is needed what is the best structure to provide it? It needs to change the basis of payments to its contractors to one based on delivered outcomes and not on activity inputs. It also needs to map the related and necessary audit and scrutiny functions to be proportionate to the risk and expenditure. Q64 – If a dual approach is needed what is the best structure to provide it? It needs to change the basis of payments to its contractors to one based on delivered outcomes and not on activity inputs. It also needs to map the related and necessary audit and scrutiny functions to be proportionate to the risk and expenditure.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-384 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:47:41 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-384 Q55 - It should start with policy then strategy and if this leads to specific action in apparently unrelated parts of the economy so be it. Things can/must be allowed to wither although they can/might be recreated if needed but most likely in a new and invigorated form. If however you expect industrial capacity to be sustained then you have to provide a market or it will move to where the market exists. Defence is not a free market in the accepted sense wherein a customer chooses the most suitable offering - in defence the customer determines the offering to be made in the first place. Q55 – It should start with policy then strategy and if this leads to specific action in apparently unrelated parts of the economy so be it. Things can/must be allowed to wither although they can/might be recreated if needed but most likely in a new and invigorated form. If however you expect industrial capacity to be sustained then you have to provide a market or it will move to where the market exists. Defence is not a free market in the accepted sense wherein a customer chooses the most suitable offering – in defence the customer determines the offering to be made in the first place.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-2/#comment-383 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:41:49 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-383 Q39 - Risks need to be assessed on a case by case basis and not be a box ticking exercise. If the innovation is needed it comes with a risk premium - there is no innovation in certainty. Programmes/projects need to be phased so that the riskiest elements have gates or breakpoints associated with them. Q39 – Risks need to be assessed on a case by case basis and not be a box ticking exercise. If the innovation is needed it comes with a risk premium – there is no innovation in certainty. Programmes/projects need to be phased so that the riskiest elements have gates or breakpoints associated with them.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-2/#comment-382 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:39:40 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-382 Q38 - A start would be to recognise that MoD has a supplier network which includes the SMEs rather than a supply chain controlled by the primes. There then needs to be a rethink about the appropriate level of bureaucracy to deliver governance, confidence, fitness for purpose etc. Q38 – A start would be to recognise that MoD has a supplier network which includes the SMEs rather than a supply chain controlled by the primes. There then needs to be a rethink about the appropriate level of bureaucracy to deliver governance, confidence, fitness for purpose etc.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-381 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:38:23 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-381 Q37 - SME need to have a voice in their own right and not be "looked after" by the primes whose interests are not the same. Perhaps a form of positive discrimination is needed similar to the US disadvantaged company status? It must start with what the MoD/Governement thinks the SMEs can offer which the primes cannot supply. Q37 – SME need to have a voice in their own right and not be “looked after” by the primes whose interests are not the same. Perhaps a form of positive discrimination is needed similar to the US disadvantaged company status? It must start with what the MoD/Governement thinks the SMEs can offer which the primes cannot supply.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-380 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:34:30 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-380 Q27 - The UK is increasingly a centre for design and the creation of IP. The emphasis on defence exports needs to match this shift so that it is progressively less the export of manufactured product and more the intellectual property. Q27 – The UK is increasingly a centre for design and the creation of IP. The emphasis on defence exports needs to match this shift so that it is progressively less the export of manufactured product and more the intellectual property.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-379 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:32:46 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-379 Q26 - Need to put more effort into recognising common need and less into emphasising differences. UK specifications are too poorly defined in the early stages then expand after initial approval giving reward to the prime contractors for scope creep and contributing to preventing export because the base line is too sophisticated for an export market. Q26 – Need to put more effort into recognising common need and less into emphasising differences. UK specifications are too poorly defined in the early stages then expand after initial approval giving reward to the prime contractors for scope creep and contributing to preventing export because the base line is too sophisticated for an export market.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-378 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:28:06 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-378 Q11 - Invest where industrial/commercial research would not choose to or where an opportunity has been identified which is too sensitive to reveal an interest. Otherwise be relatively open on areas of interest and where the potential market solutions might exist but then be responsive to industrial suggestions. However, can/should a government owned research body interested in its own survival be charged with sponsoring such external research? Q11 – Invest where industrial/commercial research would not choose to or where an opportunity has been identified which is too sensitive to reveal an interest. Otherwise be relatively open on areas of interest and where the potential market solutions might exist but then be responsive to industrial suggestions. However, can/should a government owned research body interested in its own survival be charged with sponsoring such external research?

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-377 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:23:13 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-377 Q6 - This must start at the philosophical and cultural level. Principles guide behaviour and if the philosophy and culture does not align the behaviours are unlikely to do so. Similarly a prescription as to who will do what in which circumstances provides a blueprint for those who wish to do harm to test their strategies. Shared intelligence and common understanding of capabilities then provides the basis for cooperation in a given circumstance. Where common needs and resources are identified these might then be shared or developed collaboratively. Q6 – This must start at the philosophical and cultural level. Principles guide behaviour and if the philosophy and culture does not align the behaviours are unlikely to do so. Similarly a prescription as to who will do what in which circumstances provides a blueprint for those who wish to do harm to test their strategies. Shared intelligence and common understanding of capabilities then provides the basis for cooperation in a given circumstance. Where common needs and resources are identified these might then be shared or developed collaboratively.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by David Rainford http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-376 David Rainford Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:20:23 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-376 Q2 - There are at least two key tests: if others had a specific something would they be at an advantage; if we did not have that something would we be at a disadvantage? This is likely to be the case for specific attributes/features of design, some techniques or technologies for production, as well as operational philosophies, approaches or methodologies - e.g. how we synthesise information and intelligence to ensure efficient and effective interventions.There are many issues to be considered from quality to signature management. Q2 – There are at least two key tests: if others had a specific something would they be at an advantage; if we did not have that something would we be at a disadvantage? This is likely to be the case for specific attributes/features of design, some techniques or technologies for production, as well as operational philosophies, approaches or methodologies – e.g. how we synthesise information and intelligence to ensure efficient and effective interventions.There are many issues to be considered from quality to signature management.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Helen Clark http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-375 Helen Clark Tue, 29 Mar 2011 19:57:07 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-375 We're not driving the defence and security threats, either in the short-term (UORs) or in the future (potential threats). Therefore we have no choice but to find ways of responding to those threats as best we can. (There will be other ways of responding which should be considered in parallel with defence investment). International risk assessment and prioritisation of potential threats should be possible. Unless we evaluate our capability needs rigorously, we won't know where research is really needed. We have to know whether our current capability set matches our current capability requirements. Then we can look at the current and future threat list, decide whether we need to maintain capability, expand, upgrade, plan for 2050, etc. (or we may be constrained by our budget to reduce our required capability) To create a wider supplier base, awareness could be raised - Government could be more open with defence capability requirements. Reach out to industry, schools, universities etc would be possible. An effective way of maximising pull-through would be to provide links to independent business start-up facilities. Q24) You can't be an intelligent customer unless you understand what you're buying, so you need to invest in science and technology experts. You can't ensure value-for-money unless you have robust contracting practices and commercial acumen, so you need to invest in business experts. Then you have to get the scientists and business people to work together.... We’re not driving the defence and security threats, either in the short-term (UORs) or in the future (potential threats). Therefore we have no choice but to find ways of responding to those threats as best we can. (There will be other ways of responding which should be considered in parallel with defence investment).

International risk assessment and prioritisation of potential threats should be possible.

Unless we evaluate our capability needs rigorously, we won’t know where research is really needed. We have to know whether our current capability set matches our current capability requirements. Then we can look at the current and future threat list, decide whether we need to maintain capability, expand, upgrade, plan for 2050, etc. (or we may be constrained by our budget to reduce our required capability)

To create a wider supplier base, awareness could be raised – Government could be more open with defence capability requirements. Reach out to industry, schools, universities etc would be possible. An effective way of maximising pull-through would be to provide links to independent business start-up facilities.

Q24) You can’t be an intelligent customer unless you understand what you’re buying, so you need to invest in science and technology experts. You can’t ensure value-for-money unless you have robust contracting practices and commercial acumen, so you need to invest in business experts. Then you have to get the scientists and business people to work together….

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Helen Clark http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-374 Helen Clark Tue, 29 Mar 2011 19:05:35 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-374 If we want to work with other nations, we need to invest in understanding what they are expecting to get out of the project, as well as making sure that they know what we want to achieve. All parties should be in agreement before any work is started. We should work to predefined international standards. (Q10) Financial arrangements could be openly discussed - they should stand up to public (or press) scrutiny. If we want to work with other nations, we need to invest in understanding what they are expecting to get out of the project, as well as making sure that they know what we want to achieve. All parties should be in agreement before any work is started.
We should work to predefined international standards.
(Q10) Financial arrangements could be openly discussed – they should stand up to public (or press) scrutiny.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Helen Clark http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-373 Helen Clark Tue, 29 Mar 2011 18:53:05 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-373 Q2 If we take the view that a globalized economy is developing, then it makes sense to have as many international network connections as possible in the defence and security sectors. Our economy still depends on global trade - we should reflect this in our acquisition policy. (Q3) However, not all acquisition is about commercial negotiation to buy things. We need to be intelligent shoppers, to understand what capability we need, and to understand, from a non-commercial perspective, what the current practical limits to technology are. I think it is crucial to keep the UK science and technology base as wide as possible; it's in danger of becoming too commercially orientated. (Q4) We've allowed our infrastructure to become fragile - a lot of it's not under UK control, and as suppliers become larger and technology becomes more complex, vulnerability at single points of failure increases. We're in danger of losing the agile responses to security problems that a multiplicity of small companies with variety of industrial and technological skills can provide. Q2 If we take the view that a globalized economy is developing, then it makes sense to have as many international network connections as possible in the defence and security sectors. Our economy still depends on global trade – we should reflect this in our acquisition policy.
(Q3) However, not all acquisition is about commercial negotiation to buy things. We need to be intelligent shoppers, to understand what capability we need, and to understand, from a non-commercial perspective, what the current practical limits to technology are. I think it is crucial to keep the UK science and technology base as wide as possible; it’s in danger of becoming too commercially orientated.

(Q4) We’ve allowed our infrastructure to become fragile – a lot of it’s not under UK control, and as suppliers become larger and technology becomes more complex, vulnerability at single points of failure increases. We’re in danger of losing the agile responses to security problems that a multiplicity of small companies with variety of industrial and technological skills can provide.

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Comment on Part One – General Question by Helen Clark http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/part-one-general-question/comment-page-1/#comment-372 Helen Clark Tue, 29 Mar 2011 18:18:51 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=171#comment-372 The principles may be key, but principles alone do not constitute an approach to solving a problem. The processes that will be used to implement them need also to be specified before a judgement can be made on whether the balance will be right. Open competition is fine as long as we have done our background research thoroughly. We must define exactly what is being competed for (what we want to be able to do), why we want the capability (strategic and scientific validation), and why it is the best overall, long-term solution (cost and benefit analysis), before any competition begins. If we allow the potential 'solutions' to dictate the acquisition process we won't necessarily get the most appropriate capability. We must also ensure that competition is regulated appropriately. The principles may be key, but principles alone do not constitute an approach to solving a problem. The processes that will be used to implement them need also to be specified before a judgement can be made on whether the balance will be right.
Open competition is fine as long as we have done our background research thoroughly. We must define exactly what is being competed for (what we want to be able to do), why we want the capability (strategic and scientific validation), and why it is the best overall, long-term solution (cost and benefit analysis), before any competition begins. If we allow the potential ‘solutions’ to dictate the acquisition process we won’t necessarily get the most appropriate capability. We must also ensure that competition is regulated appropriately.

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by Stuart Jones http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-371 Stuart Jones Tue, 29 Mar 2011 17:31:06 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-371 I am making this comment as a private individual rather than employee. I have been engaged in much MOD funded work, some very positive. My only serious gripe is that often work is funded to a certain point and then stops and not due to changes in priorities or poor performance. Rather, work is sometimes funded by MOD to a certan point, without securing further resource or high level support fro mthe outset to continue. Coupled with changes in priorities and staff at MOD, this means stuff sometimes starts because it is the pet subject of a MOD employee, and then because that person leaves or because no real thought has been given to how it will be next picked up, the work that has been paid for stops and there is ultimately no long term benefit. A related issue is that MOD in seeking value for money will often prioritise a solution that appears to offer the smallest price initially, without factoring in the potential for more expensive solutions intitially that when looked at over the full length of the project would be less expensive. This is because MOD's money is so tight as to ask for the impossible, a low cost bid is received which delivers modestly, but does not leave room for a more expensive initial bid which would cost less overall. There needs to be more cradle-to-grave funding allocation to address these issues. I am making this comment as a private individual rather than employee.

I have been engaged in much MOD funded work, some very positive.

My only serious gripe is that often work is funded to a certain point and then stops and not due to changes in priorities or poor performance. Rather, work is sometimes funded by MOD to a certan point, without securing further resource or high level support fro mthe outset to continue. Coupled with changes in priorities and staff at MOD, this means stuff sometimes starts because it is the pet subject of a MOD employee, and then because that person leaves or because no real thought has been given to how it will be next picked up, the work that has been paid for stops and there is ultimately no long term benefit.

A related issue is that MOD in seeking value for money will often prioritise a solution that appears to offer the smallest price initially, without factoring in the potential for more expensive solutions intitially that when looked at over the full length of the project would be less expensive. This is because MOD’s money is so tight as to ask for the impossible, a low cost bid is received which delivers modestly, but does not leave room for a more expensive initial bid which would cost less overall.

There needs to be more cradle-to-grave funding allocation to address these issues.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Shaun Hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-370 Shaun Hipgrave Tue, 29 Mar 2011 15:45:07 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-370 Q26 As an SME in the security sector the creation of the Security Direcorate of UKTI DSO has transformed my export capbilties. With their support for the HOSDB show and the focus on security through many foreign posts it has opened up an eager market for UK PLC. More support for the security directorate to continue this strategy. Q27 In the foreign posts there are often MAs who are excellent at supporting the defence cause, however the security sector is not so well served and although the local commercial officers try their best they are often not afforded the access into the local policing/intelleigence agencies that are relevant. If the Govt appointed 5 or 6 key security professional from HMG or similar background to go into the priority export countries and act as Security Attaches the return on that investment would be huge. Q28 The Security Directorate of DSO should enhance their ability to delievr all the key UK products and services in the more diverse nations. SMEs cannot afford to go to all these countries but if DSO had an interactive hi-Tech trade stand where each of the UKs security companies capabilities could easily be flashed onto screen it would not only deliver our SMEs products more widely but set the UK as a leader in displaying these products amongst the other nations. Q32 Sort out the inefficency and bureacracy surrounding the ECO, its ciosats the UK millions of pounds every month. Contact the trade associations on this, they hold the evidence. Q33 in the same way that the MOD support the defence industry internationally with display teams etc, the Security Sector needs the blue uniform support from the Home office to example UK Security PLC internationally, this would be available through HOSDB or other central organisations. Q26 As an SME in the security sector the creation of the Security Direcorate of UKTI DSO has transformed my export capbilties. With their support for the HOSDB show and the focus on security through many foreign posts it has opened up an eager market for UK PLC. More support for the security directorate to continue this strategy.
Q27 In the foreign posts there are often MAs who are excellent at supporting the defence cause, however the security sector is not so well served and although the local commercial officers try their best they are often not afforded the access into the local policing/intelleigence agencies that are relevant. If the Govt appointed 5 or 6 key security professional from HMG or similar background to go into the priority export countries and act as Security Attaches the return on that investment would be huge.
Q28 The Security Directorate of DSO should enhance their ability to delievr all the key UK products and services in the more diverse nations. SMEs cannot afford to go to all these countries but if DSO had an interactive hi-Tech trade stand where each of the UKs security companies capabilities could easily be flashed onto screen it would not only deliver our SMEs products more widely but set the UK as a leader in displaying these products amongst the other nations.
Q32 Sort out the inefficency and bureacracy surrounding the ECO, its ciosats the UK millions of pounds every month. Contact the trade associations on this, they hold the evidence.
Q33 in the same way that the MOD support the defence industry internationally with display teams etc, the Security Sector needs the blue uniform support from the Home office to example UK Security PLC internationally, this would be available through HOSDB or other central organisations.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Shaun Hipgrave http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-369 Shaun Hipgrave Tue, 29 Mar 2011 15:09:19 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-369 Q10 The UK security need and some of our priority CT countries are often aligned, However aour approach to supporting UK industry through cross cuttinig initiatives in such depts as UKTI DSO, FCO, Home Office and DFID are very rarely co-ordinated, thus industry and Govt fail to capitalise on these opportunities. A form of cross cutting authority should be put in place within the Home Office to co-ordinate this. Q10 The UK security need and some of our priority CT countries are often aligned, However aour approach to supporting UK industry through cross cuttinig initiatives in such depts as UKTI DSO, FCO, Home Office and DFID are very rarely co-ordinated, thus industry and Govt fail to capitalise on these opportunities. A form of cross cutting authority should be put in place within the Home Office to co-ordinate this.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by David Marsden http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-368 David Marsden Mon, 28 Mar 2011 12:19:23 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-368 Q24 - An intelligent customer must have a credible and coherent ability to support both requirements decomposition and acceptance processes. Requirements decomposition is invariably carried out post contract award, and will inevitably result in functionality gaps, requirement approtionment and/or equipment redesign. It is crucial that the customer is able to positively support this process with expert, empowered resource, to enable the decomposition to be completed in a timely manner and the acceptance criteria to be defined and agreed. Q24 – An intelligent customer must have a credible and coherent ability to support both requirements decomposition and acceptance processes.

Requirements decomposition is invariably carried out post contract award, and will inevitably result in functionality gaps, requirement approtionment and/or equipment redesign. It is crucial that the customer is able to positively support this process with expert, empowered resource, to enable the decomposition to be completed in a timely manner and the acceptance criteria to be defined and agreed.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by David Marsden http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-367 David Marsden Mon, 28 Mar 2011 12:09:15 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-367 Q21 - By ensuring an expert and empowered resource exists to consider and approve any functional 'gaps'. COTS procurement normally starts well but invariably suffers delays when functional or qualification shortfalls are identified. An expert, coherent customer agency is essential at this stage to avoid vacilation and delay Q21 – By ensuring an expert and empowered resource exists to consider and approve any functional ‘gaps’. COTS procurement normally starts well but invariably suffers delays when functional or qualification shortfalls are identified. An expert, coherent customer agency is essential at this stage to avoid vacilation and delay

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Comment on Part One – General Question by David Marsden http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/part-one-general-question/comment-page-1/#comment-366 David Marsden Mon, 28 Mar 2011 11:43:59 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=171#comment-366 Key principles 2 & 3 do not seem particularly 'key'. Their significance will depend on implementation methodology; specifically the ability to include wider considerations into 'value for money' assessments. How will long term capability, core competance retention and the effects of deliberate, technology 'price dumping' competition strategies be considered? Key principles 2 & 3 do not seem particularly ‘key’. Their significance will depend on implementation methodology; specifically the ability to include wider considerations into ‘value for money’ assessments.

How will long term capability, core competance retention and the effects of deliberate, technology ‘price dumping’ competition strategies be considered?

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by David Morris http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-365 David Morris Sun, 27 Mar 2011 20:02:06 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-365 General Comments The Government must recognise the particular skill set the UK SME's provide to the Special User Community. This market has very specific needs that the specialised SME with its entrepreneurial skill has abundance of, however, it does come with a degree of risk. It has been shown time and again that Special User Community projects that have been given to Prime Contractors have incurred overspends, delays and have been managed risk adverse. This is not how the community operates. The technology must be adaptable as it is only 'advanced' for a short time until the enemy adapts it capability. Designing systems for the special user community that last greater than five years is not in the best interests of national security. It is the SME's that are best placed to address this ever-changing market either individually or as a like minded consortia. The balanced approach to SME's regarding the procurement of products and services must be encouraged. The mix must be for the SME's to participate in bidding for UK requirements directly or indirectly through prime contractors for major UK procurements and for the Government to support the very same SME's to export that capability unless in a very small percentage of cases it is within National Security interest. In all respects there must be a 'reward' for the SME to achieve this. To be held at ransom that the Government of the day will first look globally for a solution knowing that a SME has the capability in the UK does not help in the employment of graduate engineers, technicians and the investment in high technology manufacture. The SME will operate at a higher risk level than an overseas supplier, it will also provide a better after sales service. You only have to look at the number of American company's that only want to team with UK company's in the short term to get a foothold in the UK market. They then hold both the Government and the small UK company to ransom supplying the requirement as non-urgent and invoking ITAR issues. Recognising the value of SME's must be more than just lip service. The Government must recognise those SME's that can provide solutions that are effective and efficient against the modern threats in terrorism, cyberspace and asymmetric warfare. The Government needs to create an environment of risk-sharing with accountability on all sides of the equation. The ethos of this Consultation Paper gives some very positive signposts to the way ahead. However, the delivery is dependent on active and open interfaces between the MoD and Industry. Specific Questions Q3. There is a danger that the UK lose control of IED Counter Measure technologies due to the nature of multinational sharing of critical information. There should be a more robust framework for protecting National Intellectual Property. Bilateral arrangements are aimed at Prime contractors and there will always be competition between Primes and SMEs. Primes will, quite naturally, protect certain areas from SMEs. Q26/Q27. There is a marked inconsistency of support to industry between different government departments and between particular individuals within departments. There is no clear and accessible policy for SMEs. There is often conflicting advice and support offered between MoD Main Building, DE&S and the FCO. Q51. MoD must ensure a consistent approach. Q52. MoD could lay down a standard set of Terms and Conditions for SMEs. General Comments

The Government must recognise the particular skill set the UK SME’s provide to the Special User Community. This market has very specific needs that the specialised SME with its entrepreneurial skill has abundance of, however, it does come with a degree of risk. It has been shown time and again that Special User Community projects that have been given to Prime Contractors have incurred overspends, delays and have been managed risk adverse. This is not how the community operates. The technology must be adaptable as it is only ‘advanced’ for a short time until the enemy adapts it capability. Designing systems for the special user community that last greater than five years is not in the best interests of national security. It is the SME’s that are best placed to address this ever-changing market either individually or as a like minded consortia.

The balanced approach to SME’s regarding the procurement of products and services must be encouraged. The mix must be for the SME’s to participate in bidding for UK requirements directly or indirectly through prime contractors for major UK procurements and for the Government to support the very same SME’s to export that capability unless in a very small percentage of cases it is within National Security interest. In all respects there must be a ‘reward’ for the SME to achieve this. To be held at ransom that the Government of the day will first look globally for a solution knowing that a SME has the capability in the UK does not help in the employment of graduate engineers, technicians and the investment in high technology manufacture. The SME will operate at a higher risk level than an overseas supplier, it will also provide a better after sales service. You only have to look at the number of American company’s that only want to team with UK company’s in the short term to get a foothold in the UK market. They then hold both the Government and the small UK company to ransom supplying the requirement as non-urgent and invoking ITAR issues.

Recognising the value of SME’s must be more than just lip service. The Government must recognise those SME’s that can provide solutions that are effective and efficient against the modern threats in terrorism, cyberspace and asymmetric warfare. The Government needs to create an environment of risk-sharing with accountability on all sides of the equation.

The ethos of this Consultation Paper gives some very positive signposts to the way ahead. However, the delivery is dependent on active and open interfaces between the MoD and Industry.

Specific Questions

Q3. There is a danger that the UK lose control of IED Counter Measure technologies due to the nature of multinational sharing of critical information. There should be a more robust framework for protecting National Intellectual Property. Bilateral arrangements are aimed at Prime contractors and there will always be competition between Primes and SMEs. Primes will, quite naturally, protect certain areas from SMEs.

Q26/Q27. There is a marked inconsistency of support to industry between different government departments and between particular individuals within departments. There is no clear and accessible policy for SMEs. There is often conflicting advice and support offered between MoD Main Building, DE&S and the FCO.

Q51. MoD must ensure a consistent approach.

Q52. MoD could lay down a standard set of Terms and Conditions for SMEs.

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by F Chedham http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-364 F Chedham Thu, 24 Mar 2011 17:18:08 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-364 The enthusiasm set out for SMEs as a service and supply provider for the MOD is welcomed. As an SME provider of IT and professionals services with significant senior military expertise available we have undertaken successful work for the United States Department of Defence, Australian Defence Forces, Nato and the EDA. Each of these organisations opens its minor value contract requirements in web based formats free of charge. It is a matter of irritation to the point of principle that the MOD seeks a subscription for receipt of the Defence Contracts Bulletin. While we all appreciate the sum required is not great, it is not in sympathy with the spirit of supporting greater inclusion of SMEs in MOD procurement. The enthusiasm set out for SMEs as a service and supply provider for the MOD is welcomed. As an SME provider of IT and professionals services with significant senior military expertise available we have undertaken successful work for the United States Department of Defence, Australian Defence Forces, Nato and the EDA. Each of these organisations opens its minor value contract requirements in web based formats free of charge. It is a matter of irritation to the point of principle that the MOD seeks a subscription for receipt of the Defence Contracts Bulletin. While we all appreciate the sum required is not great, it is not in sympathy with the spirit of supporting greater inclusion of SMEs in MOD procurement.

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by F Chedham http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-363 F Chedham Thu, 24 Mar 2011 17:00:07 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-363 It is apparent to me that the vision for enterprise within the MOD and government as a whole is recognised by ministers. The need for the economy to regenerate itself and the role of SMEs in that regeneration has been understood. Within this wider economic understanding MOD procurement has a significant role to play. The tension occurs when the broader vision for procurement and the economy as a whole meets the Department civil service procurement demand for process and tidiness. The institutional reliance on prime contractors which is enshrined in framework catalogues prevents highly competent expertise held in SMEs being bought to bear on challenging MOD requirements. During the consultation conference the senior MOD commercial officer acknowledged that they prefer primes ‘as a central point of coordination’. That this preference can lead to a project taking twice as long and costing twice as much is not considered sufficient imperative for seeking an alternative solution. In many areas of provision the only advantage that a prime contractor has is capacity. It’s a hard truth but they have little real interest in working with SMEs unless they have to or they see an advantage in doing so. As such they do not share the same enthusiasm for SME inclusion that may be expressed elsewhere. In many areas SMEs win work in spite of the system not because of it. A number of changes could help bring increased SME effort to bear and offer more cost effective services to the MOD: • The cultural tension between process and enterprise needs to be debated and some transformation takes place. This could include initial steps to outsourcing the provision of MOD procurement. • The catalogue system needs to be larger and include a quota of shadow SMEs who offer the same services as a prime but at scale. Current primes need to be challenged at tender by smaller, more agile less overhead intensive organisations. The results would surprise. It is apparent to me that the vision for enterprise within the MOD and government as a whole is recognised by ministers. The need for the economy to regenerate itself and the role of SMEs in that regeneration has been understood. Within this wider economic understanding MOD procurement has a significant role to play. The tension occurs when the broader vision for procurement and the economy as a whole meets the Department civil service procurement demand for process and tidiness. The institutional reliance on prime contractors which is enshrined in framework catalogues prevents highly competent expertise held in SMEs being bought to bear on challenging MOD requirements.
During the consultation conference the senior MOD commercial officer acknowledged that they prefer primes ‘as a central point of coordination’. That this preference can lead to a project taking twice as long and costing twice as much is not considered sufficient imperative for seeking an alternative solution. In many areas of provision the only advantage that a prime contractor has is capacity. It’s a hard truth but they have little real interest in working with SMEs unless they have to or they see an advantage in doing so. As such they do not share the same enthusiasm for SME inclusion that may be expressed elsewhere. In many areas SMEs win work in spite of the system not because of it.
A number of changes could help bring increased SME effort to bear and offer more cost effective services to the MOD:
• The cultural tension between process and enterprise needs to be debated and some transformation takes place. This could include initial steps to outsourcing the provision of MOD procurement.
• The catalogue system needs to be larger and include a quota of shadow SMEs who offer the same services as a prime but at scale. Current primes need to be challenged at tender by smaller, more agile less overhead intensive organisations. The results would surprise.

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-362 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:54:09 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-362 Additional comments for consideration: Should there be some kind of restriction on senior MOD personnel joining private companies with which they have previously been involved for a certain period of time (e.g. two years or more)? Additional comments for consideration:

Should there be some kind of restriction on senior MOD personnel joining private companies with which they have previously been involved for a certain period of time (e.g. two years or more)?

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-361 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:52:19 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-361 Additional comments for consideration: In order to assist UK industry, the government should perhaps consider applying the same kind of 'positive discrimination' as other countries, e.g. - Small Business Set-Aside (USA), Small Business Innovation Research (S.B.I.R.) programme (USA), etc. In the USA, foreign-owned companies are categorised as 'multi-nationals' (and not as SMEs). Companies that are connected to a larger organisation should not be treated as individual SMEs, but as subsidiaries of the larger entity. Additional comments for consideration:

In order to assist UK industry, the government should perhaps consider applying the same kind of ‘positive discrimination’ as other countries, e.g. -

Small Business Set-Aside (USA), Small Business Innovation Research (S.B.I.R.) programme (USA), etc.

In the USA, foreign-owned companies are categorised as ‘multi-nationals’ (and not as SMEs).

Companies that are connected to a larger organisation should not be treated as individual SMEs, but as subsidiaries of the larger entity.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-360 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:43:33 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-360 Q74 - there appear to be many management layers between the Front Line and Procurement. A greater openness within UK Defence with trusted suppliers would allow industry to offer targeted solutions that immediately fulfil Front Line requirements. It is important to ensure that unncecessary layers of bureaucracy are removed. Q74 – there appear to be many management layers between the Front Line and Procurement.
A greater openness within UK Defence with trusted suppliers would allow industry to offer targeted solutions that immediately fulfil Front Line requirements.
It is important to ensure that unncecessary layers of bureaucracy are removed.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-359 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:40:38 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-359 Q72 - a more open forum within UK Defence at all levels, in particular with engineers / end-users, combined with UK Defence management and industry know-how, would lead to quicker solution of problems and greater 'right first time' innovation. Q72 – a more open forum within UK Defence at all levels, in particular with engineers / end-users, combined with UK Defence management and industry know-how, would lead to quicker solution of problems and greater ‘right first time’ innovation.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-358 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:38:48 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-358 Q71 - training, maintenance, repairs, calibration, data processing and some areas of procurement could all be outsourced. Q71 – training, maintenance, repairs, calibration, data processing and some areas of procurement could all be outsourced.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-357 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:38:04 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-357 Q69 - more support could be outsourced. Q69 – more support could be outsourced.

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Comment on 3.1.2 Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-urgent-operational-requirements-uors-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-356 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:37:03 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=345#comment-356 Q68 - Long-term relationships can only deliver value if the two organisations work together to improve efficiency and reduce costs. The supplier needs to have a better understanding of future procurement needs. A long-term relationship should not be an excuse to keep procurement administration simple. It is key to ensure that any long-term relationship provides value for money. Q68 –

Long-term relationships can only deliver value if the two organisations work together to improve efficiency and reduce costs.

The supplier needs to have a better understanding of future procurement needs.

A long-term relationship should not be an excuse to keep procurement administration simple.

It is key to ensure that any long-term relationship provides value for money.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-355 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:33:27 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-355 Q62 - apply similar rules to those in other countries (e.g.USA), in order to protect UK companies from unfair competition - foreign-owned companies are classified as 'multi-nationals', and not as SMEs. Q62 – apply similar rules to those in other countries (e.g.USA), in order to protect UK companies from unfair competition – foreign-owned companies are classified as ‘multi-nationals’, and not as SMEs.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-354 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:29:29 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-354 Q62 - UK should perhaps consider similar measures to other countries, where “positive discrimination” is practised – e.g. Small Business Set-Aside (USA), Small Business Innovation Research (S.B.I.R.) programme (USA), etc. Q62 – UK should perhaps consider similar measures to other countries, where “positive discrimination” is practised – e.g. Small Business Set-Aside (USA), Small Business Innovation Research (S.B.I.R.) programme (USA), etc.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-353 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:27:17 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-353 Q62 - Closer collaboration between academia and business. Setting up of Technology Network Centres, ensuring that rural areas (e.g. Devon and Cornwall) are not left out. Q62 -

Closer collaboration between academia and business.

Setting up of Technology Network Centres, ensuring that rural areas (e.g. Devon and Cornwall) are not left out.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-352 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:25:25 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-352 Q61 - this is essential for the UK to compete within a worldwide arena, where countries such as Singapore are mandating this. Q61 – this is essential for the UK to compete within a worldwide arena, where countries such as Singapore are mandating this.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-351 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:24:22 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-351 Q59 - Introduction of IPR audits, offered at cost to SMEs, so that they can gain a better understanding of where the value lies within their business. Q59 – Introduction of IPR audits, offered at cost to SMEs, so that they can gain a better understanding of where the value lies within their business.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-350 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:23:17 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-350 Q58 - Through the establishment of standard IPR protection policies. Greater understanding of the uniqueness of a product. Exploitation through licensing and technology transfer. Q58 –

Through the establishment of standard IPR protection policies.

Greater understanding of the uniqueness of a product.

Exploitation through licensing and technology transfer.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-349 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:11:12 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-349 Q57 - the models utilised must also take into account the supportability and lifetime costs of the asset / service purchased. It is essential that the through-life support costs are truly understood. Q57 – the models utilised must also take into account the supportability and lifetime costs of the asset / service purchased.
It is essential that the through-life support costs are truly understood.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-348 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:08:30 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-348 Q56 - goverment should invest in further grant support to ensure that UK manufacturing and services are 'leading the pack' when it comes to selection. Q56 – goverment should invest in further grant support to ensure that UK manufacturing and services are ‘leading the pack’ when it comes to selection.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-347 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:07:42 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-347 Q56 - capabilities developed in the UK for defence could be transferred to other sectors (e.g. utilities). Q56 – capabilities developed in the UK for defence could be transferred to other sectors (e.g. utilities).

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-346 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:06:11 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-346 Q55 - it is essential to ensure that greater collaboration can occur between academia, SMEs, primes and government, in order to encourage innovation and build up UK capability. The Knowlege Transfer Programme (KTP) has been highly valuable to our organisation, and has contributed significantly to our growth during the past ten years. Q55 – it is essential to ensure that greater collaboration can occur between academia, SMEs, primes and government, in order to encourage innovation and build up UK capability.
The Knowlege Transfer Programme (KTP) has been highly valuable to our organisation, and has contributed significantly to our growth during the past ten years.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-345 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:03:04 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-345 Q55 - see also our response to Q15. Q55 – see also our response to Q15.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-344 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 12:00:30 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-344 Q54 - it would also be helpful if the SME could be given an opportunity to demonstrate the company's track record outside of the defence and security sector. Q54 – it would also be helpful if the SME could be given an opportunity to demonstrate the company’s track record outside of the defence and security sector.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-343 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:58:45 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-343 Q54 - in the Industrial arena, companies are registered with / subject to a regulatory body known as ‘Achilles’. Under the Achilles Registration, all aspects of business performance are audited, and these results are then published (scored by percentage, with 100% being the best), thus providing an accessible “Register of Capability” to OEMs, Customers, etc., for consideration prior to placement of a PQQ. Applied to the UK’s defence sector, this could consist of implementation of some form of ‘Approved Supplier Register’, managed by a private entity (+ with companies paying an annual subscription charge for registration). Q54 – in the Industrial arena, companies are registered with / subject to a regulatory body known as ‘Achilles’.
Under the Achilles Registration, all aspects of business performance are audited, and these results are then published (scored by percentage, with 100% being the best), thus providing an accessible “Register of Capability” to OEMs, Customers, etc., for consideration prior to placement of a PQQ.

Applied to the UK’s defence sector, this could consist of implementation of some form of ‘Approved Supplier Register’, managed by a private entity (+ with companies paying an annual subscription charge for registration).

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-342 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:57:04 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-342 Q53 - it is up to SMEs to engage with the primes in order to develop a relationship and create a value proposition. Q53 – it is up to SMEs to engage with the primes in order to develop a relationship and create a value proposition.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-341 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:54:47 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-341 Q52 - A simple nationwide model for protection of IPR would be very helpful, as getting lawyers involved can be very expensive and daunting. Retention of IPR by the SME should be considered as an essential element of any contract. Q52 -

A simple nationwide model for protection of IPR would be very helpful, as getting lawyers involved can be very expensive and daunting.

Retention of IPR by the SME should be considered as an essential element of any contract.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-340 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:51:48 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-340 Q51 - The Government could set up a central 'open office' for both primes and SMEs, to enable meetings with defence and security officers. Greater engagement of Local MPs with SMEs. Q51 -

The Government could set up a central ‘open office’ for both primes and SMEs, to enable meetings with defence and security officers.

Greater engagement of Local MPs with SMEs.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-339 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:49:17 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-339 Q50 - the primes have the resources to lobby, have established brand names, along with strong existing long-term relationships. The cost to switch products / suppliers is high in the defence industry, due to equipment exportability, training requirements, etc. Primes are generally able to offer a 'one-stop' solution. Q50 – the primes have the resources to lobby, have established brand names, along with strong existing long-term relationships.
The cost to switch products / suppliers is high in the defence industry, due to equipment exportability, training requirements, etc.
Primes are generally able to offer a ‘one-stop’ solution.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-338 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:46:39 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-338 Q49 - continued support and funding for the UKTI to support SMEs. Q49 – continued support and funding for the UKTI to support SMEs.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-337 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:45:54 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-337 Q48 - it is important to take into account the overall project costs, rather than just the administration costs. Q48 – it is important to take into account the overall project costs, rather than just the administration costs.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-336 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:41:23 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-336 Q47 - by placing a higher weighting (during the procurement bidding process) on innovation that goes beyond simply meeting the minimal contractual requirements. Q47 – by placing a higher weighting (during the procurement bidding process) on innovation that goes beyond simply meeting the minimal contractual requirements.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-335 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:39:52 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-335 Q46 - resources are the principal limiting factor, as this is clearly a long-term investment. Q46 – resources are the principal limiting factor, as this is clearly a long-term investment.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-334 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:39:02 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-334 Q45 - the main challenge is availability of resource. Compared to the primes, SME commercial resources are more limited, and size and capability is often directly proportional to sales volume. Once the PQQ has been completed, one way to overcome this limitation would be to follow-up with a paid Feasibility Study to complete the RFQ. Q45 – the main challenge is availability of resource.
Compared to the primes, SME commercial resources are more limited, and size and capability is often directly proportional to sales volume.
Once the PQQ has been completed, one way to overcome this limitation would be to follow-up with a paid Feasibility Study to complete the RFQ.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-333 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:26:05 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-333 Q44 - Yes, this would ensure transparency Q44 – Yes, this would ensure transparency

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-332 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:25:27 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-332 Q43 - Yes, this would ensure accountability Q43 – Yes, this would ensure accountability

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-331 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:24:56 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-331 Q42 - Yes (for the reasons described in our response to Q41) Q42 – Yes (for the reasons described in our response to Q41)

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-330 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:24:05 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-330 Q41 - greater participation by SMEs SHOULD definitely be encouraged, as SME overheads are much lower than primes. SMEs also tend to be highly flexible, innovative, and able to change course when requirements change. A new model must be found that breaks down major programmes into smaller mangeable projects, which could then be offered to SMEs. The participation of SMEs on larger projects would improve accountability and provide increased value for money. Q41 – greater participation by SMEs SHOULD definitely be encouraged, as SME overheads are much lower than primes. SMEs also tend to be highly flexible, innovative, and able to change course when requirements change.
A new model must be found that breaks down major programmes into smaller mangeable projects, which could then be offered to SMEs.
The participation of SMEs on larger projects would improve accountability and provide increased value for money.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-329 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:19:31 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-329 Q40 - yes, this would be in line with modern procurement 'best practice', where domain experts are given an opportunity to think 3 - 5 years ahead in order to determine what will truly be required. Q40 – yes, this would be in line with modern procurement ‘best practice’, where domain experts are given an opportunity to think 3 – 5 years ahead in order to determine what will truly be required.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-328 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 11:17:12 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-328 Q39 - in the Industrial arena, companies are registered with / subject to a regulatory body known as 'Achilles'. Under the Achilles Registration, all aspects of business performance are audited, and these results are then published (scored by percentage, with 100% being the best), thus providing an accessible "Register of Capability" to OEMs, Customers, etc., for consideration prior to placement of a PQQ. Applied to the UK's defence sector, this could consist of implementation of some form of 'Approved Supplier Register', managed by a private entity (+ with companies paying an annual subscription charge for registration). Q39 – in the Industrial arena, companies are registered with / subject to a regulatory body known as ‘Achilles’.
Under the Achilles Registration, all aspects of business performance are audited, and these results are then published (scored by percentage, with 100% being the best), thus providing an accessible “Register of Capability” to OEMs, Customers, etc., for consideration prior to placement of a PQQ.

Applied to the UK’s defence sector, this could consist of implementation of some form of ‘Approved Supplier Register’, managed by a private entity (+ with companies paying an annual subscription charge for registration).

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-327 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 10:50:27 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-327 Q38 - requirement for single open and accessible website where ALL contract opportunities can be viewed, including 'split' contracts (see response to Q37). Q38 – requirement for single open and accessible website where ALL contract opportunities can be viewed, including ‘split’ contracts (see response to Q37).

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-326 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 10:47:37 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-326 Q37 - where an initial PQQ is funded through PDS, it should be ensured that there is a flow-down of the PDS elements from the primes to SMEs / Tier 2 suppliers. Q37 – where an initial PQQ is funded through PDS, it should be ensured that there is a flow-down of the PDS elements from the primes to SMEs / Tier 2 suppliers.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-325 Peter Morrish Thu, 24 Mar 2011 10:45:47 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-325 Q37 - As an SME, we would like to see the number of government bodies reduced. The trend for primes to offer total capability (outside of their core expertise in many cases) has restricted the opportunities for SMEs. Large single-action tenders should be split into specific projects, so that SMEs can bid directly to the Authority (rather than to the prime) for a sub-set of the main contract. Q37 – As an SME, we would like to see the number of government bodies reduced.
The trend for primes to offer total capability (outside of their core expertise in many cases) has restricted the opportunities for SMEs.
Large single-action tenders should be split into specific projects, so that SMEs can bid directly to the Authority (rather than to the prime) for a sub-set of the main contract.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-324 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 17:04:56 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-324 Q36 - Yes - e.g., Iran Q36 – Yes – e.g., Iran

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-323 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 17:02:34 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-323 Q35 - through licensing (e.g. company retains the IP, but has an arrangement where a percentage of the profits will be paid to the Crown for each successful export. Helitune Ltd. currently has such an arrangement in place for our 'Rotortuner, product, which has now sold over 200 systems overseas, thus raising a substantial amount of revenue for the Authority. Q35 – through licensing (e.g. company retains the IP, but has an arrangement where a percentage of the profits will be paid to the Crown for each successful export.
Helitune Ltd. currently has such an arrangement in place for our ‘Rotortuner, product, which has now sold over 200 systems overseas, thus raising a substantial amount of revenue for the Authority.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-322 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 16:58:56 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-322 Q33 - the barriers to entry are high in countries that protect their national interests. UK should perhaps consider similar measures ("positive discrimination") - e.g. Small Business Set-Aside (USA), Small Business Innovation Research (S.B.I.R.) programme (USA), etc. Q33 – the barriers to entry are high in countries that protect their national interests.

UK should perhaps consider similar measures (“positive discrimination”) – e.g. Small Business Set-Aside (USA), Small Business Innovation Research (S.B.I.R.) programme (USA), etc.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-321 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 16:50:38 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-321 Q31 - a truly open and certifiable standard for modular systems (see response to Q20) may open up the defence market and improve exporting prospects. However, one drawback of having to conform to specific standards is that this could hold back progress and innovation, thus losing competitive advantage. Q31 – a truly open and certifiable standard for modular systems (see response to Q20) may open up the defence market and improve exporting prospects.

However, one drawback of having to conform to specific standards is that this could hold back progress and innovation, thus losing competitive advantage.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-320 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 16:41:01 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-320 Q27 - As an SME with limited resources, we just need simple reliable advice. In the past, we have found the cetegorisation of exports bewildering. Q27 – As an SME with limited resources, we just need simple reliable advice.
In the past, we have found the cetegorisation of exports bewildering.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-319 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 16:17:51 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-319 Q25 - duplication of Q21 Q25 – duplication of Q21

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-318 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 16:16:42 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-318 Q24 - Use of feasibility studies, rapid prototyping, and ensuring that all stakeholders participate, including the end-user. Consider the use of more agile development processes rather than the traditional 'waterfall' model. Adopt the development approaches already used by leading commercial organisations. Calculate and critique the lifetime project cost of capabilty. Q24 – Use of feasibility studies, rapid prototyping, and ensuring that all stakeholders participate, including the end-user.

Consider the use of more agile development processes rather than the traditional ‘waterfall’ model.

Adopt the development approaches already used by leading commercial organisations.

Calculate and critique the lifetime project cost of capabilty.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-317 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 16:11:14 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-317 Q23 - through an independent and transparent procurement process, involving the relevant domain experts. Use of external support should also be considered where necessary. Q23 – through an independent and transparent procurement process, involving the relevant domain experts.

Use of external support should also be considered where necessary.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-316 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 16:09:56 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-316 Q21 - It does not necessarily matter whether it is COTS or MIL - it is more important to consider what needs to be achieved (i.e. what is the unique capability required?). The components that make up the most cost-effective and capable solution can then be selected. Q21 – It does not necessarily matter whether it is COTS or MIL – it is more important to consider what needs to be achieved (i.e. what is the unique capability required?).
The components that make up the most cost-effective and capable solution can then be selected.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-315 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 16:06:30 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-315 Q20 - this area requires either significant investment, or adoption of commercial standards. The reality is that the majority of existing open military standards are still in their infancy and are too open to interpretation. For open standards to be compliant and truly modular, we believe that there needs to be a Certification Authority. Taking a commercial example - "Microsoft Certified" (verification / validation). Q20 – this area requires either significant investment, or adoption of commercial standards. The reality is that the majority of existing open military standards are still in their infancy and are too open to interpretation.
For open standards to be compliant and truly modular, we believe that there needs to be a Certification Authority.
Taking a commercial example – “Microsoft Certified” (verification / validation).

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-314 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 14:43:44 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-314 Q17 - this is a great idea, but how practical is it in reality? A wider supplier base cannot engage without domain experience, and most of this experience is held within the primes. Hence there needs to be greater engagement between primes, SMEs and universities. Q17 – this is a great idea, but how practical is it in reality? A wider supplier base cannot engage without domain experience, and most of this experience is held within the primes.
Hence there needs to be greater engagement between primes, SMEs and universities.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-313 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 14:41:11 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-313 Q15 - this also needs to take into account the wider economy - For example, the French invested in aerospace (including Rotary Wing), where the UK outsourced. French-owned Eurocopter now produces over 50% of the world helicopters. Q15 – this also needs to take into account the wider economy -

For example, the French invested in aerospace (including Rotary Wing), where the UK outsourced. French-owned Eurocopter now produces over 50% of the world helicopters.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-312 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 14:38:59 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-312 Q14 - This falls to management within government - better internal and external communication across all departments and platforms is absolutely essential. Q14 – This falls to management within government – better internal and external communication across all departments and platforms is absolutely essential.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Ivan Lax http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-311 Ivan Lax Wed, 23 Mar 2011 10:31:23 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-311 Q57. Perhaps more than any other area of Government, defence value-for-money cannot be considered using simple financial measures and therefore requires a more all-encompassing approach to establishing what is meant by value. Over the years there has been considerable advice and guidance from HM Treasury on the need to adopt a broader understanding of ‘value’, and this is encapsulated in the Treasury GREEN BOOK Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government. Other documents that further support this approach based upon the tried and tested multi-criteria decision analysis methodology include Multi-criteria analysis: a manual, published January 2009 and found on the Communities and Local Government web site, and more recently the Management of Portfolios practitioners’ manual published by the TSO on behalf of the OGC, which is now part of the new Efficiency and Reform Group within the Cabinet Office. A practical implementation of this approach has been and continues to be used in various parts of both central and local Government supported by Catalyze Limited using software, tools and techniques originally developed at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The recent OGC publication includes five case studies from Catalyze indicating how the process has been successfully applied, including one from the MOD. However, despite Treasury and OGC recommendations and endorsement from the National Audit Office the process is not widely adopted across Government. Q57. Perhaps more than any other area of Government, defence value-for-money cannot be considered using simple financial measures and therefore requires a more all-encompassing approach to establishing what is meant by value.
Over the years there has been considerable advice and guidance from HM Treasury on the need to adopt a broader understanding of ‘value’, and this is encapsulated in the Treasury GREEN BOOK Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government. Other documents that further support this approach based upon the tried and tested multi-criteria decision analysis methodology include Multi-criteria analysis: a manual, published January 2009 and found on the Communities and Local Government web site, and more recently the Management of Portfolios practitioners’ manual published by the TSO on behalf of the OGC, which is now part of the new Efficiency and Reform Group within the Cabinet Office.

A practical implementation of this approach has been and continues to be used in various parts of both central and local Government supported by Catalyze Limited using software, tools and techniques originally developed at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The recent OGC publication includes five case studies from Catalyze indicating how the process has been successfully applied, including one from the MOD. However, despite Treasury and OGC recommendations and endorsement from the National Audit Office the process is not widely adopted across Government.

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Comment on 3.1.2 Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) – General and Specific Questions by Simon Valencia http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-urgent-operational-requirements-uors-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-310 Simon Valencia Wed, 23 Mar 2011 09:34:38 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=345#comment-310 Q68: As an Industrial Partner we would argue that the benefits of a long term arrangement far outway any constraints, be they perceived or otherwise. Any long term arrangement would need to be proven to be competitive from the outset and this should be verified at regular intervals. Some of the softer aspects of a long term agreement are difficult to apply metrics to, but fully appreciated by the stakeholders involved. A Benefit Log should be maintained to record success. Q68: As an Industrial Partner we would argue that the benefits of a long term arrangement far outway any constraints, be they perceived or otherwise. Any long term arrangement would need to be proven to be competitive from the outset and this should be verified at regular intervals. Some of the softer aspects of a long term agreement are difficult to apply metrics to, but fully appreciated by the stakeholders involved. A Benefit Log should be maintained to record success.

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Comment on 3.1.2 Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) – General and Specific Questions by Thomas Dülge http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-urgent-operational-requirements-uors-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-309 Thomas Dülge Wed, 23 Mar 2011 09:23:44 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=345#comment-309 Long Term Partnering with Industry is one key area as it allows the MoD to maintain a constant dialogue with its partners. This permits a two way flow of information from the customer to the supplier and vice versa. The openess created by this type of partnership allows Industry to be considerably more flexible and responsive than would otherwise be the case if these partnerships were not in place. Long Term Partnering with Industry is one key area as it allows the MoD to maintain a constant dialogue with its partners. This permits a two way flow of information from the customer to the supplier and vice versa. The openess created by this type of partnership allows Industry to be considerably more flexible and responsive than would otherwise be the case if these partnerships were not in place.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-308 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 08:44:07 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-308 Q13 - it is possible to see examples of governments independently (in parallel) investing in their own country's R&D, for the same goals. We believe that there is significant scope to develop joint capability, particularly within Europe. Before making any investment, the question should be asked - "Is this development already being undertaken by any of our Allies?" Q13 – it is possible to see examples of governments independently (in parallel) investing in their own country’s R&D, for the same goals.

We believe that there is significant scope to develop joint capability, particularly within Europe.

Before making any investment, the question should be asked – “Is this development already being undertaken by any of our Allies?”

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-307 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 08:39:47 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-307 Q11 - investment through organisations such as the Centre for Defence Enterprise for 'breakthrough research'. Greater R&D investment is also needed in more general areas such as Condition-Based Maintenance and Through-Life Asset Management. Significant savings may be achieved through outsourcing to private organisations, in particular SMEs, which have small overheads, are flexilbe, and are able to rapidly change course when required. Q11 – investment through organisations such as the Centre for Defence Enterprise for ‘breakthrough research’.

Greater R&D investment is also needed in more general areas such as Condition-Based Maintenance and Through-Life Asset Management.

Significant savings may be achieved through outsourcing to private organisations, in particular SMEs, which have small overheads, are flexilbe, and are able to rapidly change course when required.

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Comment on 2.1.2 Working with other countries – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-2-working-with-other-countries-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-306 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 08:35:11 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=185#comment-306 Q6 - adoption of Civil Standards, common working methodologies, rapid prototyping, and better requirements management. Q6 – adoption of Civil Standards, common working methodologies, rapid prototyping, and better requirements management.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-305 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 08:33:15 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-305 Q3 - strategy required in order to make the UK's infrastructure more autonomous, robus and sustainable, including utilities, natural resources, food, etc. How can we protect our IT infrastructure from hostile attack? Q3 – strategy required in order to make the UK’s infrastructure more autonomous, robus and sustainable, including utilities, natural resources, food, etc.

How can we protect our IT infrastructure from hostile attack?

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-304 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 08:31:17 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-304 Q2 - greater cooperation with our European Allies for procurement of 'best-in-class' weapons, assets and communication systems. Agreements with Germany and France to jointly develop electronic warfare protection systems. Q2 – greater cooperation with our European Allies for procurement of ‘best-in-class’ weapons, assets and communication systems.

Agreements with Germany and France to jointly develop electronic warfare protection systems.

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Comment on Part One – General Question by Peter Morrish http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/part-one-general-question/comment-page-1/#comment-303 Peter Morrish Wed, 23 Mar 2011 08:26:59 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=171#comment-303 Principle 2 - The long-term supportability of the asset / purchase may be compromised and out of the Authority's control if purchased from "wherever we can". Principle 2 - This appears to be a very short-term solution, with little consideration given to development of UK capability, innovation and production. Principle 2 - Best results are achieved where long-term relationships are formed, so that industry can be 'one step ahead', and thus in a position to advise the government in relation to potential future needs. Principle 3 - This should include value for money throughout the full lifecycle of the asset / purchase. Principle 2 -
The long-term supportability of the asset / purchase may be compromised and out of the Authority’s control if purchased from “wherever we can”.

Principle 2 -
This appears to be a very short-term solution, with little consideration given to development of UK capability, innovation and production.

Principle 2 -
Best results are achieved where long-term relationships are formed, so that industry can be ‘one step ahead’, and thus in a position to advise the government in relation to potential future needs.

Principle 3 -
This should include value for money throughout the full lifecycle of the asset / purchase.

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Comment on 3.1.3 Defence support – General and Specific Questions by Herbert C Abela MBE http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-defence-support-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-302 Herbert C Abela MBE Mon, 21 Mar 2011 10:23:48 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=219#comment-302 Green Paper on Equipment, Support, and Technology for UK Defence and Security: A Consultation Paper G4S Response to Questions 69 – 75. General question: Q69. Does the MOD involve industry sufficiently in providing support to the Armed Forces? Since the early 90s MOD has been increasing industry involvement in providing support to the Armed Forces both in UK and on operations. This started with management of facilities e.g. cleaning, catering going on to the more comprehensive ‘garrison type’ support to be found within PFI projects. Equipment support has also embraced industry through CLS contracts and PFIs; while Condo and CONLOG widened the scope for support on operations. There is a link between peacetime support and support on operations – while it is possible to have base or peacetime support without involvement in operations, the reverse will not work. Manpower is one of the major costs in Defence. Beyond the facilities, equipment and Condo type support there is another area which is manpower intensive and where industry has not been sufficiently involved. The Guarding sector is the sector where MOD has not involved industry sufficiently and here industry could do a lot more in providing support to reduce pressure on existing resources and to support in surge, while providing value for money. It will need a UK base programme from which to successfully deliver support on operations. MOD employs some 3,400 MOD Police (MDP) and 3,900 MOD Guard Service (MGS) i.e. 7,300 personnel on guarding and investigation. The majority of these roles could be done by industry. Apart from reducing cost it will offer opportunities for second careers for military personnel as well as a surge capability. G4S is already one of the largest employers of ex-Service personnel in UK and is in a position to enable MOD to benefit from its earlier investment in training. As the military and MOD civilian pool reduces its surge capacity also reduces and here industry can make a considerable contribution. With such a disciplined industry manpower base there will be opportunities for extending elements into supporting deployments to do unarmed guarding and armed guarding under Condo and as Sponsored Reserves (SRs) for such activities as inside perimeter guarding, issuing of passes and guarding POWs. The activities that underpin a Base / UK contract will define what surge could be available within UK (as backfilling) or on operations. For example if a Guard Force solution includes driving and escort duties these could be used to support logistics on operations. Through the contract, the MOD can purchase capability. It is worth noting that whilst there are differences between an SR and a conventional volunteer reservist, the military safeguards remain the same including: • SRs will be members of an existing reserve force (the TA, RNR or Air Force Reserves) and subject to Service regulations • SRs wear uniform, are under military command and fully subject to the Service Discipline Acts whilst called out, undertaking training or otherwise on duty • Military training requirements and standards will be decided upon and enforced by MOD • Becoming an SR will require the individual to meet the requisite reserve entry criteria, and maintain required fitness levels • In addition to delivering the support skills for which they were called out, SRs may be required to undertake routine duties normally associated with military service. Industry would expect to operate at at least 20% less cost and with a Police / Guarding annual budget in the region of £300 million this would save over £60m per annum. In addition it will also save regular manpower and for example looking at guarding within Afghanistan and particularly at Bastion the guarding inside the wire and on watchtowers could be done by the contractorised force. Regular manpower deployed on guarding duties has a period or pre-deployment training which is followed by deployment and then a recuperation period. Use of a contractorised solution could be freeing up to a battalion’s worth of manpower. The inclusion of MCTC Colchester is another consideration of related activity and here there are around 164 employees, including military and civilian employees. The question that will be asked is can industry do it? For G4S this is core business and its activity and successful growth speaks for itself. The company related annual statistics support this and these are listed below as evidence: • 50,000 employees in UK and over 625,000 worldwide ( 2nd largest employer in the world and one of the largest private sector employer of former UK military personnel) • 20 immigration facilities worldwide • 28 adult and youth custody facilities worldwide • £59bn processed in UK cash centres • 90% of UK bank notes transported • 160+ Ghurkhas training the British Army • 675+ UK police and court cells managed • 5,000+ convoys protected in Iraq • 13,000+ explosive remnants of war destroyed • 39,000+ offenders monitored globally • 55,000+ UK alarm callouts • 559,000+ UK court and detainee movements It is also worth noting that G4S runs the GCHQ PFI, provides forensic services to the Police, provides security at airports and ports and delivers security to FCO personnel and infrastructure overseas. Clients include sovereign governments, embassies as well as multinational corporations. Previously in the Balkans G4S provided guarding services to US Forces at Bondsteel and Monteith camps. Specific questions: Q70. What support roles should only be delivered by the Armed Forces? In base operations and equipment support in the UK and in non-operational areas there are almost no limitations on support from industry. Industry should not take on support roles that adversely affect the Armed Forces ability to train for operations. On operations industry should not be involved in actual fighting (unless in uniform) and in the Early Entry phase. The Armed Forces are the ones that do the actual fighting in contact with the enemy and there is no scope for industry involvement here. The Armed Forces initially need to retain an Early Entry capability that gives them total freedom of action as this is likely to be a period of hostility and for this phase limited inherent sustainability will be required. Beyond this phase industry can be used to support the Armed Forces where contact with the enemy is unlikely and military protection of contactors is not onerous. Q71. What support roles could legitimately be provided by industry? In relation to operations, the full spectrum of support could be delivered by industry as in CONLOG, CLS and ISP contracts covering life support, equipment support, civil engineering, infrastructure maintenance and guarding. The timing of delivery and its geography are critical factors – it needs to be during a phase of relative stability in areas that are reasonably static and benign that industry can deliver the whole spectrum of logistics. Earlier and wider industry involvement would require industry to be trained to operate like soldiers under SR conditions – e.g. Guarding of POWs, Met services, HET etc. Q72. How can the MOD remain an intelligent customer if it outsources more activity? In the sector we are describing the driver is disciplined manpower and company organisation. This is not an area reliant on developing new technology but where technology applies it will largely be COTS security equipment. The intelligent customer safeguards will come out from an understanding of the civilian market which is not onerous. Thus MOD remains an intelligent customer through being commercially intelligent. Q73. How might MOD enable wider exploitation of simulation and synthetic systems and scenarios? Not commented on. Q74. How could MOD simplify interfaces, relationships, and decision making to improve the provision of support to the Armed Forces? To support the Armed Forces on operations industry capability needs to be known to the Military with links in place. They need to operate in a ‘no surprise culture’ and understand one an other to arrive at assured support within a Single Force solution. This would require some level of joint planning and exercising. It would also need to be underpinned by contractual commitment and in some cases there will be a cost to MOD covering the peacetime activity and possibly latent cost of surge as in the current CONLOG contract. Q75. What legal problems do companies face when providing support to operations? Industry faces both legal and commercial problems when providing support to operations. The often MOD insistence that industry accepts ‘unlimited liability’ makes no sense as this does not take away the risk from MOD; industry cannot control enemy action and should not be expected to manage risks that are out of its control. It could also lead to bankruptcy and non-performance. Industry needs to operate as a part of the force to stay within international law through an MOU with the Force or any sovereign government in the area of operations. Industry and MOD took major risks in Iraq in the latter days when the CPA ceased to operate and no MOU was put in place. The other problem areas revolve around lack of insurance (i.e. reputable cover); Health & Safety duty of care if protection is not available and operating outside Condo Conditions which could result in charges of Corporate Manslaughter. Green Paper on Equipment, Support, and Technology for UK Defence and Security: A Consultation Paper

G4S Response to Questions 69 – 75.

General question:

Q69. Does the MOD involve industry sufficiently in providing support to the Armed Forces?

Since the early 90s MOD has been increasing industry involvement in providing support to the Armed Forces both in UK and on operations. This started with management of facilities e.g. cleaning, catering going on to the more comprehensive ‘garrison type’ support to be found within PFI projects. Equipment support has also embraced industry through CLS contracts and PFIs; while Condo and CONLOG widened the scope for support on operations. There is a link between peacetime support and support on operations – while it is possible to have base or peacetime support without involvement in operations, the reverse will not work.

Manpower is one of the major costs in Defence. Beyond the facilities, equipment and Condo type support there is another area which is manpower intensive and where industry has not been sufficiently involved. The Guarding sector is the sector where MOD has not involved industry sufficiently and here industry could do a lot more in providing support to reduce pressure on existing resources and to support in surge, while providing value for money. It will need a UK base programme from which to successfully deliver support on operations.

MOD employs some 3,400 MOD Police (MDP) and 3,900 MOD Guard Service (MGS) i.e. 7,300 personnel on guarding and investigation. The majority of these roles could be done by industry. Apart from reducing cost it will offer opportunities for second careers for military personnel as well as a surge capability. G4S is already one of the largest employers of ex-Service personnel in UK and is in a position to enable MOD to benefit from its earlier investment in training. As the military and MOD civilian pool reduces its surge capacity also reduces and here industry can make a considerable contribution. With such a disciplined industry manpower base there will be opportunities for extending elements into supporting deployments to do unarmed guarding and armed guarding under Condo and as Sponsored Reserves (SRs) for such activities as inside perimeter guarding, issuing of passes and guarding POWs.

The activities that underpin a Base / UK contract will define what surge could be available within UK (as backfilling) or on operations. For example if a Guard Force solution includes driving and escort duties these could be used to support logistics on operations. Through the contract, the MOD can purchase capability.

It is worth noting that whilst there are differences between an SR and a conventional volunteer reservist, the military safeguards remain the same including:

• SRs will be members of an existing reserve force (the TA, RNR or Air Force Reserves) and subject to Service regulations
• SRs wear uniform, are under military command and fully subject to the Service Discipline Acts whilst called out, undertaking training or otherwise on duty
• Military training requirements and standards will be decided upon and enforced by MOD
• Becoming an SR will require the individual to meet the requisite reserve entry criteria, and maintain required fitness levels
• In addition to delivering the support skills for which they were called out, SRs may be required to undertake routine duties normally associated with military service.

Industry would expect to operate at at least 20% less cost and with a Police / Guarding annual budget in the region of £300 million this would save over £60m per annum. In addition it will also save regular manpower and for example looking at guarding within Afghanistan and particularly at Bastion the guarding inside the wire and on watchtowers could be done by the contractorised force. Regular manpower deployed on guarding duties has a period or pre-deployment training which is followed by deployment and then a recuperation period. Use of a contractorised solution could be freeing up to a battalion’s worth of manpower.

The inclusion of MCTC Colchester is another consideration of related activity and here there are around 164 employees, including military and civilian employees.

The question that will be asked is can industry do it?

For G4S this is core business and its activity and successful growth speaks for itself. The company related annual statistics support this and these are listed below as evidence:

• 50,000 employees in UK and over 625,000 worldwide ( 2nd largest employer in the world and one of the largest private sector employer of former UK military personnel)
• 20 immigration facilities worldwide
• 28 adult and youth custody facilities worldwide
• £59bn processed in UK cash centres
• 90% of UK bank notes transported
• 160+ Ghurkhas training the British Army
• 675+ UK police and court cells managed
• 5,000+ convoys protected in Iraq
• 13,000+ explosive remnants of war destroyed
• 39,000+ offenders monitored globally
• 55,000+ UK alarm callouts
• 559,000+ UK court and detainee movements
It is also worth noting that G4S runs the GCHQ PFI, provides forensic services to the Police, provides security at airports and ports and delivers security to FCO personnel and infrastructure overseas. Clients include sovereign governments, embassies as well as multinational corporations. Previously in the Balkans G4S provided guarding services to US Forces at Bondsteel and Monteith camps.

Specific questions:
Q70. What support roles should only be delivered by the Armed Forces?

In base operations and equipment support in the UK and in non-operational areas there are almost no limitations on support from industry. Industry should not take on support roles that adversely affect the Armed Forces ability to train for operations. On operations industry should not be involved in actual fighting (unless in uniform) and in the Early Entry phase.

The Armed Forces are the ones that do the actual fighting in contact with the enemy and there is no scope for industry involvement here. The Armed Forces initially need to retain an Early Entry capability that gives them total freedom of action as this is likely to be a period of hostility and for this phase limited inherent sustainability will be required. Beyond this phase industry can be used to support the Armed Forces where contact with the enemy is unlikely and military protection of contactors is not onerous.

Q71. What support roles could legitimately be provided by industry?

In relation to operations, the full spectrum of support could be delivered by industry as in CONLOG, CLS and ISP contracts covering life support, equipment support, civil engineering, infrastructure maintenance and guarding. The timing of delivery and its geography are critical factors – it needs to be during a phase of relative stability in areas that are reasonably static and benign that industry can deliver the whole spectrum of logistics.

Earlier and wider industry involvement would require industry to be trained to operate like soldiers under SR conditions – e.g. Guarding of POWs, Met services, HET etc.

Q72. How can the MOD remain an intelligent customer if it outsources more activity?

In the sector we are describing the driver is disciplined manpower and company organisation. This is not an area reliant on developing new technology but where technology applies it will largely be COTS security equipment. The intelligent customer safeguards will come out from an understanding of the civilian market which is not onerous. Thus MOD remains an intelligent customer through being commercially intelligent.

Q73. How might MOD enable wider exploitation of simulation and synthetic systems and scenarios?

Not commented on.

Q74. How could MOD simplify interfaces, relationships, and decision making to improve the provision of support to the Armed Forces?

To support the Armed Forces on operations industry capability needs to be known to the Military with links in place. They need to operate in a ‘no surprise culture’ and understand one an other to arrive at assured support within a Single Force solution. This would require some level of joint planning and exercising. It would also need to be underpinned by contractual commitment and in some cases there will be a cost to MOD covering the peacetime activity and possibly latent cost of surge as in the current CONLOG contract.

Q75. What legal problems do companies face when providing support to operations?

Industry faces both legal and commercial problems when providing support to operations. The often MOD insistence that industry accepts ‘unlimited liability’ makes no sense as this does not take away the risk from MOD; industry cannot control enemy action and should not be expected to manage risks that are out of its control. It could also lead to bankruptcy and non-performance.

Industry needs to operate as a part of the force to stay within international law through an MOU with the Force or any sovereign government in the area of operations. Industry and MOD took major risks in Iraq in the latter days when the CPA ceased to operate and no MOU was put in place. The other problem areas revolve around lack of insurance (i.e. reputable cover); Health & Safety duty of care if protection is not available and operating outside Condo Conditions which could result in charges of Corporate Manslaughter.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Chris Rowe http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-301 Chris Rowe Thu, 10 Mar 2011 18:39:21 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-301 Q3 - We are a mid-sized company (neither SME nor major Prime) based in Wales, who has a world-leading position in a small but vitally important niche (floating and airborne passive Electronic Warfare naval decoys). UK MoD has already recognised this by funding some development (enough said ...), but we are faced with the problem of maintaining and further developing our skills and products in the face of a feast-or-famine workload scenario. An SME would probably be incapable of performing this work, and a major Prime would have the resources to ride out the famine periods; a mid-sized company can't. The points to be made are: (1) this technology is crucial to national security. (2) having recognised this, the MoD system needs to have a way of formalising and flagging this, and ensuring that wider issues (and a longer time horizon) are taken into account in procuring and maintaining this capability e.g. during production, when the engineering work may dry up, employing the development engineers to work on the next variants to maintain/grow the capability. Normally this could be covered to an extent by the company, for example by penetrating export markets, but where national security is concerned this could clearly be impractical. Q3 – We are a mid-sized company (neither SME nor major Prime) based in Wales, who has a world-leading position in a small but vitally important niche (floating and airborne passive Electronic Warfare naval decoys). UK MoD has already recognised this by funding some development (enough said …), but we are faced with the problem of maintaining and further developing our skills and products in the face of a feast-or-famine workload scenario.

An SME would probably be incapable of performing this work, and a major Prime would have the resources to ride out the famine periods; a mid-sized company can’t.

The points to be made are: (1) this technology is crucial to national security.
(2) having recognised this, the MoD system needs to have a way of formalising and flagging this, and ensuring that wider issues (and a longer time horizon) are taken into account in procuring and maintaining this capability e.g. during production, when the engineering work may dry up, employing the development engineers to work on the next variants to maintain/grow the capability.

Normally this could be covered to an extent by the company, for example by penetrating export markets, but where national security is concerned this could clearly be impractical.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by David Stride http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-300 David Stride Thu, 10 Mar 2011 15:50:53 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-300 With reference to Q.17. There is an attitude problem. If you want to broaden your contact with possible suppliers you need to make information available, freely, to anyone who thinks they might have something to offer. At present such information is only available to someone who is willing to pay for the privilege of finding out what you propose to spend our tax pounds on. This is fundamentally wrong. Admittedly the charge is not very high, but that is not the point. You should not restrict your search for suppliers to those who happen to have been filtered out through subscribing to Defence Contracts Bulletin or similar publications. The obvious solution is a web-site where actual and prospective suppliers can record their interest and automatically receive, or freely access, any information which does not need to be restricted in some way. With reference to Q.17. There is an attitude problem. If you want to broaden your contact with possible suppliers you need to make information available, freely, to anyone who thinks they might have something to offer. At present such information is only available to someone who is willing to pay for the privilege of finding out what you propose to spend our tax pounds on. This is fundamentally wrong. Admittedly the charge is not very high, but that is not the point. You should not restrict your search for suppliers to those who happen to have been filtered out through subscribing to Defence Contracts Bulletin or similar publications. The obvious solution is a web-site where actual and prospective suppliers can record their interest and automatically receive, or freely access, any information which does not need to be restricted in some way.

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by Steve Shepherd http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-299 Steve Shepherd Mon, 07 Mar 2011 09:05:15 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-299 Peter Luff, MP Minister for Defence Equipment, Support & Technology Ministry of Defence Main Building Horseguards Avenue London SW1A 2HB Dear Minister, Defence Equipment, Support and Technology Consultation On behalf of the UKCeB, I am writing to you with our initial feedback to your consultation process. The United Kingdom Council for electronic Business is a not for profit trade association supported by A|D|S and Intellect, with membership drawn from Defence Contractors and their IS providers and consultants. Its mission is to transform secure information sharing for through life collaboration in defence acquisition and support. It facilitates the work of the Joint Information Group (JIG), a National Defence Industries Council (NDIC) subgroup. A shared challenge Both the MoD and the majority of UK defence contractors believe that acquisition and support for major defence capabilities could be a much more efficient process. Since the creation of the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) a good deal of progress has been made, for example through the outstanding work in Logistics Network Enabled Capability (LogNEC). Yet UK Defence, as a whole, has still not reached the world-class performance levels in acquisition and support that both our service personnel and UK taxpayers deserve. Some good examples of best practice, such as LogNEC, do exist but these have not come about as a result of a coherent strategic approach. As budgets come under increasing pressure and scrutiny, inefficiency in acquisition and support will become an even more urgent cause for concern. UKCeB recognises the great desire within the entire defence community to tackle the underlying issues and build a better way of working for the future. We will only achieve a real step-change in acquisition and support performance once we accept that UK Defence must be seen as an extended enterprise, in which the armed forces, MoD staff and industry work together for the public good. This approach is especially important when it comes to the management and exploitation of information. Information as an asset Information is a key asset possessed by the extended enterprise of UK Defence, and its importance is often overlooked. In fact, it is the factor that, more than anything else, determines quality of decision-making, relevance of research, accuracy of forward planning, efficiency of manufacturing, speed and flexibility in the supply chain, and ultimately the availability and effectiveness of all defence capabilities. Information exists right across the extended defence support enterprise and is created by all stakeholders through everything they do. Unless information is collated, analysed and managed in a targeted and structured way, it is of little value to anyone. Exploited intelligently, however, it can be the basis for a performance step-change in the costly, complex process of acquiring and supporting major defence capabilities. Best practice in information exploitation Most industries now recognise the need for collaborative joint working, often with competitors and specialist niche partners, to achieve world-class performance and efficiency. Leading defence suppliers have also made considerable progress in this direction, both internally and across their own supply chains. To enable effective collaboration, world-class organisations build open standard processes and IT infrastructures, so that partner companies, including SMEs, can contribute on a “plug and play” basis, as and when needed; develop systems that enable secure collaborative working, with flexible information-sharing for authorised users and treat information as a key asset, with repeatability and reuse of reliable information assets unlocking continuous cost-reduction and performance improvement. Information exploitation in UK Defence This world-class approach to information exploitation does not yet happen in the wider extended enterprise of UK Defence, but we are convinced that it could and should: and this is especially the case as defence contractors move closer to the operational front line in support provision. UKCeB believes that the MoD, while it understands the value of operational and intelligence information, has not applied sufficient senior level focus to the vital importance of information in the support arena. Better performance in information management and exploitation will not only lead to cost-savings in the ICT budget, which accounts for around 4% of total defence spending, but also has the power to transform the efficiency of the other 96% of the defence budget that is supported and enabled by information. Yet there still seem to be serious obstacles that prevent this key asset from being exploited to the full. The MoD has a prevalent “them and us” attitude when it comes to the topic of support information. There is a widespread assumption, (which is applicable in the operational and intelligence domains), that a hard protective barrier should be placed between the MoD and the rest of the world. This is untenable in the acquisition and support arena as it causes the relationship with the industrial base to default to the “parent – child” model, in which sharing and collaborative working become unnecessarily difficult. Proposed next steps To rectify this underlying structural problem, UKCeB strongly believes that we urgently need to build and manage a world-class, high-performing information management environment across the entire UK Defence support enterprise. In making this vision a reality, we must look to the MoD to provide the kind of determined strategic leadership that has been hampered in the past. So how is this to be done? First, there should be a very senior, determined and clear-minded Information Champion for the entire UK Defence enterprise within the MoD. This person does not need to be a technologist but should be at the level of Second PUS, and should have the confidence and mandate to make things happen and enforce positive change in exploiting our collective information resources. Second, we believe that the MoD should ensure that the organisation responsible for information exploitation has the authority and accountability to set a clear strategic direction and manage execution across the entire extended enterprise. This proposal is also supported by Intellect, and was included in its 2010 paper: “Increasing the Tempo of ISTAR Acquisition”. UKCeB is certain that all its members would welcome, support and enthusiastically work with both the Information Champion and MoD information organisation to drive the improvements that the country needs. Finally, we believe that the key importance of information exploitation should be immediately recognised by creation of a working party, comprising very senior personnel from the MoD, armed forces and industry to oversee rapid progress towards improved collaborative working and secure information sharing across the whole of UK Defence. This body should have the seniority and empowerment that NDIC currently possesses, but with the ability and willingness to provide active direction and support to the Joint Information Group. An initiative of this kind would help us to reach the kind of consistent, world-class performance that we all believe is both possible and highly desirable. Among tasks to be undertaken are identification of best practice examples in information exploitation, developing the best possible organisational structures for collaboration and clearing away the obstacles that currently hinder effective information exploitation and sharing across acquisition and support activities. This kind of initiative would also receive support and active help from UK defence contractors. Summary Defence increasingly depends on effective collaborative working with the industrial base. To make this approach work effectively, with the right levels of speed, cost-effective performance and agility will require a new approach to information management and exploitation that extends across multiple organisational boundaries. In turn, this can only be achieved within an integrated information environment, with its own strategy and management practices, driven by a team senior enough to facilitate effective joint working. This is a basic requirement for a successful future defence strategy, especially at a time when resources are under pressure and future threats remain unpredictable. UKCeB looks forward to supporting these initial views in much greater depth during the period leading up to completion of the White Paper and beyond into implementation. Nigel Whitehead Chairman Peter Luff, MP
Minister for Defence Equipment, Support & Technology
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Horseguards Avenue
London SW1A 2HB

Dear Minister,

Defence Equipment, Support and Technology Consultation

On behalf of the UKCeB, I am writing to you with our initial feedback to your consultation process. The United Kingdom Council for electronic Business is a not for profit trade association supported by A|D|S and Intellect, with membership drawn from Defence Contractors and their IS providers and consultants. Its mission is to transform secure information sharing for through life collaboration in defence acquisition and support. It facilitates the work of the Joint Information Group (JIG), a National Defence Industries Council (NDIC) subgroup.

A shared challenge
Both the MoD and the majority of UK defence contractors believe that acquisition and support for major defence capabilities could be a much more efficient process. Since the creation of the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) a good deal of progress has been made, for example through the outstanding work in Logistics Network Enabled Capability (LogNEC). Yet UK Defence, as a whole, has still not reached the world-class performance levels in acquisition and support that both our service personnel and UK taxpayers deserve.

Some good examples of best practice, such as LogNEC, do exist but these have not come about as a result of a coherent strategic approach. As budgets come under increasing pressure and scrutiny, inefficiency in acquisition and support will become an even more urgent cause for concern.

UKCeB recognises the great desire within the entire defence community to tackle the underlying issues and build a better way of working for the future. We will only achieve a real step-change in acquisition and support performance once we accept that UK Defence must be seen as an extended enterprise, in which the armed forces, MoD staff and industry work together for the public good. This approach is especially important when it comes to the management and exploitation of information.

Information as an asset
Information is a key asset possessed by the extended enterprise of UK Defence, and its importance is often overlooked. In fact, it is the factor that, more than anything else, determines quality of decision-making, relevance of research, accuracy of forward planning, efficiency of manufacturing, speed and flexibility in the supply chain, and ultimately the availability and effectiveness of all defence capabilities. Information exists right across the extended defence support enterprise and is created by all stakeholders through everything they do. Unless information is collated, analysed and managed in a targeted and structured way, it is of little value to anyone. Exploited intelligently, however, it can be the basis for a performance step-change in the costly, complex process of acquiring and supporting major defence capabilities.

Best practice in information exploitation
Most industries now recognise the need for collaborative joint working, often with competitors and specialist niche partners, to achieve world-class performance and efficiency. Leading defence suppliers have also made considerable progress in this direction, both internally and across their own supply chains. To enable effective collaboration, world-class organisations build open standard processes and IT infrastructures, so that partner companies, including SMEs, can contribute on a “plug and play” basis, as and when needed; develop systems that enable secure collaborative working, with flexible information-sharing for authorised users and treat information as a key asset, with repeatability and reuse of reliable information assets unlocking continuous cost-reduction and performance improvement.

Information exploitation in UK Defence
This world-class approach to information exploitation does not yet happen in the wider extended enterprise of UK Defence, but we are convinced that it could and should: and this is especially the case as defence contractors move closer to the operational front line in support provision. UKCeB believes that the MoD, while it understands the value of operational and intelligence information, has not applied sufficient senior level focus to the vital importance of information in the support arena. Better performance in information management and exploitation will not only lead to cost-savings in the ICT budget, which accounts for around 4% of total defence spending, but also has the power to transform the efficiency of the other 96% of the defence budget that is supported and enabled by information.

Yet there still seem to be serious obstacles that prevent this key asset from being exploited to the full. The MoD has a prevalent “them and us” attitude when it comes to the topic of support information. There is a widespread assumption, (which is applicable in the operational and intelligence domains), that a hard protective barrier should be placed between the MoD and the rest of the world. This is untenable in the acquisition and support arena as it causes the relationship with the industrial base to default to the “parent – child” model, in which sharing and collaborative working become unnecessarily difficult.

Proposed next steps
To rectify this underlying structural problem, UKCeB strongly believes that we urgently need to build and manage a world-class, high-performing information management environment across the entire UK Defence support enterprise. In making this vision a reality, we must look to the MoD to provide the kind of determined strategic leadership that has been hampered in the past. So how is this to be done?

First, there should be a very senior, determined and clear-minded Information Champion for the entire UK Defence enterprise within the MoD. This person does not need to be a technologist but should be at the level of Second PUS, and should have the confidence and mandate to make things happen and enforce positive change in exploiting our collective information resources.

Second, we believe that the MoD should ensure that the organisation responsible for information exploitation has the authority and accountability to set a clear strategic direction and manage execution across the entire extended enterprise. This proposal is also supported by Intellect, and was included in its 2010 paper: “Increasing the Tempo of ISTAR Acquisition”. UKCeB is certain that all its members would welcome, support and enthusiastically work with both the Information Champion and MoD information organisation to drive the improvements that the country needs.

Finally, we believe that the key importance of information exploitation should be immediately recognised by creation of a working party, comprising very senior personnel from the MoD, armed forces and industry to oversee rapid progress towards improved collaborative working and secure information sharing across the whole of UK Defence. This body should have the seniority and empowerment that NDIC currently possesses, but with the ability and willingness to provide active direction and support to the Joint Information Group. An initiative of this kind would help us to reach the kind of consistent, world-class performance that we all believe is both possible and highly desirable.

Among tasks to be undertaken are identification of best practice examples in information exploitation, developing the best possible organisational structures for collaboration and clearing away the obstacles that currently hinder effective information exploitation and sharing across acquisition and support activities. This kind of initiative would also receive support and active help from UK defence contractors.

Summary
Defence increasingly depends on effective collaborative working with the industrial base. To make this approach work effectively, with the right levels of speed, cost-effective performance and agility will require a new approach to information management and exploitation that extends across multiple organisational boundaries. In turn, this can only be achieved within an integrated information environment, with its own strategy and management practices, driven by a team senior enough to facilitate effective joint working. This is a basic requirement for a successful future defence strategy, especially at a time when resources are under pressure and future threats remain unpredictable. UKCeB looks forward to supporting these initial views in much greater depth during the period leading up to completion of the White Paper and beyond into implementation.

Nigel Whitehead
Chairman

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Melanie Sadler http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-298 Melanie Sadler Tue, 01 Mar 2011 16:38:38 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-298 Q21. How do we maintain a capability edge in the innovative use of commercial off-theshelf (COTS) components through the life of a military or security capability? There seems to be too great an emphasis on achieving 20+ year life, without considering the trade-offs in terms of cost, weight, functionality etc. For example, in the realm of the dismounted soldier it may be more cost-effective to sacrifice 20 yr durability for the ability to purchase significantly cheaper COTS equipment on a more regular basis, hence taking advantage of new developments in portable electronics, weapons, sights, power sources etc. To reduce procurement timescales (and cost) such that new products can be introduced quickly, it will be important in each case to ask whether we need a bespoke solution for the UK, or will a COTS system be 'good enough'? Q21. How do we maintain a capability edge in the innovative use of commercial off-theshelf (COTS) components through the life of a military or security capability?

There seems to be too great an emphasis on achieving 20+ year life, without considering the trade-offs in terms of cost, weight, functionality etc. For example, in the realm of the dismounted soldier it may be more cost-effective to sacrifice 20 yr durability for the ability to purchase significantly cheaper COTS equipment on a more regular basis, hence taking advantage of new developments in portable electronics, weapons, sights, power sources etc.
To reduce procurement timescales (and cost) such that new products can be introduced quickly, it will be important in each case to ask whether we need a bespoke solution for the UK, or will a COTS system be ‘good enough’?

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Melanie Sadler http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-297 Melanie Sadler Tue, 01 Mar 2011 15:52:08 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-297 Q18. What are the opportunities for expanding the role of the Centre for Defence Enterprise or using this model more widely across defence, security, and the cyberspace domain? The role of CDE in publicising the needs of the MOD to a wider audience is very welcome, particularly to SME's and new entrants to the Defence industry. It does however focus very heavily on disruptive, high risk technologies, which neglects the application of COTS technologies to bring improvements rapidly into use. Perhaps the principles of a 'product portfolio' could be applied i.e. a small number of high risk / high return investments with a larger number of lower risk investments in incremental improvements? Q18. What are the opportunities for expanding the role of the Centre for Defence Enterprise or using this model more widely across defence, security, and the cyberspace domain?

The role of CDE in publicising the needs of the MOD to a wider audience is very welcome, particularly to SME’s and new entrants to the Defence industry.
It does however focus very heavily on disruptive, high risk technologies, which neglects the application of COTS technologies to bring improvements rapidly into use. Perhaps the principles of a ‘product portfolio’ could be applied i.e. a small number of high risk / high return investments with a larger number of lower risk investments in incremental improvements?

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Melanie Sadler http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-296 Melanie Sadler Tue, 01 Mar 2011 15:24:24 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-296 Q11. What should be the balance of priorities for research investment in science and technology for defence and security purposes? In any industry, not just Defence & Security, it is generally a bad idea for Government to attempt to 'back the right horse' in terms of science/technology. Almost by definition, it is impossible to foresee where radical breakthroughs will emerge, so support of a healthy, wide-ranging research community in the UK is more important. The potential success of industry in developing new products then relies on (a) straightfoward access to 'raw' technology from the research community and (b) clear specification of the capability requirements that need to be met. The latter is critical to product development, but is often difficult for industry to access in sufficient detail from MOD. Q11. What should be the balance of priorities for research investment in science and technology for defence and security purposes?

In any industry, not just Defence & Security, it is generally a bad idea for Government to attempt to ‘back the right horse’ in terms of science/technology. Almost by definition, it is impossible to foresee where radical breakthroughs will emerge, so support of a healthy, wide-ranging research community in the UK is more important. The potential success of industry in developing new products then relies on (a) straightfoward access to ‘raw’ technology from the research community and (b) clear specification of the capability requirements that need to be met. The latter is critical to product development, but is often difficult for industry to access in sufficient detail from MOD.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Angela Richardson http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-295 Angela Richardson Fri, 25 Feb 2011 08:35:07 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-295 Q26. Weapons should not be exported. There was evidence that weapons exported to Libya were being used to murder people (what else can weapons be used for?) Q26. Weapons should not be exported. There was evidence that weapons exported to Libya were being used to murder people (what else can weapons be used for?)

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Gary Sermon http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-294 Gary Sermon Mon, 21 Feb 2011 11:05:36 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-294 Q58. A reduction in the profitability expectations for industry when supplying the MOD would certainly encourage companies to seek further exploitation of MOD-led technologies. The problem at present is that UK Primes are far too comfortable ‘doing what they are doing’! Q58. A reduction in the profitability expectations for industry when supplying the MOD would certainly encourage companies to seek further exploitation of MOD-led technologies. The problem at present is that UK Primes are far too comfortable ‘doing what they are doing’!

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Gary Sermon http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-293 Gary Sermon Mon, 21 Feb 2011 11:00:27 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-293 Q62. Protectionism in any field is not sustainable, and therefore should not be considered! However, the establishment of a long term strategy will enable a supply chain to determine their long term skill and capability requirements and hence encourage them to provide the environment in which those requirements will flourish. In essence, it is not really the customers responsibility to determine the skills and capability requirements of its supply chain Q62. Protectionism in any field is not sustainable, and therefore should not be considered! However, the establishment of a long term strategy will enable a supply chain to determine their long term skill and capability requirements and hence encourage them to provide the environment in which those requirements will flourish. In essence, it is not really the customers responsibility to determine the skills and capability requirements of its supply chain

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Gary Sermon http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-292 Gary Sermon Mon, 21 Feb 2011 10:52:58 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-292 Q57. There are industries, such as automotive, where the assessment of value-for-money for systems is well established. The key difference in approach between the Defence/Security and Automotive industries is the relationship between customer and supplier. In the former, both the purchase team at the MOD and the supply team in the Prime are assessed/rewarded on the programme being reported as on track, and as programmes are lengthy in duration, it is unusual for the team at launch to be the same as the team at delivery. In the latter, it is very much the same apart from assessment of programme progress is very strongly focused on actual tasks achieved versus those planned. In essence, the Automotive Industry requires detailed earned value management, which is the only level at which it is effective, whereas the MOD accepts very high level earned value management that is very much open to subjective assessment. Q57. There are industries, such as automotive, where the assessment of value-for-money for systems is well established. The key difference in approach between the Defence/Security and Automotive industries is the relationship between customer and supplier. In the former, both the purchase team at the MOD and the supply team in the Prime are assessed/rewarded on the programme being reported as on track, and as programmes are lengthy in duration, it is unusual for the team at launch to be the same as the team at delivery. In the latter, it is very much the same apart from assessment of programme progress is very strongly focused on actual tasks achieved versus those planned. In essence, the Automotive Industry requires detailed earned value management, which is the only level at which it is effective, whereas the MOD accepts very high level earned value management that is very much open to subjective assessment.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Gary Sermon http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-291 Gary Sermon Mon, 21 Feb 2011 10:36:02 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-291 Q63. The MOD needs to establish minimum criteria for both programme management and true customer focus, within the whole supply chain. Personal experiences of working at a senior management level within a UK Prime is that programmes are monitored on actual spend to date, taking little account of what has actually been achieved to date. The result of this focus on spend is that long-term programmes are invariably reported as ‘on track’ up to the point that equipment is due to be assembled for testing purposes - when all the shortfalls that have so far been overlooked become very apparent (Poor Programme Management). At this time focus changes to - what can technically be achieved for the target cost (Lack of True Customer Focus)? This is the start of the slippery slope to late delivery of equipment that doesn’t actually achieve the specification that was requested. Q63. The MOD needs to establish minimum criteria for both programme management and true customer focus, within the whole supply chain. Personal experiences of working at a senior management level within a UK Prime is that programmes are monitored on actual spend to date, taking little account of what has actually been achieved to date. The result of this focus on spend is that long-term programmes are invariably reported as ‘on track’ up to the point that equipment is due to be assembled for testing purposes – when all the shortfalls that have so far been overlooked become very apparent (Poor Programme Management). At this time focus changes to – what can technically be achieved for the target cost (Lack of True Customer Focus)? This is the start of the slippery slope to late delivery of equipment that doesn’t actually achieve the specification that was requested.

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Comment on 3.1.2 Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-urgent-operational-requirements-uors-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-290 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:19:41 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=345#comment-290 Q65: There are significant overlaps and the 6 key capability pillars proposed seem reasonable, however there are complicated interaction because of their percieved relationship to uniformed branches. Two other key areas where a pan-defence approach would be appropriate are logistics and policy/administration/support services. A pan-governmental approach would be wide for non-military ICT, procurement and benefits payment. Q65: There are significant overlaps and the 6 key capability pillars proposed seem reasonable, however there are complicated interaction because of their percieved relationship to uniformed branches. Two other key areas where a pan-defence approach would be appropriate are logistics and policy/administration/support services. A pan-governmental approach would be wide for non-military ICT, procurement and benefits payment.

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Comment on 3.1.2 Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/3-1-2-urgent-operational-requirements-uors-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-289 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:19:25 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=345#comment-289 Q64: It is not. Competition is a lengthy, harmful and financially inefficient way to find the market clearing price. In any case it is not a realistic option for many major procurements as the UK sector has consolidated reducing domestic procurement options. The remainder of this paper looks to secure effective, affordable and efficient procurements which promote the development of internationally competitive solutions. Q64: It is not. Competition is a lengthy, harmful and financially inefficient way to find the market clearing price. In any case it is not a realistic option for many major procurements as the UK sector has consolidated reducing domestic procurement options. The remainder of this paper looks to secure effective, affordable and efficient procurements which promote the development of internationally competitive solutions.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-288 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:16:53 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-288 Q62: Primes and design authorities need special protection. Although SMEs are a key provider of innovation and short-duration services, it is the retained knowledge within long-term suppliers, especially the platform design authorites, which provide the basis for integration, rapid regeneration and and assuring safety over future decades. Likewise, labour providing organisations tend to be large to dilute central overheads and to assure the breadth of skills required. Evidence for the value of primes in retaining and developiong skills can be seen in spin-off businesses and new starts around these locations. Q62: Primes and design authorities need special protection. Although SMEs are a key provider of innovation and short-duration services, it is the retained knowledge within long-term suppliers, especially the platform design authorites, which provide the basis for integration, rapid regeneration and and assuring safety over future decades. Likewise, labour providing organisations tend to be large to dilute central overheads and to assure the breadth of skills required.

Evidence for the value of primes in retaining and developiong skills can be seen in spin-off businesses and new starts around these locations.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-287 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:15:24 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-287 Q61 & Q63: HMG should always attempt to assess bids based upon the full (i.e. indirect) lifecycle costs and impacts. HMG must show how it will value environmental and UK economic impacts as these fall outside of direct cash costs. This moves beyond CADMID approach within a programme to a holistic approach. Q61 & Q63: HMG should always attempt to assess bids based upon the full (i.e. indirect) lifecycle costs and impacts. HMG must show how it will value environmental and UK economic impacts as these fall outside of direct cash costs. This moves beyond CADMID approach within a programme to a holistic approach.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-286 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:13:53 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-286 moderator - I meant to put interchangeable vehicle batteries, could you please edit that in? moderator – I meant to put interchangeable vehicle batteries, could you please edit that in?

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-285 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:13:05 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-285 Q60: For Defence, the supply of batteries and tanking of diesel into theatre are both drivers of logistics, force protection and risk. The current MoD "powerbase" initiative is a welcome first step towards self-reliant deployment and needs extending. Renewables offer clean, off-grid electricity and heat. Issuing governmental standards for compatible power connection would allow a market to develop in supply technologies and would minimising the range of equipment with attendant economies of scale. Standards related to UK/EU domestic standards (240/230v, USB, etc.) will maximise the market for investment, but may miss the opportunities to utilise low voltage technologies available with de-centralised generation. Encouraging self-contained equipment will mirror long- established civilian practices, such as placing solar cells on calculators did in the 1980s. A standard for vehicle batteries and interfaces might well overcome current range/recharging limitations and a move to service level payment (miles, not litres) would help drive efficiency. Q60: For Defence, the supply of batteries and tanking of diesel into theatre are both drivers of logistics, force protection and risk.

The current MoD “powerbase” initiative is a welcome first step towards self-reliant deployment and needs extending. Renewables offer clean, off-grid electricity and heat. Issuing governmental standards for compatible power connection would allow a market to develop in supply technologies and would minimising the range of equipment with attendant economies of scale.

Standards related to UK/EU domestic standards (240/230v, USB, etc.) will maximise the market for investment, but may miss the opportunities to utilise low voltage technologies available with de-centralised generation. Encouraging self-contained equipment will mirror long- established civilian practices, such as placing solar cells on calculators did in the 1980s.

A standard for vehicle batteries and interfaces might well overcome current range/recharging limitations and a move to service level payment (miles, not litres) would help drive efficiency.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-284 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:09:25 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-284 Q59: Development of new technologies is need driven. Unmet needs are either missed opportunities or worked around. Communicating unresolved problems might help drive innovation but risks revealing capabilities and focus. Q59: Development of new technologies is need driven. Unmet needs are either missed opportunities or worked around. Communicating unresolved problems might help drive innovation but risks revealing capabilities and focus.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-283 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:08:58 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-283 Q58: Publication of sufficient information to now what science/development is being done and who to contact (e.g. the Haldane Spearman Consortium's research highlights). This could be a widely publicised 'pull' system with verified access. Q58: Publication of sufficient information to now what science/development is being done and who to contact (e.g. the Haldane Spearman Consortium’s research highlights). This could be a widely publicised ‘pull’ system with verified access.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-282 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 16:08:11 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-282 Q56: The expenditure is particulalry relevant in the regions, where market pressures would not support the same scale in other economic activity. Agglomeration economies can be observed in the westcountry and northwest where specialist service companies and supply chains support primes. In each case, the core skills within the agglomeration have resulted in spiral development products (often based on UK MoD models bought earlier) and growth in sectors which use related skill bases (e.g. enterprise software, supply chain management, imports, internet sales). Of course all of that returns tax revenues. Without defence expenditure these economies would never out-compete London. Q56: The expenditure is particulalry relevant in the regions, where market pressures would not support the same scale in other economic activity. Agglomeration economies can be observed in the westcountry and northwest where specialist service companies and supply chains support primes. In each case, the core skills within the agglomeration have resulted in spiral development products (often based on UK MoD models bought earlier) and growth in sectors which use related skill bases (e.g. enterprise software, supply chain management, imports, internet sales). Of course all of that returns tax revenues. Without defence expenditure these economies would never out-compete London.

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Comment on 2.3.4 Wider impacts – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-4-wider-impacts-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-281 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:56:16 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=206#comment-281 Q55: HMG should ALWAYS procure to maximise the benefit of the UK and this must be explicit to be fair to external bidders (a) Procurement must be: i Effective, then ii Affordable, then iii Financially Efficient in that order of presedence (b) HMG must recognise its Duty is to (i) the nation (defence is not optional), then (ii) the economy (with its wider full-cost accounting covering spend displaced from other departments), then (iii) the taxpayer ... and this may mean tough decisions which are unpopular at the ballot box. As an example, there has been much debate of the effect on the scottish economy following the CSR debate of Scottish basing. Defence is particulalry relevant to peripheral regions. HMG must not be shy in promoting British interests, as other nations do. The USA has been very active in defending their indutrial base against market entry by others (VXX) and has actively attacked UK sales abroad (India, Aus/NZ) (c) HMG must be seen to be fair and rational whether it chooses Offset rules Weighting by jobs Return on capital ... or some other measure (d) HMG must remember that > 65% of total annual UK sales are stable post-contract support and introductions to UK companies as the result of sales, yet the focus is often on first cost and initial project. Q55: HMG should ALWAYS procure to maximise the benefit of the UK and this must be explicit to be fair to external bidders
(a) Procurement must be:
i Effective, then
ii Affordable, then
iii Financially Efficient
in that order of presedence
(b) HMG must recognise its Duty is to
(i) the nation (defence is not optional), then
(ii) the economy (with its wider full-cost accounting covering spend displaced from other departments), then
(iii) the taxpayer
… and this may mean tough decisions which are unpopular at the ballot box.

As an example, there has been much debate of the effect on the scottish economy following the CSR debate of Scottish basing. Defence is particulalry relevant to peripheral regions.

HMG must not be shy in promoting British interests, as other nations do. The USA has been very active in defending their indutrial base against market entry by others (VXX) and has actively attacked UK sales abroad (India, Aus/NZ)
(c) HMG must be seen to be fair and rational whether it chooses
Offset rules
Weighting by jobs
Return on capital
… or some other measure
(d) HMG must remember that > 65% of total annual UK sales are stable post-contract support and introductions to UK companies as the result of sales, yet the focus is often on first cost and initial project.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-280 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:40:03 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-280 Q54: The principles of assessment need to be made explicit, ideally published regularly and openly (e.g. Planning Policy Statements from Dept for Communities) and continually refined (as lessons are learned) through an open challenge mechanism and regular consultation. Q54: The principles of assessment need to be made explicit, ideally published regularly and openly (e.g. Planning Policy Statements from Dept for Communities) and continually refined (as lessons are learned) through an open challenge mechanism and regular consultation.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-279 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:39:04 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-279 Q53: They do already, it is in the prime's commercial interests, whether for services or host platforms. If another UK SME/OEM is already established in-country, a prime will assess whether continued development is worthwhile. Q53: They do already, it is in the prime’s commercial interests, whether for services or host platforms. If another UK SME/OEM is already established in-country, a prime will assess whether continued development is worthwhile.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-278 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:36:48 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-278 Q52: MoD must provide (or facilitate) a basic advice service (rather than standing neutrally) in much the same way that Councils advise business on regulation and how to meet it. A proforma NDA could be provided. Q52: MoD must provide (or facilitate) a basic advice service (rather than standing neutrally) in much the same way that Councils advise business on regulation and how to meet it. A proforma NDA could be provided.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-277 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:34:38 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-277 Q51: Industry forums require support, including funding, to be accessible to SMEs. I note that many current forums are 'crowded out' by mass MoD attendance, especially those near ABW. External distribution of "DESider" content must be maintained, even if electronic. Greater openness on pricing and specifications will help as SMEs cannot compete effectively in market intelligence. Q51: Industry forums require support, including funding, to be accessible to SMEs. I note that many current forums are ‘crowded out’ by mass MoD attendance, especially those near ABW. External distribution of “DESider” content must be maintained, even if electronic. Greater openness on pricing and specifications will help as SMEs cannot compete effectively in market intelligence.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-276 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:32:20 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-276 Q50: In general UK defence and security spending is falling, thus growth can only be at the expense of others to whom HMG also holds duties. At best HMG could "allow" SMEs which meet risk coverage and sustainability tests to participate as primes by clarifying such pre-conditions and perhaps offering prequalification/accreditation. Q50: In general UK defence and security spending is falling, thus growth can only be at the expense of others to whom HMG also holds duties. At best HMG could “allow” SMEs which meet risk coverage and sustainability tests to participate as primes by clarifying such pre-conditions and perhaps offering prequalification/accreditation.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-275 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:29:21 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-275 Q49. HMG should recognise that competition has losers. The casual branding of a rejected UK product as 'uncompetitive', 'non-compliant' or merely 'less good on VfM' makes it very much more difficult to promote that product for overseas sales. HMG should consider product reputation as part of the decision to compete. Q49. HMG should recognise that competition has losers. The casual branding of a rejected UK product as ‘uncompetitive’, ‘non-compliant’ or merely ‘less good on VfM’ makes it very much more difficult to promote that product for overseas sales. HMG should consider product reputation as part of the decision to compete.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-274 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:24:03 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-274 Q47, Q48: By being less dogmatic, though unfair practices such as supply policy exemptions should be made widely known before acceptance to ensure they're necessary. Q47, Q48: By being less dogmatic, though unfair practices such as supply policy exemptions should be made widely known before acceptance to ensure they’re necessary.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-273 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:23:42 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-273 Q46: Only practicalities 1. SME's are usually not integrators, and thus only see one side of standardisation 2. SMEs will normally be sub-contractors, primes will assure effective standardisation and will want standard internal procedures for procurement, and engineering across customers 3. SMEs often can't afford the diversion of time for input across the board and this might result in them offering a lightly-considered, selfish view. Q46: Only practicalities
1. SME’s are usually not integrators, and thus only see one side of standardisation
2. SMEs will normally be sub-contractors, primes will assure effective standardisation and will want standard internal procedures for procurement, and engineering across customers
3. SMEs often can’t afford the diversion of time for input across the board and this might result in them offering a lightly-considered, selfish view.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-272 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:21:56 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-272 Q45: Consortia and Alliances decrease the availability of competition to HMG, though they may make UK exports far more competitive. HMG should allow but not mandate Q45: Consortia and Alliances decrease the availability of competition to HMG, though they may make UK exports far more competitive. HMG should allow but not mandate

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-271 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:20:33 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-271 Q44: Compliance may be impossible if sub-contracts are themselves still be in a competitive state. This will often be the case with complex programmes. Q44: Compliance may be impossible if sub-contracts are themselves still be in a competitive state. This will often be the case with complex programmes.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-270 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:20:07 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-270 Q42: Not mandated, but the facility should be available and might be given some weight under "governance" in bid assessment. 1. This proposal would impose additional costs on the larger Prime Contractor businesses involved and will duplicate present arrangements (were it not so, the profit motive would have secured such use already). 2. The proposal is predicated on an assumption that information does not already flow freely and that the savings from compeition outweigh the dis-benefits. Q42: Not mandated, but the facility should be available and might be given some weight under “governance” in bid assessment.
1. This proposal would impose additional costs on the larger Prime Contractor businesses involved and will duplicate present arrangements (were it not so, the profit motive would have secured such use already).
2. The proposal is predicated on an assumption that information does not already flow freely and that the savings from compeition outweigh the dis-benefits.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-269 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:19:26 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-269 Q41: HMG needs to decide whether a market intervention is required at all ... Surely UK employment is key, so why favour one size of business. If there is a USP, VFM will be likely. If SMEs are unlikely to deliver VFM compared to other UK sourcing, why worry? Q41: HMG needs to decide whether a market intervention is required at all … Surely UK employment is key, so why favour one size of business. If there is a USP, VFM will be likely. If SMEs are unlikely to deliver VFM compared to other UK sourcing, why worry?

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-268 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:19:06 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-268 Q40: absolutely, history is littered with excess costs where spiral development of OTS could have been used. Q40: absolutely, history is littered with excess costs where spiral development of OTS could have been used.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-267 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:18:37 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-267 Q39: HMG needs to support British business but doesn't need to do this by contracting directly. Q39: HMG needs to support British business but doesn’t need to do this by contracting directly.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-266 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:18:22 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-266 Q37, Q38: By ensuring that competition assessments give due weight to the UK job content, once military effectiveness is secured. Employment (and national independence) should be considered as factors within affordability or as part of efficiency assessment, since without HMG economic aims will be tougher to achieve and additional HMG effort (cost)will be required to compensate. Q37, Q38: By ensuring that competition assessments give due weight to the UK job content, once military effectiveness is secured. Employment (and national independence) should be considered as factors within affordability or as part of efficiency assessment, since without HMG economic aims will be tougher to achieve and additional HMG effort (cost)will be required to compensate.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-265 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 15:16:08 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-265 General points: It's cheaper for primes to run competitions (which they're doing anyway) than for MoD to run them. MoD could then assess whether value for money is acheived in compliance with MoD strategy. No mention is made of such a partnering approach, nor of the benefits in sustaining SMEs as 1st and 2nd tier suppliers. General points:
It’s cheaper for primes to run competitions (which they’re doing anyway) than for MoD to run them. MoD could then assess whether value for money is acheived in compliance with MoD strategy.
No mention is made of such a partnering approach, nor of the benefits in sustaining SMEs as 1st and 2nd tier suppliers.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-264 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 11:12:31 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-264 Q36: Yes, ITAR has been a particular influence on export platform configurations offered,as information and other restrictions defeat industry support (esp compared to FMS, with which it often has to compete). A lot of UK equipment has US components becasue of the demanding UK requirements. Primes look elsewhere if ITAR controls apply. Q36: Yes, ITAR has been a particular influence on export platform configurations offered,as information and other restrictions defeat industry support (esp compared to FMS, with which it often has to compete). A lot of UK equipment has US components becasue of the demanding UK requirements. Primes look elsewhere if ITAR controls apply.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-263 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 11:09:30 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-263 Q33: Sharing provisioning risks (repayment sales) and support systems might reduce costs at the expense of sovereignty and control. At the moment this seems very limited. Q33: Sharing provisioning risks (repayment sales) and support systems might reduce costs at the expense of sovereignty and control. At the moment this seems very limited.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-262 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 11:08:18 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-262 Q31, Q32: Whilst the use of open systems may deliver through-life support and spiral development advantages for the MoD as customer, such advantages should be reflected in normal bid assessment/scoring, not in a prescriptive requirement, since proprietary systems are equally capable of being low-cost and easily developed whilst "open systems" only deliver that advantage once widely adopted. Q31, Q32: Whilst the use of open systems may deliver through-life support and spiral development advantages for the MoD as customer, such advantages should be reflected in normal bid assessment/scoring, not in a prescriptive requirement, since proprietary systems are equally capable of being low-cost and easily developed whilst “open systems” only deliver that advantage once widely adopted.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-261 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 11:07:28 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-261 Q28, Q29, Q30: A less restictive approach is needed but issues such as Training are best dealt with on a case by case basis. Perhaps allowing FLCs to trade their IPR or participation in commercial activity might dilute the overheads of maintaining standing forces and/or allow higher capacity for a given expenditure. This would probably require a fundamental reform of financial reporting and delegated approvals. Q28, Q29, Q30: A less restictive approach is needed but issues such as Training are best dealt with on a case by case basis. Perhaps allowing FLCs to trade their IPR or participation in commercial activity might dilute the overheads of maintaining standing forces and/or allow higher capacity for a given expenditure. This would probably require a fundamental reform of financial reporting and delegated approvals.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-260 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 11:06:39 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-260 Q27: The barriers seem to be US policy and trust, for example the new US treaty says we trust your judgement at home, but not who you deal with. Q27: The barriers seem to be US policy and trust, for example the new US treaty says we trust your judgement at home, but not who you deal with.

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Comment on 2.3.1 Exports – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-1-exports-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-259 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 11:05:15 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=196#comment-259 Q26: Need to minimise the number of assurance systems (everyone wants their own!) and seek advantage within them (e.g. ITAR bilateral treaty, extended fully to export, capable of including the whole of an international company and with minimal exemptions, especially in information. Current treaty now requires both governments to approve exports, worse not better than non-treaty) Q26: Need to minimise the number of assurance systems (everyone wants their own!) and seek advantage within them (e.g. ITAR bilateral treaty, extended fully to export, capable of including the whole of an international company and with minimal exemptions, especially in information. Current treaty now requires both governments to approve exports, worse not better than non-treaty)

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-258 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 10:59:21 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-258 Q23. Skill base for strategically significant management decisions needs to be maintained: e.g. School of Defence Management Q23. Skill base for strategically significant management decisions needs to be maintained: e.g. School of Defence Management

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-257 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 10:58:35 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-257 Q24. Broad experience and access to the front line. The MoD procurement team is large and sharing procurement expertise internally will remain difficult, particularly when staff rotate through posts on a time driven cycle. Central resources (e.g. Commercial, specification) help ensure consistency and learning beyond the "policy" levels. Q24. Broad experience and access to the front line. The MoD procurement team is large and sharing procurement expertise internally will remain difficult, particularly when staff rotate through posts on a time driven cycle. Central resources (e.g. Commercial, specification) help ensure consistency and learning beyond the “policy” levels.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-256 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 10:58:01 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-256 Q21. ... is just rubbish, unless it's the capability to integrate which is the advantage. The latter is secured by UK primes. Q25 is a REPEAT. Q21. … is just rubbish, unless it’s the capability to integrate which is the advantage. The latter is secured by UK primes. Q25 is a REPEAT.

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Comment on 2.2 Science and technology – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-2-science-and-technology-key-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-255 Peter Seib Wed, 16 Feb 2011 10:56:55 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=190#comment-255 Q11. Priority should be to avoid ... - duplicating that which will be delivered by the market to be publicly available in the UK - working inefficiently - being held hostage by IPR owner - gaps in capability - Gaps in UK control in wartime provision/support - Loss of UK lead - inability to specify for procurement Q11. Priority should be to avoid …
- duplicating that which will be delivered by the market to be publicly available in the UK
- working inefficiently
- being held hostage by IPR owner
- gaps in capability
- Gaps in UK control in wartime provision/support
- Loss of UK lead
- inability to specify for procurement

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-254 Peter Seib Wed, 09 Feb 2011 16:27:49 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-254 Q9. (a) The best model is to use a single commercial prime, with parallel procurement by only 2 nations - Specification compromises are limited - Full individual accountability for performance - Support arrangements need to be capable of later change to share work to best advantage, possibly with a compensatory package (if one nation leads in many key technologies). - It is difficult to reap the benefits of sharing Initial Provisioning although IP concurrent with production should be a feasible goal. (b) Next best is a workshare split, with national primes by programme Only works well where multiple platforms or variants allow an overall programme balance e.g. 1970s CVR(T) or Lx/Puma/Gazelle - Aftermarket support delegation hasn't worked. National agencies look after own nation first on many programmes - Dominant national interests prevail by variant (i.e. lead nation accepts less compromise). (c) Third best model is a co-owned prime, with joint procurement (e.g. Tornado, Jaguar) - More overheads - Compromised spec e.g. Complex Weapons, Eurofighter (d) Worst model is two nation, two prime with workshare e.g. EH101 - Competitive pressures between customers and national interests within industry - Exports uncertain, and difficult to control ... But the up-side is greater diplomatic collaboration results. Q9.
(a) The best model is to use a single commercial prime, with parallel procurement by only 2 nations
– Specification compromises are limited
– Full individual accountability for performance
– Support arrangements need to be capable of later change to share work to best advantage, possibly with a compensatory package (if one nation leads in many key technologies).
– It is difficult to reap the benefits of sharing Initial Provisioning although IP concurrent with production should be a feasible goal.
(b) Next best is a workshare split, with national primes by programme
Only works well where multiple platforms or variants allow an overall programme balance e.g. 1970s CVR(T) or Lx/Puma/Gazelle
– Aftermarket support delegation hasn’t worked. National agencies look after own nation first on many programmes
– Dominant national interests prevail by variant (i.e. lead nation accepts less compromise).
(c) Third best model is a co-owned prime, with joint procurement (e.g. Tornado, Jaguar)
– More overheads
– Compromised spec
e.g. Complex Weapons, Eurofighter
(d) Worst model is two nation, two prime with workshare e.g. EH101
– Competitive pressures between customers and national interests within industry
– Exports uncertain, and difficult to control
… But the up-side is greater diplomatic collaboration results.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-253 Peter Seib Wed, 09 Feb 2011 16:14:45 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-253 Q8. Collaboration appears to be mainly held back by a reluctance to regularly update communication systems to match more recent standards. The equipment involved tends to use relatively cheap technology (assuming multilateral) and is often allowed to become obsolescent, pushing up support costs. Regular updates would help the SMEs which supply. Q8.
Collaboration appears to be mainly held back by a reluctance to regularly update communication systems to match more recent standards. The equipment involved tends to use relatively cheap technology (assuming multilateral) and is often allowed to become obsolescent, pushing up support costs. Regular updates would help the SMEs which supply.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-252 Peter Seib Wed, 09 Feb 2011 16:11:00 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-252 Q7. A multi-national procurement will need to demonstrate that the economies of scale in build, in-service support and disposal outweight the direct costs of common specification effort, establishing unilateral modification support (which will be at national scale only) and of multi-national wirking throughout the life of the system/equipment/service (e.g. transport/travel time/diversions/security/governance). In many cases the UK interest is demonstrably harmed and the question is whether the remediation costs exceed those of other interventions, such as development aid, bi-lateral trade fairs or additional diplomatic effort. Military and security developments tend to be very cost intensive, are only shared with very close friends and shared capability cannot be recovered should the nation turn against UK interests. Q7.
A multi-national procurement will need to demonstrate that the economies of scale in build, in-service support and disposal outweight the direct costs of common specification effort, establishing unilateral modification support (which will be at national scale only) and of multi-national wirking throughout the life of the system/equipment/service (e.g. transport/travel time/diversions/security/governance). In many cases the UK interest is demonstrably harmed and the question is whether the remediation costs exceed those of other interventions, such as development aid, bi-lateral trade fairs or additional diplomatic effort. Military and security developments tend to be very cost intensive, are only shared with very close friends and shared capability cannot be recovered should the nation turn against UK interests.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-251 Peter Seib Wed, 09 Feb 2011 15:50:34 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-251 Q5: The greatest protection appears to have been within the "decider" rather than the "provider" capability, and this has caused an indirect protection of capacity. It is obvious that duplicate capabilities exist within the MoD because ownership is prized for its own right, because internal capacity must be retained "just-in-case" (exit) or "to retain the intelligent customer" capability. Sometimes the duplication is accidental simply because of "silo"-limited awareness (e.g. JAMES/JAIMES). Similarly, what should be complimentary or consolidated facilities are separated by management line and dispersed geography. Better co-ordination would ensure earlier delivery (with infrastructure and organisational change in step and deconfliction of projects). Q5: The greatest protection appears to have been within the “decider” rather than the “provider” capability, and this has caused an indirect protection of capacity. It is obvious that duplicate capabilities exist within the MoD because ownership is prized for its own right, because internal capacity must be retained “just-in-case” (exit) or “to retain the intelligent customer” capability. Sometimes the duplication is accidental simply because of “silo”-limited awareness (e.g. JAMES/JAIMES). Similarly, what should be complimentary or consolidated facilities are separated by management line and dispersed geography. Better co-ordination would ensure earlier delivery (with infrastructure and organisational change in step and deconfliction of projects).

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-250 Peter Seib Wed, 09 Feb 2011 15:50:12 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-250 Q4: The facilities and capabilities of the Defence Support Group are unique in the UK and are at threat if privatised, even if transferred to one of the large UK Primes. The inherent costs of maintaining capability will always be at odds with the profit motive. If they are not retained in the current form, they should be transferred to Qinetic or DSTL management. There is a danger of losing UK Prime Contractors (ownership, regeneration capabiliity and associated employment) if their business reputation is harmed by procuring overseas equipment in preference to capable UK-sourced equipment. Q4: The facilities and capabilities of the Defence Support Group are unique in the UK and are at threat if privatised, even if transferred to one of the large UK Primes. The inherent costs of maintaining capability will always be at odds with the profit motive. If they are not retained in the current form, they should be transferred to Qinetic or DSTL management.
There is a danger of losing UK Prime Contractors (ownership, regeneration capabiliity and associated employment) if their business reputation is harmed by procuring overseas equipment in preference to capable UK-sourced equipment.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-249 Peter Seib Wed, 09 Feb 2011 15:49:27 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-249 Q3: Defence and Security requirements develop at short notice in reaction to hostile developments, environmental factors or unexpected attrition (including normal equipment failure). However, the requirements endure until the threat ceases. The critical technologies involved in superiority tend to be characterised by relatively low, sometimes "prototypical" production volumes and intermittent use, yet the capability must often be sustained over many decades (and without foreknowledge of the requirement's life), posing many challenges. The UK must have a standing capability to insert leading edge technology through UORs. Spiral development (as a response to such UORs) requires an immediate and sovereign platform Design Authority and Engineering Authority. Regeneration of earlier capability requires the retention of intellectual property, standing tooling, etc. Such capacity must be retained within UK industry and will reside with platform primes. It is the combination of requiring superiority under time pressure which drives this. Off-the-shelf procurement can meet UORs but will only where parity with other holders of that technology is not a factor. Equally spiral development of platforms (e.g. to re-use or extend capability) over longer time scales does not impose this constraint. The technologies of configuration management, engineering and asset management, inventory planning, logistics planning and financial planning are all critical to the UK military capability (and its cost efficiency). The ability to test, calibrate, keep, deploy and repair militarily unique technologies, such as munitions, battle planning or defence meteorology, must remain sovereign in times of crisis. The ability to test, calibrate or repair essential equipment must be onshore in times of crisis. This is a matter of motivation as much as of control. The ability to maintain UK Secret equipment requires certain facilities to be maintained, even though commercial providers of similar technology exist. The UK must sustain the full range of deployed theatre equipment, some of which will utilise much earlier, otherwise obsolete generations of technology. Craft-based repair of obsolescent but essential equipment, including the ability to craft new examples of obsolete components (e.g. RF semiconductor junctions, older resistors, lens coatings), is essential to sustain without extreme inventory costs. Such repairs are not necessarily a capability which the market will provide. Intermittent volumes and unbounded commercial risk are not attractive investments when combined with the overheads of maintaining a wide range of intellectual property and facilities during long periods of inactivity. The biggest single shortfall across government is the capacity to programme manage and project manage. It a team level the leadership is excellent, but at division level timescale and tenture defeat the necessary drawing of balance and co-ordination of capabilities with programmes. Q3: Defence and Security requirements develop at short notice in reaction to hostile developments, environmental factors or unexpected attrition (including normal equipment failure). However, the requirements endure until the threat ceases. The critical technologies involved in superiority tend to be characterised by relatively low, sometimes “prototypical” production volumes and intermittent use, yet the capability must often be sustained over many decades (and without foreknowledge of the requirement’s life), posing many challenges.
The UK must have a standing capability to insert leading edge technology through UORs. Spiral development (as a response to such UORs) requires an immediate and sovereign platform Design Authority and Engineering Authority. Regeneration of earlier capability requires the retention of intellectual property, standing tooling, etc. Such capacity must be retained within UK industry and will reside with platform primes. It is the combination of requiring superiority under time pressure which drives this. Off-the-shelf procurement can meet UORs but will only where parity with other holders of that technology is not a factor. Equally spiral development of platforms (e.g. to re-use or extend capability) over longer time scales does not impose this constraint.
The technologies of configuration management, engineering and asset management, inventory planning, logistics planning and financial planning are all critical to the UK military capability (and its cost efficiency).
The ability to test, calibrate, keep, deploy and repair militarily unique technologies, such as munitions, battle planning or defence meteorology, must remain sovereign in times of crisis.
The ability to test, calibrate or repair essential equipment must be onshore in times of crisis. This is a matter of motivation as much as of control.
The ability to maintain UK Secret equipment requires certain facilities to be maintained, even though commercial providers of similar technology exist.
The UK must sustain the full range of deployed theatre equipment, some of which will utilise much earlier, otherwise obsolete generations of technology. Craft-based repair of obsolescent but essential equipment, including the ability to craft new examples of obsolete components (e.g. RF semiconductor junctions, older resistors, lens coatings), is essential to sustain without extreme inventory costs. Such repairs are not necessarily a capability which the market will provide. Intermittent volumes and unbounded commercial risk are not attractive investments when combined with the overheads of maintaining a wide range of intellectual property and facilities during long periods of inactivity.
The biggest single shortfall across government is the capacity to programme manage and project manage. It a team level the leadership is excellent, but at division level timescale and tenture defeat the necessary drawing of balance and co-ordination of capabilities with programmes.

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Comment on 2.1.1 Sovereignty – General and Specific Questions by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-1-1-sovereignty-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-248 Peter Seib Mon, 07 Feb 2011 13:42:16 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=180#comment-248 - will UK operational effectiveness be compromised, e.g. by a loss of operational advantage? - will UK autonomy be compromised, e.g. by subjecting deployment to the consent of a third party or losing key technology advantages? - Will the UK be able to regenerate the capability in the future? - Will the UK be able to quickly adapt or integrate new technologies through a UOR process? - Will UK diplomacy be disadvantaged by loss of indigenous capability or national credibility? - Is the current decision "the last straw" i.e. this specific contributes to creating a "critciality" considering aggregate decisions past and expected? - will acquisition contribute to the stability of a significant sector of society? - will UK operational effectiveness be compromised, e.g. by a loss of operational advantage?
- will UK autonomy be compromised, e.g. by subjecting deployment to the consent of a third party or losing key technology advantages?
- Will the UK be able to regenerate the capability in the future?
- Will the UK be able to quickly adapt or integrate new technologies through a UOR process?
- Will UK diplomacy be disadvantaged by loss of indigenous capability or national credibility?
- Is the current decision “the last straw” i.e. this specific contributes to creating a “critciality” considering aggregate decisions past and expected?
- will acquisition contribute to the stability of a significant sector of society?

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Comment on Part One – General Question by Peter Seib http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/part-one-general-question/comment-page-1/#comment-247 Peter Seib Mon, 07 Feb 2011 11:31:17 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=171#comment-247 The 3 Key Principles are sound, however any move back towards "competitive tendering" must be ameliorated by (a) the essential need for supremacy on the battlefield and (b) a full cost accounting approach, including some evaluation of externalities, opportunity costs and the economic effects Defence is a pure "public good", with a single customer and very few UK first tier suppliers. HMG has no mandate to promote or preserve non-UK employment and overseas procurement does not contribute to GDP, GNP or the exchequer. It is performance, affordability and value for money which should be the benchmark. Competition will only be truly effective for commodities and services where there are several purchasers and suppliers. The 3 Key Principles are sound, however any move back towards “competitive tendering” must be ameliorated by

(a) the essential need for supremacy on the battlefield and

(b) a full cost accounting approach, including some evaluation of externalities, opportunity costs and the economic effects

Defence is a pure “public good”, with a single customer and very few UK first tier suppliers. HMG has no mandate to promote or preserve non-UK employment and overseas procurement does not contribute to GDP, GNP or the exchequer. It is performance, affordability and value for money which should be the benchmark.

Competition will only be truly effective for commodities and services where there are several purchasers and suppliers.

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Comment on 4.3 Conclusion by M D F WARR http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/4-3-conclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-246 M D F WARR Tue, 01 Feb 2011 16:44:09 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=402#comment-246 I believe the Consultation paper represents a fair picture of challenges facing Defence and Security. I am pleased that Defence and Security are linked and I am also pleased at the aim to boost the role of small and medium sized enterprises although I am disappointed that mechanisms to show how Primes and SMES can best work together are not well articulated. The Consultation paper fails to lay out the key role of the Ministry of Defence in that it’s the ‘Intelligent keeper’ or ‘Intelligent customer’ and that’s its future objective is principally to manage information and let Industry decide on the methodology and technologies to achieve the desired Capability. It also does not address fault lines in the MOD programme and project management capability nor does it lay out in detail how the MOD should avoid altering specification and changing requirements often unilaterally But its biggest weakness is the failure to acknowledge and address how cultural issues affect the outcome. Nowhere does it provide any guidance on how Military, civil servants and Industry can work together as human beings. This lack of understanding of ‘soft issues’ is a fundamental flaw. In answer to questions Q1. There should be more emphasis on the mechanism to bind the three principles and recognition of how human factors and leadership play a role in determining a best outcome. In terms of Governance I would like to see independent scrutinisers draw from a non defence background especially those with financial and cost experience. Neither Industry nor the MOD can claim that cost estimation and cost management have been applied successfully over the last 20 years or so, Q3. Technical or industrial skills, those especially concerned with the management of secure information and especially those concerned with Cyber should be retained. I believe the Consultation paper represents a fair picture of challenges facing Defence and Security.

I am pleased that Defence and Security are linked and I am also pleased at the aim to boost the role of small and medium sized enterprises although I am disappointed that mechanisms to show how Primes and SMES can best work together are not well articulated.

The Consultation paper fails to lay out the key role of the Ministry of Defence in that it’s the ‘Intelligent keeper’ or ‘Intelligent customer’ and that’s its future objective is principally to manage information and let Industry decide on the methodology and technologies to achieve the desired Capability.

It also does not address fault lines in the MOD programme and project management capability nor does it lay out in detail how the MOD should avoid altering specification and changing requirements often unilaterally

But its biggest weakness is the failure to acknowledge and address how cultural issues affect the outcome. Nowhere does it provide any guidance on how Military, civil servants and Industry can work together as human beings. This lack of understanding of ‘soft issues’ is a fundamental flaw.

In answer to questions

Q1. There should be more emphasis on the mechanism to bind the three principles and recognition of how human factors and leadership play a role in determining a best outcome. In terms of Governance I would like to see independent scrutinisers draw from a non defence background especially those with financial and cost experience. Neither Industry nor the MOD can claim that cost estimation and cost management have been applied successfully over the last 20 years or so,

Q3. Technical or industrial skills, those especially concerned with the management of secure information and especially those concerned with Cyber should be retained.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by Martyn Coleman http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-245 Martyn Coleman Fri, 21 Jan 2011 17:52:40 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-245 To what extent will the Government encourage, indeed insist upon, Defence and Other Government Departments adopting a greater Collaborative Working (CW) ethos, as espoused in the new BS11000. The benefits of CW are proven (see NAO reports into the Defence Fixed Telecommunications Service) and now the standard has been issued, wider adoption by Government together with its industrial supply base should deliver Value for Money for the tax payer alongside affordable capability for Government. To what extent will the Government encourage, indeed insist upon, Defence and Other Government Departments adopting a greater Collaborative Working (CW) ethos, as espoused in the new BS11000. The benefits of CW are proven (see NAO reports into the Defence Fixed Telecommunications Service) and now the standard has been issued, wider adoption by Government together with its industrial supply base should deliver Value for Money for the tax payer alongside affordable capability for Government.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-244 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 11:06:01 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-244 Q49. What specific measures can the Government take to promote greater export success amongst SMEs? One disadvantage of the current CDE method of working is that it virtually ensures that an SME will remain an SME in that that the “valley of death” is bridged by an existing prime. However there are many private venture capitalists who make it their business to grow SMEs into larger companies. This is unlikely to be in the interests of some existing defence primes, but the Government acting as facilitator (as it used to do through the regional development organizations) may be a way to kick start this process. Q49. What specific measures can the Government take to promote greater export success amongst SMEs?

One disadvantage of the current CDE method of working is that it virtually ensures that an SME will remain an SME in that that the “valley of death” is bridged by an existing prime.

However there are many private venture capitalists who make it their business to grow SMEs into larger companies. This is unlikely to be in the interests of some existing defence primes, but the Government acting as facilitator (as it used to do through the regional development organizations) may be a way to kick start this process.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-243 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 11:01:21 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-243 Q48. How should the Government balance the effectiveness of consolidating its purchasing power with the importance of supporting SMEs? The Government is already starting to do this through appointing aggregators such as Babcock (previously VT plc) who take the contract and maximize the savings for the MOD. The challenge with this model today is that they act as a purchasing group only and have only technical capability and project management capability in narrow niches. Expanding the use of such organizations into a “thin prime” role would need a high degree of handholding by for example Dstl personnel. Q48. How should the Government balance the effectiveness of consolidating its purchasing power with the importance of supporting SMEs?

The Government is already starting to do this through appointing aggregators such as Babcock (previously VT plc) who take the contract and maximize the savings for the MOD. The challenge with this model today is that they act as a purchasing group only and have only technical capability and project management capability in narrow niches. Expanding the use of such organizations into a “thin prime” role would need a high degree of handholding by for example Dstl personnel.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-242 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 11:00:56 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-242 Q47. How can Government encourage and ‘champion’ greater pull-through of innovative ideas into applications and contracts? By making greater use of the CDE model approach and seeking a wider engagement through related topics from the TSB and KTN networks. Q47. How can Government encourage and ‘champion’ greater pull-through of
innovative ideas into applications and contracts?

By making greater use of the CDE model approach and seeking a wider engagement through related topics from the TSB and KTN networks.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-241 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 11:00:38 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-241 Q46. Are there any significant obstacles that prevent SMEs from contributing to the development of Defence Standards? Yes, the time, direct and opportunity costs. Most SMEs below a certain size are usually unable to provide the level of personnel commitment that such activities require. Q46. Are there any significant obstacles that prevent SMEs from contributing to the development of Defence Standards?

Yes, the time, direct and opportunity costs. Most SMEs below a certain size are usually unable to provide the level of personnel commitment that such activities require.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-240 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 11:00:14 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-240 Q45. How can the Government encourage greater cooperation between SMEs to form consortia and alliances to increase the competition level? This already happens in other Governmnet areas such as the space industry through calls via the TSB and associated KTNs. This model could be expanded to include for instance a DEW KTN or an EW KTN as modified version of the tower approach but using a mechanism that already successfully exists. Q45. How can the Government encourage greater cooperation between SMEs to form consortia and alliances to increase the competition level?

This already happens in other Governmnet areas such as the space industry through calls via the TSB and associated KTNs. This model could be expanded to include for instance a DEW KTN or an EW KTN as modified version of the tower approach but using a mechanism that already successfully exists.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-239 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 10:59:42 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-239 Q44. In the case of competitive tenders, should bidders, at the ‘preferred bidder’ stage, be required to provide a list of expected sub-contractors, including SMEs? Yes see also my response to Q43. The more important assessment is not necessarily the names of the SMES but that the majority of content ascribed as SME content at the bidder stage should remain so and not be “absorbed” into the prime body of work. It is therefore suggested that rather than Dstl providing an expensive and time consuming audit facility, the prime would simply need to verify to the MOD that in previous implementations of an award the prime had used some or all of the SME content that it presented at the bidders conference and whose engagement was a factor in the contract award to that prime. Q44. In the case of competitive tenders, should bidders, at the ‘preferred bidder’ stage, be required to provide a list of expected sub-contractors, including SMEs?

Yes see also my response to Q43. The more important assessment is not necessarily the names of the SMES but that the majority of content ascribed as SME content at the bidder stage should remain so and not be “absorbed” into the prime body of work.

It is therefore suggested that rather than Dstl providing an expensive and time consuming audit facility, the prime would simply need to verify to the MOD that in previous implementations of an award the prime had used some or all of the SME content that it presented at the bidders conference and whose engagement was a factor in the contract award to that prime.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-238 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 10:56:29 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-238 Q43. Should prime contractors be required to measure the percentage of work placed with SMEs and to report this to Government? Not necessarily, since this is unlikely to achieve anything constructive and such figures can be massaged to represent an incorrect picture or lead to the appointment of “token” SMEs. It is better to provide encouragement and selection of primes to use SMEs at ITT placement by ascertaining the proportion of SME content within a tender response. This proportion of SME involvement can then be part of the tender approval process. Verification of the SME content could then be made at project meetings and alignment to the ITT responses verified without any additional auditing overhead. Financial non-compliance penalties or non-award of future contracts, are tools which the MOD could then impose if it was felt necessary. Q43. Should prime contractors be required to measure the percentage of work placed with SMEs and to report this to Government?

Not necessarily, since this is unlikely to achieve anything constructive and such figures can be massaged to represent an incorrect picture or lead to the appointment of “token” SMEs. It is better to provide encouragement and selection of primes to use SMEs at ITT placement by ascertaining the proportion of SME content within a tender response. This proportion of SME involvement can then be part of the tender approval process. Verification of the SME content could then be made at project meetings and alignment to the ITT responses verified without any additional auditing overhead.

Financial non-compliance penalties or non-award of future contracts, are tools which the MOD could then impose if it was felt necessary.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-237 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 10:53:58 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-237 Q42. Should MOD’s prime contractors be required to advertise competitive subcontract opportunities in the Defence Contracts Bulletin and on-line portals? Yes. It is hoped that the new web portal “Contracts Finder” will, as from March 2011, facilitate this not only for the MOD and other government departments but also for primes who have been awarded contracts by the MOD Q42. Should MOD’s prime contractors be required to advertise competitive subcontract opportunities in the Defence Contracts Bulletin and on-line portals?

Yes. It is hoped that the new web portal “Contracts Finder” will, as from March 2011, facilitate this not only for the MOD and other government departments but also for primes who have been awarded contracts by the MOD

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-236 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 10:53:32 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-236 Q40. Should new requirements be exposed to industry at an earlier stage, potentially to allow SMEs and innovators to propose ‘non-traditional’ solutions? Definitely. The methodology used by the CDE wherein the problem is articulated clearly but no solution or potential solution is proffered provides the best type of potential engagement, since it exposes the MOD to potentially “out of the box” ideas that can lead to more satisfactory and cost-effective problem solutions. Q40. Should new requirements be exposed to industry at an earlier stage, potentially to allow SMEs and innovators to propose ‘non-traditional’ solutions?

Definitely. The methodology used by the CDE wherein the problem is articulated clearly but no solution or potential solution is proffered provides the best type of potential engagement, since it exposes the MOD to potentially “out of the box” ideas that can lead to more satisfactory and cost-effective problem solutions.

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Comment on 2.3.2 Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – General and Specific Questions by John O'Brien http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/2010/12/20/2-3-2-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises-smes-general-and-specific-questions/comment-page-1/#comment-235 John O'Brien Fri, 21 Jan 2011 10:52:50 +0000 http://defenceconsultations.org.uk/?p=200#comment-235 Q39. How can the Government manage better the risks associated with procurement from SMEs? It would be useful to identify the risks associated with the use of any company irrespective of size and then identify the mitigation of those risks paying specific attention to SMEs. The principal areas of risk when contracting with any company are: 1. Competence in the discipline 2. Under estimate of effort needed 3. Over-commitment of resources 4. Fiscal prudence 5. Retention of key personnel 6. Overcharging the MOD 7. Undercharging the MOD In working with any SME items 2, 3, 4, 5 6 and 7 above are the more likely risk areas and from these the major risks are in areas around item 4. Cashflow is the single largest problem for an SME and the single most likely cause of company failure. Therefore having suitable regular, small payments will assist in ameliorating this issue which also is a major contributory aspect to other failures within the SME. Currently the CDE process limits the financial engagement of SMEs with the MOD generally to sums of less than £100k. This therefore minimizes the financial risk to MOD and ensures that the MOD has time to build up a good understanding of how any particular SME responds in areas 2 through 7 above. Today a successful CDE innovative project/partnership would be handed on to a prime such as BAE in the event that it reaches TRL 5 or 6 for implementation and delivery in order to bridge the “valley of death”. Using a commercial company conversant in the art, skills, demands and pitfalls of a particular development project, and which is sufficiently large to underwrite the risk for the MOD maybe a way forward, providing IPR and payment terms are sufficiently flexible. At the same time the chosen company should not pose a competitive threat to the existence of or the technology from the SME. Examples abound in this type of approach with companies that specialize in this area of third party contracting and include Serco, Babcock, QinetiQ amongst others. Q39. How can the Government manage better the risks associated with procurement from SMEs?

It would be useful to identify the risks associated with the use of any company irrespective of size and then identify the mitigation of those risks paying specific attention to SMEs.

The principal areas of risk when contracting with any company are:
1. Competence in the discipline
2. Under estimate of effort needed
3. Over-commitment of resources
4. Fiscal prudence
5. Retention of key personnel
6. Overcharging the MOD
7. Undercharging the MOD

In working with any SME items 2, 3, 4, 5 6 and 7 above are the more likely risk areas and from these the major risks are in areas around item 4. Cashflow is the single largest problem for an SME and the single most likely cause of company failure. Therefore having suitable regular, small payments will assist in ameliorating this issue which also is a major contributory aspect to other failures within the SME.

Currently the CDE process limits the financial engagement of SMEs with the MOD generally to sums of less than £100k. This therefore minimizes the financial risk to MOD and ensures that the MOD has time to build up a good understanding of how any particular SME responds in areas 2 through 7 above.

Today a successful CDE innovative project/partnership would be handed on to a prime such as BAE in the event that it reaches TRL 5 or 6 for implementation and delivery in order to bridge the “valley of death”.

Using a commercial company conversant in the art, skills, demands and pitfalls of a particular development project, and which is sufficiently large to underwrite the risk for the MOD maybe a way forward, providing IPR and payment terms are sufficiently flexible. At the same time the chosen company should not pose a competitive threat to the existence of or the technology from the SME. Examples abound in this type of approach with companies that specialize in this area of third party contracting and include Serco, Babcock, QinetiQ amongst others.

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